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In search of the ontology of quantum mechanics
Shan Gao
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This book is dedicated to Erwin Schro¨dinger, who introduced the wave function,
discovered the equation named after him, and had been attempting to find the on-
tology of quantum mechanics throughout the rest of his life.
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Preface
The meaning of the wave function has been a hot topic of debate since the early
days of quantum mechanics. Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in this
long-standing question.1 Is the wave function ontic, directly representing a state
of reality, or epistemic, merely representing a state of (incomplete) knowledge, or
something else? If the wave function is not ontic, then what, if any, is the underlying
state of reality? If the wave function is indeed ontic, then exactly what physical
state does it represent?
In this book, I aim to make sense of the wave function in quantum mechanics and
find the ontological content of the theory. The book can be divided into three parts.
The first part addresses the question of the nature of the wave function (Chapters
1-5). After giving a comprehensive and critical review of the competing views of
the wave function, I present a new argument for the ontic view in terms of protec-
tive measurements. In addition, I also analyze the origin of the wave function by
deriving the free Schro¨dinger equation. The second part analyzes the ontological
meaning of the wave function (Chapters 6, 7). I propose a new ontological interpre-
tation of the wave function in terms of random discontinuous motion of particles,
and give two main arguments supporting this interpretation. The third part inves-
tigates whether the suggested quantum ontology is complete in accounting for our
definite experience and whether it needs to be revised in the relativistic domain
(Chapters 8, 9).
The idea of random discontinuous motion of particles came to my mind when
I was a postgraduate at the Institute of Electronics, Chinese Academy of Sciences
in 1993. I am happy that finally it has a more logical and satisfying formulation
in this book. During the past twenty years, I have benefited from interactions and
1 See, e.g. Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph (2012), Ney and Albert (2013), and Gao (2014a, 2015b).
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discussions with many physicists and philosophers of physics who care about the
way the world really is. They are: Steve Adler, Guido Bacciagaluppi, Jeremy But-
terfield, Tian Yu Cao, Ze-Xian Cao, Eli Cohen, Lajos Dio´si, Bernard d’Espagnat,
Arthur Fine, Shelly Goldstein, Guang-Can Guo, Bob Griffiths, Basil Hiley, Richard
Healey, Jenann Ismael, Adrian Kent, Vincent Lam, Tony Leggett, Matt Leifer, Peter
Lewis, Chuang Liu, David Miller, Owen Maroney, Wayne Myrvold, Philip Pearle,
Roger Penrose, Matt Pusey, Huw Price, Alastair Rae, Dean Rickles, Abner Shi-
mony, Max Schlosshauer, Lee Smolin, Antoine Suarez, Hans Westman, Ken Whar-
ton, Ling-An Wu, Jos Uffink, Lev Vaidman, and H. Dieter Zeh, among others. I
thank them all deeply.
I would like to thank Steve Adler, Guido Bacciagaluppi, Eli Cohen, Vincent
Lam, David Miller, Owen Maroney, and Dean Rickles for reading through some
parts of an early draft of this manuscript and providing helpful suggestions for im-
proving it. I also wish to express my warm thanks to all participants of First iWork-
shop on the Meaning of the Wave Function and Quantum Foundations Workshop
2015, which were both hosted by International Journal of Quantum Foundations
and in which the main ideas of this book were discussed.2 I thank Simon Capelin
of Cambridge University Press for his kind support as I worked on this project,
and the referees who gave helpful suggestions on how the work could best serve its
targeted audience.
During the writing of this book, I have been assisted by research funding from
the Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China, Chinese Academy of
Sciences, and the Institute for the History of Natural Sciences, Chinese Academy
of Sciences. Some parts of this book were written when I taught The Philosophy
of Quantum Mechanics to the postgraduates at the University of Chinese Academy
of Sciences. I thank the International Conference Center of the University for pro-
viding comfortable accommodation.
Finally, I am deeply indebted to my parents, Qingfeng Gao and Lihua Zhao, my
wife Huixia and my daughter Ruiqi for their unflagging love and support; this book
would have been simply impossible without them. Moreover, they have never let
me forget the true values of life.
Shan Gao
Beijing
May 2016
2 See http://www.ijqf.org/ for more information about the workshops.
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Quantum mechanics and experience
Quantum mechanics is an extremely successful physical theory due to its accurate
empirical predictions. The core of the theory, which is contained in various non-
relativistic quantum theories, is the Schro¨dinger equation and the Born rule.1 The
Schro¨dinger equation governs the time evolution of the wave function assigned to
a physical system, and the Born rule connects the wave function with the proba-
bilities of possible results of a measurement on the system. In this chapter, I will
introduce the core of quantum mechanics, especially the connections of its mathe-
matical formalism with experience. The introduction is not intended to be complete
but enough for the later analysis of the meaning of the wave function and the onto-
logical content of quantum mechanics.
1.1 The mathematical formalism
The mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics is mainly composed of two
parts. The first part assigns a mathematical object, the so-called wave function or
quantum state, to a physical system appropriately prepared at a given instant.2 The
second part specifies how the wave function evolves with time. The evolution of
the wave function is governed by the Schro¨dinger equation, whose concrete form
is determined by the properties of the system and its interactions with environment.
There are two common representations for the wave function: the Hilbert space
representation and the configuration space representation, which have their respec-
tive advantages. According to the Hilbert space representation, the wave function
is an unit vector or state vector in a Hilbert space, usually denoted by |ψ(t)〉 with
1 An apparent exception is collapse theories (Ghirardi, 2016). In these theories, however, the additional
collapse term in the revised Schro¨dinger equation is so tiny for microscopic systems that it can be ignored in
analyzing the ontological status and meaning of the wave function.
2 It is worth noting that although all quantum theories assign the same wave function to an isolated physical
system, different quantum theories, such as no-collapse theories and collapse theories, may assign different
wave functions to a non-isolated physical system. The assignment, which depends on the concrete laws of
motion in the theory, does not influence the ontological status and meaning of the wave function.
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Dirac’s bracket notation. The Hilbert space is a complete vector space with scalar
product, and its dimension and structure depend on the particular system. For ex-
ample, the Hilbert space associated with a composite system is the tensor product
of the Hilbert spaces associated with the systems of which it is composed.3
This structure of the Hilbert space can be seen more clearly from the configura-
tion space representation. The configuration space of an N-body quantum system
has 3N dimensions, and each point in the space can be specified by an ordered 3N-
tuple, where each group of three coordinates are position coordinates of each sub-
system in three-dimensional space. The wave function of the system is a complex
function on this configuration space,4 and it can be written as ψ(x1, y1, z1, ..., xN , yN , zN , t),
where xi, yi, zi are coordinates of the i-th subsystem in the 3N-dimensional config-
uration space. Moreover, the wave function is normalized, namely the integral of
the modulus squared of the wave function over the whole space is one. When the
N subsystems are independent, the whole wave function can be decomposed as the
product of the wave functions of the N subsystems, each of which lives in three-
dimensional space.
For an N-body quantum system, there are also a 3N-dimensional space and wave
functions on the space for other properties of the system besides position. For ex-
ample, the momentum space of an N-body system is a 3N-dimensional space pa-
rameterized by 3N momentum coordinates, and the momentum wave function is
a complex function on this space. Here the Hilbert space representation is more
convenient. Every measurable property or observable of a physical system is rep-
resented by a Hermitian operator on the Hilbert space associated with the system,
and the wave functions for different properties such as position and momentum
may be transformed into each other by considering the relationship between the
corresponding operators of these properties.
The second part of the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics specifies
how the wave function assigned to a physical system evolves with time. The time
evolution of the wave function, |ψ(t)〉, is governed by the Schro¨dinger equation
i~
∂ |ψ(t)〉
∂t
= H |ψ(t)〉 , (1.1)
where ~ is Planck’s constant divided by 2pi, and H is the Hamiltonian operator that
depends on the energy properties of the system. The time evolution is linear and
unitary in the sense that the Hamiltonian is independent of the evolving wave func-
tion and it keeps the normalization of the wave function unchanged. The concrete
3 Similarly, the Hilbert space associated with independent properties is the tensor product of the Hilbert spaces
associated with each property.
4 To be consistent with convention, I will also say “the wave function of a physical system”, but it still means
“the wave function assigned to a physical system”.
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forms of the Hamiltonian and the Schro¨dinger equation depend on the studied sys-
tem and its interactions with other systems in the environment. For example, the
wave function of an electron evolving in an external potential obeys the following
Schro¨dinger equation:
i~
∂ψ(x, y, z, t)
∂t
= [− ~
2
2m
∇2 + V(x, y, z, t)]ψ(x, y, z, t), (1.2)
where ψ(x, y, z, t) is the wave function of the electron, m is the mass of the electron,
and V(x, y, z, t) is the external potential.
1.2 The Born rule
What is the empirical content of quantum mechanics? Or how does the wave func-
tion assigned to a physical system relate to the results of measurements on the sys-
tem? The well-known connection rule is the Born rule, which has been precisely
tested by experiments. It says that a (projective) measurement of an observable A
on a system with the wave function |ψ〉 will randomly obtain one of the eigenvalues
of A, and the probability of obtaining an eigenvalue ai is given by |〈ai|ψ〉|2, where
|ai〉 is the eigenstate corresponding to the eigenvalue ai.
The Born rule can also be formulated in the language of configuration space. It
says that the integral of the modulus squared of the wave function over a certain
region of the configuration space associated with a property of a physical system
gives the probability of the measurement of the property of the system obtaining the
values inside the region. For example, for a physical system whose wave function
is ψ(x, y, z, t), |ψ(x, y, z, t)|2dxdydz represents the probability of a position measure-
ment on the system obtaining a result between (x, y, z) and (x + dx, y + dy, z + dz),
and |ψ(x, y, z, t)|2 is the corresponding probability density in position (x, y, z). Sim-
ilarly, for an N-body system whose wave function is ψ(x1, y1, z1, ..., xN , yN , zN , t),
|ψ(x1, y1, z1, ..., xN , yN , zN , t)|2 represents the probability density that a position mea-
surement on the first subsystem obtains result (x1, y1, z1) and a position measure-
ment on the second subsystem obtains result (x2, y2, z2) ... and a position measure-
ment on the N-th subsystem obtains result (xN , yN , zN).
The Born rule provides a probabilistic connection between the wave function
and the results of measurements. However, it may be not the only connection rule,
as the involved measurements are only one kind of measurements, the projective
measurements. In order to know whether there are other possible connections be-
tween quantum mechanics and experience, we need to analyze measurements in
more detail.
A measurement is an interaction between a measured system and a measuring
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device. It can be described by using the standard von Neumann procedure. Sup-
pose the wave function of the measured system is |ψ〉 at a given instant t = 0, and
the initial wave function of the pointer of a measuring device at t = 0 is a Gaus-
sian wavepacket of very small width w0 centered in initial position x0, denoted by
|φ(x0)〉. The total Hamiltonian of the combined system can be written as
H = HS + HD + HI , (1.3)
where HS and HD are the free Hamiltonians of the measured system and the mea-
suring device, respectively, and HI is the interaction Hamiltonian coupling the mea-
sured system to the measuring device, which can be further written as
HI = g(t)PA, (1.4)
where P is the momentum of the pointer of the measuring device, A is the mea-
sured observable, and g(t) represents the time-dependent coupling strength of the
interaction, which is a smooth function normalized to
∫
dtg(t) = 1 during the mea-
surement interval τ, and g(0) = g(τ) = 0.
It has been known that there are different types of measurements, depending on
the interaction strength and time and whether the measured system is appropri-
ately protected etc. The most common measurements are projective measurements
involved in the Born rule. For a projective measurement, the interaction HI is of
very short duration and so strong that it dominates the rest of the Hamiltonian, and
thus the effect of the free Hamiltonians of the measuring device and the measured
system can be neglected. Then the state of the combined system at the end of the
interaction can be written as
|t = τ〉 = e− i~ PA |ψ〉 |φ(x0)〉 . (1.5)
By expanding |ψ〉 in the eigenstates of A, |ai〉, we obtain
|t = τ〉 =
∑
i
e−
i
~ Paici |ai〉 |φ(x0)〉 , (1.6)
where ci are the expansion coefficients. The exponential term shifts the center of
the pointer by ai:
|t = τ〉 =
∑
i
ci |ai〉 |φ(x0 + ai)〉 . (1.7)
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This is an entangled state, where the eigenstates of A with eigenvalues ai are corre-
lated to the measuring device states in which the pointer is shifted by these eigen-
values ai.
The Born rule tells us (and we also know by experience) that the result of this
projective measurement is one of the eigenvalues of the measured observable, say
ai, with probability |ci|2. However, we still don’t know whether this entangled su-
perposition is the final state of the combining system after the measurement.5 The
appearance of the definite result seems apparently incompatible with the super-
posed state. This is the notorious measurement problem. I will try to solve this
problem in Chapter 8.
1.3 A definite connection with experience
It is not surprising that since the interaction between the measured system and the
measuring device is very strong during a projective measurement, the measurement
disturbs the measured system and changes its wave function greatly. This is not a
good measurement. A good measurement is required not to disturb the state of the
measured system so that it can measure the realistic properties of the system. This
is only possible for projective measurements when the initial state of the measured
system is an eigenstate of the measured observable. In this case, the final state of
the combining system is not an entangled state but a product state such as:
|t = τ〉 = |ai〉 |φ(x0 + ai)〉 . (1.8)
According to the Born rule, this projective measurement obtains a definite result
ai.
A general way to make a good measurement is to protect the measured state
from being changed when the measurement is being made. A universial protec-
tion scheme is via the quantum Zeno effect (Aharonov, Anandan and Vaidman,
1993).6 Let us see how this can be done. We make projective measurements of an
observable O, of which the measured state |ψ〉 is an nondegenerate eigenstate, a
large number of times which are dense in a very short measurement interval [0, τ].
For example, O is measured in [0, τ] at times tn = (n/N)τ, n = 1, 2, ...,N, where
5 In other words, it is still unknown how the wave function evolves during a projective measurement. In
standard quantum mechanics, which is formulated by Dirac (1930) and von Neumann (1932), it is assumed
that after a projective measurement of an observable the entangled superposition formed by the Schro¨dinger
evolution collapses to one of the eigenstates of the observable that corresponds to the result of the
measurement. This assumption is called the collapse postulate. For a helpful introduction of standard
quantum mechanics for philosophers see Ismael (2015).
6 Another protection scheme is to introduce a protective potential such that the measured wave function of a
quantum system is a nondegenerate energy eigenstate of the Hamiltonian of the system with finite gap to
neighboring energy eigenstates (Aharonov and Vaidman, 1993). By this scheme, the measurement of an
observable is required to be weak and adiabatic.
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N is an arbitrarily large number. At the same time, we make the same projective
measurement of an observable A in the interval [0, τ] as in the last section, which
is described by the interaction Hamiltonian (1.4).
As noted before, since the interaction HI is of very short duration and so strong
that it dominates the rest of the Hamiltonian, the effect of the free Hamiltonians of
the measuring device and the measured system can be neglected. Then the branch
of the state of the combined system after τ, in which each projective measurement
of O results in the state of the measured system being in |ψ〉, is given by
|t = τ〉 = |ψ〉 〈ψ|e− i~ τN H(tN )... |ψ〉 〈ψ|e− i~ τN H(t2) |ψ〉 〈ψ|e− i~ τN H(t1) |ψ〉 |φ(x0)〉
= |ψ〉 〈ψ|e− i~ τN g(tN )PA... |ψ〉 〈ψ|e− i~ τN g(t2)PA |ψ〉 〈ψ|e− i~ τN g(t1)PA |ψ〉 |φ(x0)〉 ,
(1.9)
where |φ(x0)〉 is the initial wave function of the pointer of the measuring device,
which is supposed to be a Gaussian wavepacket of very small width centered in
initial position x0.
Thus in the limit of N → ∞, we have
|t = τ〉 = |ψ〉 e− i~
∫ τ
0 g(t)〈ψ|A|ψ〉Pdt |φ(x0)〉 = |ψ〉 |φ(x0 + 〈A〉)〉 , (1.10)
where 〈A〉 ≡ 〈ψ|A|ψ〉 is the expectation value of A in the measured state |ψ〉. Since
the modulus squared of the amplitude of this branch approaches one when N → ∞,
this state will be the state of the combined system after τ.7 It can be seen that after
the measurement, the measuring device state and the system state are not entangled,
and the pointer of the measuring device is shifted by the expectation value 〈A〉.8
This demonstrates that for an arbitrary state of a quantum system at a given
instant, we can protect the state from being changed via the quantum Zeno effect,
and a projective measurement of an observable, which is made at the same time,
yields a definite measurement result, the expectation value of the observable in
the measured state. Such measurements have been called protective measurements
(Aharonov and Vaidman, 1993; Aharonov, Anandan and Vaidman, 1993; Vaidman,
2009).
7 It is worth noting that the possible collapse of the wave function resulting from the projective measurements
of O does not influence this result. The reason is that the probability of the measured state collapsing to
another state different from |ψ〉 after each projective measurement of O is proportional to 1/N2, and thus the
sum of these probabilities is proportional to 1/N after τ and approaches zero when N → ∞. Moreover, since
the pointer of a measuring device may be a microscopic system, whose shift can be further read out by
another measuring device, the effect of the possible collapse of the wave function resulting from the
projective measurements of A can also be ignored.
8 Note that after the measurement the pointer wavepacket does not spread, and the width of the wavepacket is
the same as the initial width. This ensures that the pointer shift can represent a valid measurement result.
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In fact, it can be shown that if the measured state is not changed during a pro-
jective measurement, then the result must be the expectation value of the measured
observable in the measured state. In this case, the evolution of the state of the com-
bined system is
|ψ(0)〉 |φ(0)〉 → |ψ(t)〉 |φ(t)〉 , t > 0, (1.11)
where |φ(0)〉 and |φ(t)〉 are the states of the measuring device at instants 0 and t,
respectively, |ψ(0)〉 and |ψ(t)〉 are the states of the measured system at instants 0
and t, respectively, and |ψ(t)〉 is the same as |ψ(0)〉 up to a phase factor during
the measurement interval [0, τ]. The interaction Hamiltonian is still given by (1.4).
Then by Ehrenfest’s theorem we have
d
dt
〈ψ(t)φ(t)|X |ψ(t)φ(t)〉 = g(t)〈ψ(0)|A |ψ(0)〉 , (1.12)
where X is the pointer variable. This further leads to
〈φ(τ)|X |φ(τ)〉 − 〈φ(0)|X |φ(0)〉 = 〈ψ(0)|A |ψ(0)〉 , (1.13)
which means that the shift of the center of the pointer of the measuring device is the
expectation value of the measured observable in the measured state. This clearly
demonstrates that the result of a measurement which does not disturb the measured
state is the expectation value of the measured observable in the measured state.
Since the wave function can be reconstructed from the expectation values of a
sufficient number of observables, the wave function of a single quantum system
can be measured by a series of protective measurements. Let the explicit form of
the measured state at a given instant t be ψ(x), and the measured observable A be
(normalized) projection operators on small spatial regions Vn having volume vn:
A =
 1vn , if x ∈ Vn,0, if x < Vn. (1.14)
A protective measurement of A then yields
〈A〉 = 1
vn
∫
Vn
|ψ(x)|2dv, (1.15)
which is the average of the density ρ(x) = |ψ(x)|2 over the small region Vn. Sim-
ilarly, we can measure another observable B = ~2mi (A∇ + ∇A). The measurement
yields
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〈B〉 = 1
vn
∫
Vn
~
2mi
(ψ∗∇ψ − ψ∇ψ∗)dv = 1
vn
∫
Vn
j(x)dv. (1.16)
This is the average value of the flux density j(x) in the region Vn. Then when
vn → 0 and after performing measurements in sufficiently many regions Vn we can
measure ρ(x) and j(x) everywhere in space. Since the wave function ψ(x, t) can be
uniquely expressed by ρ(x, t) and j(x, t) (except for an overall phase factor), the
whole wave function of the measured system at a given instant can be measured by
protective measurements.
Protective measurements provide a definite, direct connection between the wave
function assigned to a physical system and the results of measurements on the sys-
tem, and the connection is only determined by the linear Schro¨dinger evolution.9
As I will argue later in this book, although this connection seems less well-known,
it will be extremely important for understanding the meaning of the wave function
and searching for the ontology of quantum mechanics.
9 Note that besides the wave function there are also state-independent quantities such as m (mass) and Q
(charge) in the Schro¨dinger equation, and the measurement of such a quantity will obtain a definite result.
This is also a definite, direct connection between the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics and
experience.
2
The wave function: ontic vs epistemic
The mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics and its connections with expe-
rience are the starting point of our search for the ontology of quantum mechanics.
The theory admits the mind-independent existence of a physical world, which con-
tains various physical systems. Moreover, it assigns a wave function to each appro-
priately prepared physical system, and states the relationship of the wave function
with the results of measurements on the system. But the theory does not tell us
what a physical system ontologically is, and especially, what the connection of the
wave function with the ontic state of the system is. Does the wave function directly
represent the ontic state of a physical system? Or does it merely represent the state
of (incomplete) knowledge about the ontic state of the system? In short, is the wave
function ontic or epistemic? We need to first answer this question in order to find
the ontological content of quantum mechanics. But wait, is there such a thing like
the ontic state of a physical system such as an atom?
2.1 There is an underlying reality
There is an argument for a negative answer to the above question, which is due to
Bohr. It is based on the concepts of entanglement and nonseparability between sys-
tem and device during a measurement (Bohr, 1948; Faye, 2014). Bohr believed that
atoms are real, but he would not attribute intrinsic and measurement-independent
state properties to atomic objects (Faye, 1991). Moreover, he did not regard the
wave function as a description of something physically real. According to Bohr,
the distinction between the measured system and the measuring device is a nec-
essary condition for a measurement to reveal information about the properties of
the system. Concretely speaking, in order to measure the properties of the mea-
sured system, it must be assumed that the system possesses an independent state,
which is in principle distinguishable from the state of the measuring device with
which it interacts. However, a quantum-mechanical treatment of the interaction
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between the measured system and the measuring device will make the very dis-
tinction ambiguous, since it requires that the combining system must be described
by a single inseparable entangled state. Therefore, according to Bohr, the impos-
sibility of “separating the behaviour of the objects from their interaction with the
measuring instruments” in quantum mechanics “implies an ambiguity in assign-
ing conventional attributes to atomic objects” (Bohr, 1948; see also Camilleri and
Schlosshauer, 2015).
It can be argued that there are several loopholes in the above argument. First
of all, it is possible that microscopic objects have some properties that cannot be
measured. Thus the unmeasurability of certain properties does not necessarily ex-
clude the existence of these properties. Next, the above argument only applies to
certain kinds of measurements such as projective measurements, which lead to in-
evitable entanglement and nonseparability between the measured system and the
measuring device. It is indeed true that such a measurement disturbs the measured
system and changes its state, and thus the result does not reflect the properties of
the measured system even if they exist. However, the argument does not apply to
protective measurements, during which there is no entanglement and nonseparabil-
ity. Thirdly, even for projective measurements, the above argument does not hold
true when the measured system is in an eigenstate of the measured observable.
In this case, there is no entanglement and nonseparability between the measured
system and the measuring device during the measurement either. Finally, if quan-
tum mechanics is universal,1 then the above argument also applies to macroscopic
objects including measuring devices. Therefore, if the argument is valid, then mea-
suring devices will have no properties either. This contradicts the presupposition
that measuring devices can obtain definite results, and in particular, the pointers of
measuring devices have definite positions.
Certainly, even if there are no convincing arguments, one may also assume that
a microscopic object has no properties, e.g. the properties that determine the result
of a measurement on it. It has been suggested that the behaviour of microscopic
objects falls under no law and they do not properly admit of direct description
(Timpson, 2008; Fuchs, 2011). This view seems reasonable when the measure-
ments of microscopic objects yield only random results. But even for projective
measurements, when the measured system is in an eigenstate of the measured ob-
servable, the measurement result is not random, but definite. In this case, this view
cannot explain the definite measurement result. In fact, even for projective mea-
surements whose results are random, this view cannot explain the probabilities of
different measurement results either. In addition, according to Timpson (2008), this
view cannot provide an explanation of why macroscopic objects have the kinds of
1 It seems that Bohr did not exclude the application of quantum mechanics to any system (Faye, 2014).
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physical properties that they do in virtue of the properties their constituents pos-
sess, since it does not ascribe properties to microscopic objects along with laws
describing how they behave.
Besides this explanatory deficit problem, it can be argued that the above view
has a more serious inconsistency problem. An observation of the position of the
pointer of a measuring device obtains a definite result (without disturbing it), and
the result indicates that the pointer has a definite position. This is the very reason
why we assume macroscopic objects including the pointers of measuring devices
have definite properties. Now if we can measure a microscopic object without dis-
turbing it and also obtain a definite result as for protective measurements, then
why cannot we ascribe properties to these objects? It will be inconsistent if we do
not ascribe properties to microscopic objects in this case.2 In fact, if quantum me-
chanics is universal and can be applied to any physical system, then microscopic
objects will have the same ontological status as macroscopic objects. Therefore, if
macroscopic objects have properties (that can be measured by a measuring device),
so do microscopic objects. Note that denying macroscopic objects have properties
that we can experience will slip into solipsism for all practical purposes (see also
Norsen, 2016).
Last but not least, it is worth noting that whether or not microscopic objects
have properties related to their states, it is arguable that they at least have some
state-independent properties such as mass and charge. This is clearly indicated
by the Schro¨dinger equation that governs the evolution of microscopic objects, in
which there are quantities m and Q. Moreover, these properties also determine the
results of the measurements on them, which are definite and involve no quantum
randomness.
2.2 The ψ-epistemic view
I have argued that there is an underlying reality in the sense that microscopic ob-
jects such as atoms, like our familiar macroscopic objects, also have state properties
or an underlying ontic state (which can be measured). However, it is still possible
that the wave function, the key mathematical object of quantum mechanics, does
not directly represent the underlying reality. Concretely speaking, the wave func-
tion assigned to a physical system may not represent the ontic state of the system,
but merely represent a state of (incomplete) knowledge – an epistemic state – about
the ontic state of the system. There are indeed some heuristic arguments against the
2 Similarly, when considering the existence of protective measurements, if classical mechanics can attribute
intrinsic and observation-independent state properties to macroscopic objects, then quantum mechanics can
also attribute intrinsic and observation-independent state properties to microscopic objects.
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ψ-ontic view and supporting the (realist) ψ-epistemic view.3 In the following, I will
examine these arguments.
2.2.1 Multidimensionality
The first sign of the non-reality of the wave function is that the space it lives on
is not three-dimensional but multidimensional. If a physical system consists of
N subsystems, then the space in which its wave function is defined, namely the
configuration space of the system, will be 3N-dimensional.
When Schro¨dinger first introduced the wave function for a two-body system, he
already worried about its reality:
The direct interpretation of this wave function of six variables in three-dimensional space
meets, at any rate initially, with difficulties of an abstract nature. (Schro¨dinger, 1926a, p.39)
Einstein expressed the same doubt:
The field in a many-dimensional coordinate space does not smell like something real. (Ein-
stein, 1926)
Later, after failing to develop a satisfactory ontology for the wave function, Schro¨dinger
also conceded this point when writing to Einstein:
I am long past the stage where I thought that one can consider the w-function as somehow
a direct description of reality. (Schro¨dinger, 1935a)
Interestingly, the multidimensionality of configuration space also made Bohm doubt
the reality of the wave function in the initial phase of formulating his theory:
While our theory can be extended formally in a logically consistent way by introducing the
concept of a wave in a 3N-dimensional space, it is evident that this procedure is not really
acceptable in a physical theory, and should at least be regarded as an artifice that one uses
provisionally until one obtains a better theory in which everything is expressed once more
in ordinary three-dimensional space. (Bohm, 1957, p.117)
However, although the multidimensionality of configuration space may pose a
serious difficulty for wave function realism (Albert, 1996, 2013), which regards
the wave function as a physical field in configuration space, it does not lead to
difficulties when interpreting the wave function as a representation of a property
of particles in three-dimensional space (Monton, 2002, 2013; Lewis, 2013, 2016;
3 It is worth noting that there are two different ψ-epistemic views. One is the realist ψ-epistemic view, which
will be discussed below. The other is the operationalist ψ-epistemic view, which regards the wave function of
a quantum system as representing a state of incomplete knowledge about which outcome will occur if a
measurement is made on the system. A further development of this view is QBism (Caves, Fuchs and
Schack, 2002; Fuchs, 2011), according to which the Born probabilities are subjective even for probability
one. This subjective Bayesian account of quantum mechanical probability has been debated by Timpson
(2008) and Stairs (2011). As argued in the last section, this view is also plagued by the explanatory deficit
problem etc (see Marchildon, 2004; Timpson, 2008).
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Gao, 2014b).4 Therefore, the above analysis does not consititute a decisive argu-
ment supporting the ψ-epistemic view and against the ψ-ontic view.
2.2.2 Collapse of the wave function
Besides the multidimensional form of the wave function, the laws that govern the
evolution of the wave function seem to also suggest its non-reality.
Recall that there are two distinct evolution laws in standard quantum mechanics.
When a physical system is not being measured, its wave function evolves contin-
uously according to the Schro¨dinger equation. On the other hand, according to the
collapse postulate, if a (projective) measurement is made on the system, the origi-
nal wave function will instantaneously and discontinuously be updated by the wave
function corresponding to the measurement result. It has been a hot topic of debate
how to explain or explain away the collapse of the wave function.
It seems that the ψ-epistemic view may provide a natural explanation of the
collapse of the wave function (Leifer, 2014a). If the wave function does not directly
represent a state of reality but merely represent a state of incomplete knowledge
about reality, namely if the wave function is not ontic but epistemic, then it seems
that the collapse of the wave function can be readily explained as the effect of
acquiring new information, no more mysterious than the updating of a classical
probability distribution when new data is obtained. For example, in Schro¨dinger’s
cat thought experiment, the cat may be definitely dead or alive before we observe
it, and the superposition of dead and alive cats we assign to it may simply reflect
the fact that we do not know the actual state of the cat. Then after we observe the
cat and know whether it is dead or alive, the superposition will naturally be updated
by the state corresponding to the dead or alive cat.
There is evidence that Einstein once supported this explanation of the collapse
of the wave function (see Fine, 1993, 1996 for a more careful analysis). In a letter
to Heitler, he criticized Heitler’s notion that the observer plays an important role in
the process of wavefunction collapse:
[I advocate] that one conceives of the ψ-function [i.e., wavefunction] only as an incomplete
description of a real state of affairs, where the incompleteness of the description is forced
by the fact that observation of the state is only able to grasp part of the real factual situation.
Then one can at least escape the singular conception that observation (conceived as an act
of consciousness) influences the real physical state of things; the change in the ψ-function
through observation then does not correspond essentially to the change in a real matter
of fact but rather to the alteration in our knowledge of this matter of fact. (emphasis in
original) (Einstein, 1948)
If this simple, intuitive explanation of the collapse of the wave function is indeed
4 I will analyze these two interpretations of the wave function in detail in Chapters 6 and 7.
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valid, then it strongly suggests that the wave function is not real. However, this
explanation cannot be wholly correct. Consider a quantum system being in the
following superposed state:
|ψ〉 =
∑
i
ci |ai〉, (2.1)
where |ai〉 are the eigenstates of an arbitrary observable A, and ci are the expansion
coefficients. The Born rule tells us that the result of a projective measurement of A
is one of the eigenvalues of A, say ai, with probability |ci|2. The collapse postulate
in standard quantum mechanics further says that after the measurement the original
superposition instantaneously and discontinuously collapses to the corresponding
eigenstate |ai〉. The explanation of the collapse of the wave function provided by
the ψ-epistemic view is as follows. Before the measurement, the observable A of
the system has a definite value ai. The superposed state we assign to the system
reflects our incomplete knowledge about the actual value of the observable. Then
after we measure the observable and know its actual value ai, the superposed state
will naturally be updated by the state corresponding to the value, |ai〉.
Since this explanation of wavefunction collapse is supposed to hold true for the
measurement of every observable at any time, it must assume that all observables
defined for a quantum system have definite values at all times, which are their
eigenvalues, independently of any measurement context, and moreover, measure-
ments also reveal these pre-existing values. As a result, the functional relations
between commuting observables must hold for the values assigned to them in or-
der to avoid conflicts with the predictions of quantum mechanics. This obviously
violates the Kochen-Specker theorem, which asserts the impossibility of assigning
values to all observables whilst, at the same time, preserving the functional rela-
tions between them (in a Hilbert space of dimension d > 3) (Kochen and Specker,
1967).5
Today, most ψ-epistemists already abandon the above explanation of wavefunc-
tion collapse. However, a satisfactory explanation consistent with the ψ-epistemic
view is still wanting. In order that a ψ-epistemic model is consistent with the pre-
dictions of quantum mechanics, the underlying ontic state also needs to be changed
during the measurement process in general. For example, in Spekkens’s toy model
(Spekkens, 2007), even a measurement of an eigenstate of the measured observ-
able also causes change of the underlying ontic state. Therefore, even if denying
5 Here I ignore the finite precision loophole of the Kochen-Specker theorem, which allows non-contextual
hidden-variables theories, but which is widely regarded as physically implausible (Bartlett and Kent, 2004).
Besides, it is worth noting that for a quantum system all observables can have their expectation values in the
state of the system at all times (Gao, 2015b). The Kochen-Specker theorem does not prohibit this, since the
definite values being expectation values violates the production rule, which is one of the key assumptions of
the theorem (Kochen and Specker, 1967).
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the reality of the wave function and wavefunction collapse, the ψ-epistemic view
also needs to explain why the underlying ontic state is changed during the mea-
surement process. This is still a big challenge to the ψ-epistemic view.6
To sum up, I have argued that the collapse of the wave function cannot simply be
explained as a process of updating information about the ontic state of the measured
system. This result provides a support for the ψ-ontic view, not for the ψ-epistemic
view.
2.2.3 Indistinguishability of nonorthogonal states
Although some features of quantum mechanics seem to also suggest the non-reality
of the wave function, a more careful analysis shows that this is not the case. In the
following, I will take the indistinguishability of nonorthogonal states as a typical
example.
At first sight, the ψ-epistemic view may provide a very natural explanation of
the impossibility of distinguishing between nonorthogonal states with certainty.
The usual argument is as follows. If the wave function represents an ontic state,
then two nonorthogonal states will correspond to distinct ontic states, and thus it
seems puzzling that we cannot measure the difference between them. On the other
hand, if the wave functions are epistemic states and represented by probability dis-
tributions that have support over some set of ontic states, then two nonorthogonal
states will overlap and may correspond to the same ontic state. Thus it is quite
understandable that we cannot perfectly distinguish them by a measurement. Take
again Spekkens’s (2007) toy model as an example. In the model, two nonorthogo-
nal states |x+) and |y+) overlap on the ontic state (+1,+1), which will be occupied
by the system half the time whenever |x+) or |y+) is prepared. When this hap-
pens, there is nothing about the ontic state of the system that could possibly tell us
whether |x+) or |y+) was prepared. Therefore, we cannot distinguish between these
two prepared nonorthogonal states at least half the time. The overlap of the two
epistemic states explains their indistinguishability.
In order to justify the above ψ-epistemic explanation of the indistinguishability
of nonorthogonal states, we need more than just that the probability distributions
corresponding to two nonorthogonal states should have nonzero overlap. We also
need that the overlap should be equal to the overlap of the two nonorthogonal states
(i.e. the modulus squared of the inner product of these two states). That is: when
measuring a physical system prepared in one of these two states, the probability
of obtaining the result corresponding to the projector of the other state should be
6 In Spekkens’s (2007) toy model, this change is explained by the requirement of the so-called knowledge
balance principle, which, roughly speaking, states that at most half of the information needed to specify the
ontic state can be known at any given time. But again, the problem turns to explaining why there is this
knowledge balance principle. For further discussion see Leifer (2014a).
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equal to the overlap between the probability distributions corresponding to the two
states. Such models are called maximally ψ-epistemic models. Only in these mod-
els, can the difficulty of distinguishing nonorthogonal states be completely and
quantitatively explained by the difficulty of distinguishing the corresponding epis-
temic states, and thus the ψ-epistemic explanation of the indistinguishability of
nonorthogonal states can be wholly satisfying (Maroney, 2012).
However, it has been shown that this simple, intuitive understanding of the in-
distinguishability of nonorthogonal states cannot go through (Leifer and Maroney,
2013; Barrett et al, 2014; Leifer, 2014b; Branciard, 2014). For example, it proves
that the maximally ψ-epistemic models, in which the overlap of the probability
distributions is large enough to explain fully the indistinguishability of nonorthog-
onal states, must make different predictions from quantum mechanics for Hilbert
space dimension d ≥ 3 (Barrett et al, 2014). As we will see in the next section, the
ψ-ontology theorems will further show that ψ-epistemic models must be severely
constrained if they are to reproduce the predictions of quantum mechanics.
2.2.4 The eigenvalue-eigenstate half link
In the last part of this section, I will also discuss a heuristic argument against the
ψ-epistemic view and supporting the ψ-ontic view. The argument is based on the
so-called eigenvalue-eigenstate half link, which says that when a physical system
is in an eigenstate of an observable, the system has an observation-independent
property with value being the eigenvalue corresponding to the eigenstate (Monton,
2006, 2013).
Here is the argument given by Leifer (2014a). First of all, according to the
eigenvalue-eigenstate half link, the observables of which the wave function is an
eigenstate are properties of a physical system with values being the corresponding
eigenvalues. Next, the wave function of a physical system is uniquely determined
by the set of observables of which it is an eigenstate. In fact, every wave function is
uniquely determined by a single observable; |ψ〉 is an eigenstate of the observable
|ψ〉 〈ψ| with eigenvalue +1 and it is the only state in the +1 eigenspace of |ψ〉 〈ψ|
(up to a global phase). Then the argument goes like this: if a physical system has
a set of properties, and those properties uniquely determine its wave function, then
the wave function is also real, representing a property of the system.
This argument deserves careful examination. To begin with, if one denies the
eigenvalue-eigenstate half link, then one can certainly refute the argument. How-
ever, it is worth noting that unlike the problematic eigenvalue-eigenstate link, the
eigenvalue-eigenstate half link seems more reasonable. The former states that if
and only if a physical system is in an eigenstate of an observable, the system has
a property with value being the eigenvalue corresponding to the eigenstate, and it
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restricts the scope of possible properties of a physical system. While the latter re-
moves the words “and only if” and thus avoids this unnecessary restriction. I will
analyze the basis of the eigenvalue-eigenstate half link in more detail in Chapter 4.
Next, when assuming the validity of the eigenvalue-eigenstate half link, it is
indeed surprising how this weak link can be so strong as to be able to derive the
reality of the wave function. The crux of the matter is whether the eigenvalue-
eigenstate half link really implies that the observables of which the wave function
is an eigenstate are properties of a physical system. It can be argued that the answer
is negative. The reason is that the eigenvalue-eigenstate half link is overused here;
the link only says that an observable is a property of a physical system when the
system is in an eigenstate of the observable, and it does not say that the observable
is a property of the system in all cases, e.g. when the system is not in an eigenstate
of the observable. For example, according to the eigenvalue-eigenstate half link,
the observable |ψ〉 〈ψ| is a property of a physical system when the system is in the
state |ψ〉. However, the link does not say that the observable |ψ〉 〈ψ| is still a property
of the system when the system is in a state other than |ψ〉. Only if the latter is true
can the above argument go through.
In fact, this understanding of the eigenvalue-eigenstate half link is still not very
accurate. What the link really says is that when a physical system is in an eigen-
state of an observable, the system has a property represented by the eigenvalue
associated with the eigenstate. This property is certainly not the observable itself,
although we may say that it is the observable possessing the corresponding eigen-
value. Therefore, although the wave function |ψ〉 can be uniquely determined by
the observable |ψ〉 〈ψ|, since the observable is not a property of the system, this has
no implication on the reality of the wave function. On the other hand, even though
the observable |ψ〉 〈ψ| possessing an eigenvalue +1 is a property of the system, this
property cannot uniquely determine the wave function |ψ〉; the wave function is a
very complex object, while some property having value +1 contains little informa-
tion.
However, this analysis may not persuade Penrose. He said:
One of the most powerful reasons for rejecting such a subjective viewpoint concerning
the reality of |ψ〉 comes from the fact that whatever |ψ〉 might be, there is always—in
principle, at least—a primitive measurement whose YES space consists of the Hilbert-
space ray determined by |ψ〉. The point is that the physical state |ψ〉 (determined by the ray
of complex multiples of |ψ〉) is uniquely determined by the fact that the outcome YES, for
this state, is certain. No other physical state has this property. For any other state, there
would merely be some probability, short of certainty, that the outcome will be YES, and
an outcome of NO might occur. Thus, although there is no measurement which will tell us
what |ψ〉 actually is, the physical state |ψ〉 is uniquely determined by what it asserts must
be the result of a measurement that might be performed on it. (Penrose, 1994, p.314)
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Penrose’s argument is different from the above argument in that it is not based on
the eigenvalue-eigenstate half link. His reason for the reality of the wave function
is that the wave function |ψ〉 is uniquely determined by the fact that the result of
the measurement of the projector |ψ〉 〈ψ| on this state is certain, and other wave
functions do not have this property. This seems to be a good reason, but it in fact
assumes too much. Concretely speaking, it assumes that the Born probabilities are
not epistemic, but objective, intrinsic to a single measurement process. This already
rejects the ψ-epistemic view, according to which the Born probabilities are at least
partly epistemic. Therefore, Penrose’s argument is not a valid argument supporting
the ψ-ontic view either.
2.3 ψ-ontology theorems
I have analyzed several heuristic arguments for the ψ-epistemic view and ψ-ontic
view. The analysis shows that these arguments do not constitute a decisive proof of
either view. In order to obtain a definite result, we need to find a general, rigorous
approach to determine whether the wave function is ontic or epistemic. In this
section, I will introduce one such approach, the ontological models framework,
and two ψ-ontology theorems based on this framework.
2.3.1 The ontological models framework
The ontological models framework provides a rigorous approach to address the
question of the nature of the wave function (Spekkens, 2005; Harrigan and Spekkens,
2010). It has two fundamental assumptions. The first assumption is about the exis-
tence of the underlying state of reality. It says that if a quantum system is prepared
such that quantum mechanics assigns a pure state to it, then after preparation the
system has a well-defined set of physical properties or an underlying ontic state,
which is usually represented by a mathematical object, λ. This assumption is nec-
essary for the analysis of the ontological status of the wave function, since if there
are no any underlying ontic states, it will be meaningless to ask whether or not the
wave functions describe them.
Here a strict ψ-ontic/epistemic distinction can be made. In a ψ-ontic ontological
model, the ontic state of a physical system determines its wave function uniquely,
and thus the wave function represents a property of the system. While in a ψ-
epistemic ontological model, the ontic state of a physical system can be compatible
with different wave functions, and the wave function represents a state of incom-
plete knowledge – an epistemic state – about the actual ontic state of the system.
Concretely speaking, the wave function corresponds to a probability distribution
p(λ|P) over all possible ontic states when the preparation is known to be P, and the
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probability distributions corresponding to two different wave functions can over-
lap.7
In order to investigate whether an ontological model is consistent with the em-
pirical predictions of quantum mechanics, we also need a rule of connecting the
underlying ontic states with the results of measurements. This is the second as-
sumption of the ontological models framework, which says that when a measure-
ment is performed, the behaviour of the measuring device is only determined by
the ontic state of the system, along with the physical properties of the measuring
device. More specifically, the framework assumes that for a projective measure-
ment M, the ontic state λ of a physical system determines the probability p(k|λ,M)
of different results k for the measurement M on the system.8 The consistency
with the predictions of quantum mechanics then requires the following relation:∫
dλp(k|λ,M)p(λ|P) = p(k|M, P), where p(k|M, P) is the Born probability of k
given M and P. A direct inference of this relation is that different orthogonal states
correspond to different ontic states.
In recent years, there have appeared several no-go theorems which attempt to
refute the ψ-epistemic view within the ontological models framework. These the-
orems are called ψ-ontology theorems, including the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theo-
rem, the Colbeck-Renner theorem, and Hardy’s theorem (Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph,
2012; Colbeck and Renner, 2012; Hardy, 2013).9 The key assumption of the ψ-
epistemic view is that there exist two nonorthogonal states which are compatible
with the same ontic state (i.e. the probability distributions corresponding to these
two nonorthogonal states overlap).10 A general strategy of these ψ-ontology the-
orems is to prove the consequences of this assumption are inconsistent with the
predictions of quantum mechanics (under certain auxiliary assumptions). In the
following, I will introduce two typical ψ-ontology theorems.
2.3.2 Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem
The first ψ-ontology theorem is the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem (Pusey, Bar-
rett and Rudolph, 2012). Its basic proof strategy is as follows. Assume there is a
nonzero probability that N nonorthogonal states |ψi〉 (i=1, ... , N) are compatible
7 Note that it is possible that two wave functions are compatible with the same ontic state but the probability
distributions corresponding to the two different wave functions do not overlap, although the probability of
this situation occurring is zero. I will not consider this undetectable difference between the two formulations
of the ψ-epistemic view in my following discussion.
8 This specific assumption is not necessarily a consequence of the second assumption. For further discussion
see Chapter 3.
9 Note that the early no-go theorems for hidden variables, such as Bell’s theorem and the Kochen-Specker
theorem, are not ψ-ontology theorems, since they do not explicitly addresses the ψ-ontic/epistemic
distinction. For a comprehensive review of ψ-ontology theorems and related work see Leifer (2014a).
10 In other words, when these two nonorthogonal states are prepared, there is a non-zero probability that the
prepared ontic states are the same.
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with the same ontic state λ. The ontic state λ determines the probability p(k|λ,M)
of different results k for the measurement M. Moreover, there is a normalization
relation for any N result measurement:
∑N
i=1 p(ki|λ,M) = 1. Now if an N result
measurement satisfies the condition that the first state gives zero Born probability
to the first result and the second state gives zero Born probability to the second
result and so on, then there will be a relation p(ki|λ,M) = 0 for any i, which leads
to a contradiction.
The task is then to find whether there are such nonorthogonal states and the
corresponding measurement. Obviously there is no such a measurement for two
nonorthogonal states of a physical system, since this will permit them to be per-
fectly distinguished. However, such a measurement does exist for four nonorthog-
onal states of two copies of a physical system (Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph, 2012).
The four nonorthogonal states are the following product states: |0〉 ⊗ |0〉, |0〉 ⊗
|+〉,|+〉 ⊗ |0〉 and |+〉 ⊗ |+〉, where |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉). The corresponding measure-
ment is a joint measurement of the two systems, which projects onto the following
four orthogonal states:
|φ1〉 = 1√2 (|0〉 ⊗ |1〉 + |1〉 ⊗ |0〉),
|φ2〉 = 1√2 (|0〉 ⊗ |−〉 + |1〉 ⊗ |+〉),
|φ3〉 = 1√2 (|+〉 ⊗ |1〉 + |−〉 ⊗ |0〉),
|φ4〉 = 1√2 (|+〉 ⊗ |−〉 + |−〉 ⊗ |+〉), (2.2)
where |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). This proves that the four nonorthogonal states are onto-
logically distinct. In order to further prove the two nonorthogonal states |0〉 and |+〉
for one system are ontologically distinct, a preparation independence assumption
is needed, which says that multiple systems can be prepared such that their ontic
states are uncorrelated. Under this assumption, a similar proof for every pair of
nonorthogonal states can also be found, which requires more than two copies of a
physical system (Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph, 2012).
2.3.3 Hardy’s theorem
The proof of the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem requires an analysis of multiple
copies of the system in question. Hardy’s theorem improves this by pertaining to
a single copy of the system in question (Hardy, 2013). The price it needs to pay
is to resort to assumptions about how dynamics is represented in an ontological
model. In contrast, the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem only involves prepare-and-
measure experiments.
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Hardy’s theorem can be illustrated with a simple example (Leifer, 2014a). As-
sume there are two nonorthogonal states |ψ1〉 and 1√2 (|ψ1〉 + |ψ2〉), which are com-
patible with the same ontic state λ as required by the ψ-epistemic view. Consider a
unitary evolution which leaves |ψ1〉 invariant but changes 1√2 (|ψ1〉 + |ψ2〉) to its or-
thogonal state 1√
2
(|ψ1〉 − |ψ2〉). Since two orthogonal states correspond to different
ontic states,11 the original ontic state λ must be changed by the unitary evolution.
How to derive a contradiction then? If assuming that the unitary evolution that
leaves |ψ1〉 invariant also leaves the underlying ontic state λ invariant, then there
will be a contradiction. In other words, under this assumption we can prove that
the two nonorthogonal state |ψ1〉 and 1√2 (|ψ1〉 + |ψ2〉) are ontologically distinct.
This is the simplest example of Hardy’s theorem. The above auxiliary assump-
tion is called ontic indifference assumption. One strong motivation for this assump-
tion is locality. When |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 are two spatially separated states prepared in
regions 1 and 2 respectively, it seems reasonable to assume that the local evolution
of the ontic state in region 2 does not influence the ontic state in region 1. Interest-
ingly and surprisingly, even if the ontic indifference assumption holds only for a
single pure state, Hardy’s theorem can also be proved (Hardy, 2013; Patra, Pironio
and Massar, 2013).
11 Note that in order to prove this result and Hardy’s theorem, it is not necessary to resort to the stronger
assumption that the ontic state determines the probability for measurement results (which is needed to prove
the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem); rather, one only needs to assume that the ontic state determines
whether the probability is zero or nonzero. This weaker assumption is called possibilistic completeness
assumption (Hardy, 2013).
3
The nomological view
The ontological models framework provides a rigorous approach to address the
question of whether the wave function is ontic or epistemic. However, as noted by
the proponents of this framework (Harrigan and Spekkens, 2010), there could exist
realist interpretations of quantum mechanics that are not suited to it. This is in-
deed the case. For example, Bohm’s theory is just an exception.1 The reason is that
the ontological models framework and Bohm’s theory have different assumptions
about the connection between the underlying ontic state and the probabilities of
measurement results; the former assumes that the ontic state determines the prob-
ability of a measurement result, while the latter as a deterministic theory assumes
that the ontic state completely determines the measurement result, and the (epis-
temic) probability of a measurement result is determined by the initial condition
of the universe. Therefore, the ψ-ontology theorems such as the Pusey-Barrett-
Rudolph theorem, which are based on the ontological models framework, do not
apply to Bohm’s theory even though their auxiliary assumptions can be avoided
(see also Feintzeig, 2014; Gao, 2014b; Drezet, 2015). In other words, these theo-
rems do not require that the wave function should be ontic in Bohm’s theory. Since
Bohm’s theory clearly rejects the ψ-epistemic view, how can it interpret the wave
function if not assuming the ψ-ontic view? Interestingly, there is a third option, the
nomological view. In this chapter, I will introduce this view of the wave function
and give a critical analysis of it.
1 Bohm’s theory is a realistic alternative to standard quantum mechanics initially proposed by de Broglie
(1928) and later rediscovered and developped by Bohm (1952) (see also Bohm and Hiley, 1993; Holland,
1993; Du¨rr and Teufel, 2009; Du¨rr, Goldstein and Zanghı`, 2012; Goldstein, 2013). The theory is also called
the de Broglie-Bohm theory or the pilot wave theory in the literature. I will use the appellation “Bohm’s
theory” throughout this book.
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3.1 The effective wave function
According to Bohm’s theory, a complete realistic description of a quantum system
is provided by the configuration defined by the positions of its particles together
with its wave function. The Bohmian law of motion is expressed by two equations:
a guiding equation for the configuration of particles and the Schro¨dinger equation,
describing the time evolution of the wave function which enters the guiding equa-
tion. The law can be formulated as follows:
dQ(t)
dt
= vΨ(t)(Q(t)), (3.1)
i~
∂Ψ(t)
∂t
= HΨ(t), (3.2)
where Q(t) denotes the spatial configuration of particles, Ψ(t) is the wave function
at time t, and v equals to the velocity of probability density in standard quantum
mechanics.2 Moreover, it is assumed that at some initial instant t0, the epistemic
probability of the configuration, ρ(t0), is given by the Born rule: ρ(t0) = |Ψ(t0)|2.
This is the so-called quantum equilibrium hypothesis, which, together with the law
of motion, ensures the empirical equivalence between Bohm’s theory and standard
quantum mechanics.
The status of the above equations is different depending on whether one consid-
ers the physical description of the universe as a whole or of a subsystem thereof.
Bohm’s theory starts from the concept of a universal wave function (i.e. the wave
function of the universe), figuring in the fundamental law of motion for all the par-
ticles in the universe. That is, Q(t) describes the configuration of all the particles
in the universe at time t, and Ψ(t) is the wave function of the universe at time t,
guiding the motion of all particles taken together. To describe subsystems of the
universe, the appropriate concept is the effective wave function in Bohm’s theory.
The effective wave function is the Bohmian analogue of the usual wave function
in standard quantum mechanics. It is not primitive, but derived from the universal
wave function and the actual spatial configuration of all the particles ignored in the
description of the respective subsystem (Du¨rr, Goldstein and Zanghı`, 1992). The
effective wave function of a subsystem can be defined as follows. Let A be a subsys-
tem of the universe including N particles with position variables x = (x1, x2, ..., xN).
2 Note that there are two somewhat different formulations of Bohm’s theory, in one of which the guiding
equation is second-order as Bohm originally formulated, and in the other the guiding equation is first-order.
Here I introduce the first-order formulation of Bohm’s theory, which is usually called Bohmian mechanics
(Goldstein, 2013). See Belousek (2003) for a comparison of these two formulations. In addition, it is worth
noting that there are also other velocity formulas with nice properties, including Galilean symmetry, and
yielding theories that are empirically equivalent to standard quantum mechanics and to Bohm’s theory
(Deotto and Ghirardi, 1998), although the Bohmian choice is arguably the simplest.
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Let y = (y1, y2, ..., yM) be the position variables of all other particles not belonging
to A. Then the subsystem A’s conditional wave function at time t is defined as the
universal wave function Ψt(x, y) evaluated at y = Y(t):
ψAt (x) = Ψt(x, y)|y=Y(t). (3.3)
If the universal wave function can be decomposed in the following form:
Ψt(x, y) = ϕt(x)φt(y) + Θt(x, y), (3.4)
where φt(y) and Θt(x, y) are functions with macroscopically disjoint supports, and
Y(t) lies within the support of φt(y), then ψAt (x) = ϕt(x) (up to a multiplicative
constant) is A’s effective wave function at t. It can be seen that the temporal evo-
lution of A’s particles is given in terms of A’s conditional wave function in the
usual Bohmian way, and when the conditional wave function is A’s effective wave
function, it also obeys a Schro¨dinger dynamics of its own. This means that the ef-
fective descriptions of subsystems are of the same form of the law of motion as
given above. This is a satisfactory result.
3.2 The universal wave function as law
It has been a hot topic of debate how to interpret the wave function in Bohm’s
theory. An influential view is the nomological interpretation of the wave function,
which was originally suggested by Du¨rr, Goldstein and Zanghı` (1997).3 They ar-
gued that the universal wave function or the wave function of the universe has a
law-like character, that is, it is more in the nature of a law than a concrete physical
reality. In their own words,
The wave function of the universe is not an element of physical reality. We propose that
the wave function belongs to an altogether different category of existence than that of
substantive physical entities, and that its existence is nomological rather than material. We
propose, in other words, that the wave function is a component of a physical law rather
than of the reality described by the law. (Du¨rr, Goldstein and Zanghı`, 1997, p. 10)
The reasons to adopt this nomological view of the wave function come from the
unusual kind of way in which Bohm’s theory is formulated, and the unusual kind
of behavior that the wave function undergoes in the theory. First of all, although
the wave function affects the behavior of the configuration of the particles, which is
expressed by the guiding equation (3.1), there is no back action of the configuration
upon the wave function. The evolution of the wave function is governed by the
Schro¨dinger equation (3.2), in which the actual configuration Q(t) does not appear.
3 See also Goldstein and Teufel (2001) and Goldstein and Zanghı` (2013).
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Since a physical entity is supposed to satisfy the action-reaction principle, the wave
function cannot describe a physical entity in Bohm’s theory.
Next, the wave function of a many-particle system, ψ(q1, ..., qN), is defined not
in our ordinary three-dimensional space, but in the 3N-dimensional configuration
space, the set of all hypothetical configurations of the system. Thus it seems un-
tenable to view the wave function as directly describing a physical field. I have
discussed such worries in the last chapter. In fact, the sort of physical field the
wave function is supposed to describe is even more abstract. Since two wave func-
tions such that one is a (nonzero) scalar multiple of the other are physically equiv-
alent, what the wave function describes is not even a physical field at all, but an
equivalence class of physical fields. Moreover, Bohm’s theory regards identical
particles such as electrons as unlabelled, so that the configuration space of N such
particles is not the familiar high dimensional space, like R3N , but is the unfamiliar
high-dimensional space NR3 of N-point subsets of R3. This space has a nontrivial
topology, which may naturally lead to the possibilities of bosons and fermions. But
it seems odd as a fundamental space in which a physical field exists.
Thirdly, and more importantly, the wave function in Bohm’s theory plays a role
that is analogous to that of the Hamiltonian in classical Hamiltonian mechanics
(Goldstein and Zanghı`, 2013). To begin with, both the classical Hamiltonian and
the wave function live on a high dimensional space. The wave function is defined
in configuration space, while the classical Hamiltonian is defined in phase space:
a space that has twice as many dimensions as configuration space. Next, there is a
striking analogy between the guiding equation in Bohm’s theory and the Hamilto-
nian equations in classical mechanics. The guiding equation can be written as:
dQ
dt
= der(logψ), (3.5)
where the symbol der denotes some sort of derivative. Similarly, the Hamiltonian
equations can be written in a compact way as:
dX
dt
= der(H), (3.6)
where der(H) is a suitable derivative of the Hamiltonian. Moreover, it is also true
that both logψ and H are normally regarded as defined only up to an additive con-
stant. Adding a constant to H doesn’t change the equations of motion. Similarly,
when multiplying the wave function by a scalar, which amounts to adding a con-
stant to its log, the new wave function is physically equivalent to the original one,
and they define the same velocity for the configuration in the equations of motion
in Bohm’s theory. Since the classical Hamiltonian is regarded not as a description
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of some physical entity, but as the generator of time evolution in classical mechan-
ics, by the above analogy it seems natural to assume that the wave function is not a
description of some physical entity either, but a similar generator of the equations
of motion in Bohm’s theory.
These analyses suggest that one should think of the wave function as describing
a law and not as some sort of concrete physical reality in Bohm’s theory. However,
it seems that there is a serious problem with this nomological view of the wave
function. The wave function of a quantum system typically changes with time, but
laws are supposed not to change with time. Moreover, we can prepare the wave
function of a quantum system and control its evolution, but laws are not supposed
to be things that we can prepare and control. This problem indeed exists for the
effective wave function of a subsystem of the universe, but it may not exist for the
wave function of the universe, only which deserves to be interpreted nomologically
(Goldstein and Zanghı`, 2013). The wave function of the universe is certainly not
controllable. And it may not be dynamical either. This can be illustrated by the
Wheeler-DeWitt equation, which is the fundamental equation for the wave function
of the universe in canonical quantum cosmology:
HΨ(q) = 0, (3.7)
where Ψ(q) is the wave function of the universe, q refers to 3-geometries, and H is
the Hamiltonian constraint which involves no explicit time-dependence. Unlike the
Schro¨dinger equation, the Wheeler-DeWitt equation has on one side, instead of a
time derivative of Ψ, simply 0, and thus its natural solutions are time-independent.
Moreover, the wave function of the universe may be unique. Although the Wheeler-
DeWitt equation presumably has a great many solutions, when supplemented with
additional natural conditions such as the Hartle-Hawking boundary condition, the
solution may become unique. Such uniqueness also fits nicely with the conception
of the wave function as law.
Whether the wave function of the universe is a stationary function, uniquely
obeying some constraints and hence resembling the classical Hamiltonian is still
unknown, since the final theory of quantum gravity is not yet available. What we
can do now is to examine whether the effective wave functions of subsystems also
have a tenable physical explanation under the nomological view of the universal
wave function. As we will see in the next section, the answer to this question will
have implications for the nomological view of the wave function, as well as for the
ontology of Bohm’s theory.
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3.3 A critical analysis
What is the physical meaning of the effective wave function in Bohm’s theory?
If the wave function of the universe is nomological, then the ontology of Bohm’s
theory will consist only in particles and their positions. As a consequence, the
effective wave function of a subsystem of the universe, which is not nomological
in general, must be ontologically explained by these particles and their positions.
Moreover, it is uncontroversial that the effective wave function of a subsystem does
not supervene on the distribution of the system’s particles’ positions. For instance,
for the electron in the hydrogen atom, there are countably many real-valued wave
functions corresponding to different energy eigenstates of the electron, but they
may all describe a particle that is at rest in the same position at all times. Therefore,
if the ontology of Bohm’s theory consists only in particles and their positions,
then the effective wave function of a subsystem must encode the influences of the
particles which are not part of the subsystem.
This line of reasoning is also supported by the analysis of Esfeld et al (2013).
According to these authors, the effective wave function of a subsystem encodes the
non-local influences of other particles on the subsystem via the non-local law of
Bohm’s theory. For example, in the double-slit experiment with one particle at a
time, the particle goes through exactly one of the two slits, and that is all there is in
the physical world. There is no field or wave that guides the motion of the particle
and propagates through both slits and undergoes interference. The development of
the position of the particle (its velocity and thus its trajectory) is determined by the
positions of other particles in the universe, including the particles composing the
experimental setup, and the non-local law of Bohm’s theory can account for the
observed particle position on the screen (Esfeld et al, 2013).4
In the following, I will argue that the effective wave function of a subsystem of
the universe does not encode the influences of other particles on the subsystem,
and thus the nomological view of the wave function seems problematic. First of
all, consider the simplest case in which the universal wave function factorizes so
that
Ψt(x, y) = ϕt(x)φt(y). (3.8)
Then ψAt (x) = ϕt(x) is subsystem A’s effective wave function at t. This is the first
example considered by Du¨rr, Goldstein and Zanghı` (1992) in explaining the effec-
tive wave function. In this case, it is uncontroversial that subsystem A and its en-
vironment are independent of each other, and the functions ϕt(x) and φt(y) describe
subsystem A and its environment, respectively. Thus, the effective wave function
4 See also Dorato (2015) for a recent evaluation of this view.
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of subsystem A is independent of the particles in the environment, and it does
not encode the non-local influences of these particles. Note that even although the
universal wave function is time-independent, the effective wave functions of sub-
system A and its environment may be both time-dependent, and thus it is arguable
that they cannot be interpreted nomologically.5
Next, consider the general case in which there is an extra term in the factorization
of the universal wave function, which is denoted by (3.4). In this case, the effective
wave function of subsystem A is determined by both the universal wave function
and the positions of the particles in its environment (via a measurement-like pro-
cess). If Y(t) lies within the support of φt(y), A’s effective wave function at t will
be ϕt(x). If Y(t) does not lie within the support of φt(y), A’s effective wave function
at t will be not ϕt(x). For example, suppose Θt(x, y) =
∑
n fn(x)gn(y), where gi(y)
and g j(y) are functions with macroscopically disjoint supports for any i , j, then
if Y(t) lies within the support of gi(y), A’s effective wave function at t will be fi(x).
It can be seen that the role played by the particles in the environment is only se-
lecting which function the effective wave function of subsystem A is, while each
selected function is independent of the particles in the environment and completely
determined by the universal wave function.
Therefore, it seems that the effective wave function of a subsystem of the uni-
verse does not encode the influences of other particles in the universe in general
cases. When the effective wave function of a subsystem has been selected, the other
particles in the universe will have no influences on the particles of the subsystem.
For example, in the double-slit experiment with one particle at a time, the devel-
opment of the position of the particle does not depend on the positions of other
particles in the universe (if only the positions of these particles select the same
effective wave function of the particle during the experiment, e.g. Y(t) has been
within the support of φt(y) during the experiment).
Since it is arguable that the nomological view of the wave function implies that
the effective wave function of a subsystem of the universe encodes the influences of
other particles in the universe, the above result seems to pose a threat to the view.
Moreover, the result also suggests that the ontology of Bohm’s theory consist in
not only Bohmian particles and their positions, but also the wave function.
5 Moreover, this simplest case seems to also pose a difficulty for the dispositionalist interpretation of Bohm’s
theory suggested by Esfeld et al (2013). If the universal wave function represents the disposition of motion of
all particles in the universe, then when the universal wave function factorizes, the effective wave function of
each subsystem will also represent the disposition of motion of the particles of the subsystem, and thus
Belot’s (2012) objections will be valid in this case.
4
Reality of the wave function
I have analyzed the competing views of the wave function, including the ψ-epistemic
view, the ψ-ontic view and the nomological view. Which interpretation is true,
then? Although there are already several ψ-ontology theorems, a definite answer
to this question is still unavailable. On the one hand, auxiliary assumptions are
required to prove these ψ-ontology theorems, e.g. the preparation independence
assumption for the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem (Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph,
2012) and the ontic indifference assumption for Hardy’s theorem (Hardy, 2013). It
thus seems to be impossible to completely rule out the ψ-epistemic view without
auxiliary assumptions.1 On the other hand, as noted before, the ontological models
framework, on which these ψ-ontology theorems are based, is not very general. For
example, the framework does not apply to deterministic theories such as Bohm’s
theory. Thus the ψ-ontology theorems, even if their auxiliary assumptions can be
avoided, cannot rule out the nomological view of the wave function either.
But this is not the end of the story. In this chapter, I will extend the ontolog-
ical models framework by introducing protective measurements, and give a new
argument for the ψ-ontic view in terms of protective measurements, first in the ex-
tended ontological models framework and then beyond the framework (see also
Gao, 2015b). The argument does not rely on auxiliary assumptions, and it also
applies to deterministic theories.
4.1 Ontological models framework extended
In order to obtain a definite answer to the question of the nature of the wave func-
tion, the ontological models framework must be amended and extended.
The first limitation of the ontological models framework is that it does not apply
1 Indeed, by removing the assumptions of these ψ-ontology theorems, explicit ψ-epistemic models can be
constructed to reproduce the statistics of (projective) quantum measurements in Hilbert spaces of any
dimension (Lewis et al, 2012; Aaronson et al, 2013).
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to deterministic theories. This limitation can be readily removed by assuming that
the ontic state of a physical system determines the probabilities for different results
of a projective measurement on the system only for indeterministic theories, and
for deterministic theories the ontic state of a physical system (and the ontic state
of the measuring device) determine the result of a projective measurement on the
system. In this way, the ontological models framework can be amended to apply
to deterministic theories. However, since the result of a projective measurement
is random, the additional connection between the ontic state and the measurement
result for deterministic theories will have little use in addressing the question of the
nature of the wave function in these theories.
The second limitation of the ontological models framework is that the framework
only consider conventional projective measurements. This is not beyond expecta-
tions, as these measurements are most well-known and have been once regarded
as the only type of quantum measurements. However, it has been known that there
are in fact other types of quantum measurements, one of which is the relatively
less-known protective measurements (Aharonov and Vaidman, 1993; Aharonov,
Anandan and Vaidman, 1993; see also Section 1.3). During a protective measure-
ment, the measured state is protected by an appropriate mechanism such as via the
quantum Zeno effect, so that it neither changes nor becomes entangled with the
state of the measuring device. In this way, such protective measurements can mea-
sure the expectation values of observables on a single quantum system, even if the
system is initially not in an eigenstate of the measured observable, and the wave
function of the system can also be measured as expectation values of a sufficient
number of observables.
Protective measurements are distinct from projective measurements in that a
protective measurement always obtains a definite result, while a projective mea-
surement in general obtains a random result with certain probability in accordance
with the Born rule. As a consequence, the ontological models framework will be
greatly extended by including protective measurements. The framework assumes
as its second assumption that when a measurement is performed, the behaviour of
the measuring device is only determined by the ontic state of the system, along
with the physical properties of the measuring device. For a projective measure-
ment, this assumption means the ontic state of a physical system determines the
probabilities for different results of the projective measurement on the system (for
indeterministic theories). Similarly, for a protective measurement, this assumption
will mean that the ontic state of a physical system determines the definite result of
the protective measurement on the system.2 Note that this inference for protective
2 One may think that the result of a protective measurement is determined not by the ontic state of the
measured system, but by the protection procedure, or in other words, what a protective measurement
measures is not the ontic state of the measured system but the protection procedure, such as the protection
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measurements is independent of the origin of the Born probabilities, and it applies
to both deterministic theories and indeterministic theories.
As we will see immediately, by extending the ontological models framework,
protective measurements will provide more resources for proving the reality of the
wave function.
4.2 A new proof in terms of protective measurements
Since the wave function can be measured from a single physical system by a se-
ries of protective measurements, it seems natural to assume that the wave func-
tion refers directly to the ontic state of the system. Several authors, including the
discoverers of protective measurements, have given similar arguments supporting
this implication of protective measurements for the ontological status of the wave
function (Aharonov and Vaidman, 1993; Aharonov, Anandan and Vaidman, 1993;
Anandan, 1993; Dickson, 1995; Gao, 2013d, 2014b; Hetzroni and Rohrlich, 2014).
However, these analyses are not very rigorous and also subject to some objec-
tions (Unruh, 1994; Rovelli, 1994; Uffink, 1999, 2013; Dass and Qureshi, 1999;
Schlosshauer and Claringbold, 2014).3 It is still debatable whether protective mea-
surements imply the reality of the wave function. In the following, I will give a
new, rigorous argument for ψ-ontology in terms of protective measurements in the
extended ontological models framework (see also Gao, 2015b).
I first use the proof strategy of the existing ψ-ontology theorems, namely first
assuming that two nonorthogonal wave functions are compatible with the same
ontic state, and then proving the consequences of this assumption are inconsis-
tent with the predictions of quantum mechanics. The argument is as follows. For
two different wave functions such as two nonorthogonal states, select an observ-
able whose expectation values in these two states are different. For example, con-
sider a spin half particle. The two nonorthogonal states are |0〉 and |+〉, where
|+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉), and |0〉 , |1〉 are eigenstates of spin in the z-direction. As
Aharonov, Anandan and Vaidman (1993) showed, a spin state can be protected by
a magnetic field in the direction of the spin. Let B0, B+ be protecting fields for the
states |0〉, |+〉, respectively, and let the measured observable be P0 = |0〉 〈0|. Then
the protective measurements of this observable on these two nonorthogonal states
yield results 1 and 1/2, respectively. Although these two nonorthogonal states need
different protection procedures, the protective measurements of the observable on
potential for an adiabatic protective measurement (see, e.g. Rovelli, 1994). However, it has been argued that
this understanding is not right (Aharonov, Anandan and Vaidman, 1996). The main reason is that for infinite
number of various protective procedures which are all characterized by having the same wave function, the
protective measurements of the same observable will always yield the same results. For further discussion
see Section 4.3.
3 See Gao (2014b) for a brief review of these objections.
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the two (protected) states are the same, and the results of the measurements are dif-
ferent with certainty. If these two (protected) wave functions are compatible with
the same ontic state λ, then according to the extended ontological models frame-
work, the results of the protective measurements of the observable on these two
states will be the same. This leads to a contradiction. Therefore, two (protected)
wave functions correspond to different ontic states.4 By assuming that whether an
unprotected state or a corresponding protected state is prepared, the probability
distribution of the ontic state λ is the same, which may be called preparation non-
contextuality assumption (Spekkens, 2005; Leifer, 2014a),5 we can further reach
the conclusion that two (unprotected) wave functions also correspond to distinct
ontic states. In other words, the wave function represents the ontic state of a single
system.
A similar argument can also be given in terms of realistic protective measure-
ments. A realistic protective measurement cannot be performed on a single quan-
tum system with absolute certainty. For a realistic protective measurement of an
observable A, there is always a small probability to obtain a result different from
〈A〉. In this case, according to the ontological models framework, the probabilities
for different results will be determined by the ontic state of the measuring device
and the realistic measuring condition such as the measuring time, as well as by
the ontic state of the measured system.6 Now consider two (protected) wave func-
tions, and select an observable whose expectation values in these two states are
different. Then we can perform the same realistic protective measurements of the
observable on these two states. The overlap of the probability distributions of the
results of these two measurements can be arbitrarily close to zero when the realistic
condition approaches the ideal condition (In the limit, each probability distribution
will be a Dirac δ−function localized in the expectation value of the measured ob-
servable in the measured state, and it will be determined only by the ontic state
of the measured system). If there exists a non-zero probability p that these two
wave functions correspond to the same ontic state λ, then since the same λ yields
4 This result is not surprising, since two (protected) wave functions of a single system can be distinguished
with certainty by protective measurements.
5 According to Leifer (2014a), “Preparation noncontextuality says that if there is no difference between two
preparation procedures in terms of the observable statistics they predict, i.e. they are represented by the same
quantum state, then there should be no difference between them at the ontological level either, i.e. they
should be represented by the same probability.” Due to the existence of protective measurements, however,
this definition is vague, since even though two preparation procedures are represented by the same wave
function, they may have different observable statistics. it is arguable that a more appropriate definition of
preparation noncontextuality is that if two preparation procedures are represented by the same wave function,
then there should be no difference between them at the ontological level, in other words, the same wave
function corresponds to the same probability distribution of the ontic state. I use this definition of preparation
noncontextuality in my argument.
6 Note that this applies only to indeterministic theories. Similarly, the probabilities for different results of a
realistic projective measurement will be also determined by the ontic state of the measuring device and the
measuring time, as well as by the ontic state of the measured system. As we will see later, the existing
ψ-ontology theorems will be difficult or even impossible to prove for realistic projective measurements.
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the same probability distribution of measurement results under the same measur-
ing condition according to the ontological models framework, the overlap of the
probability distributions of the results of protective measurements of the above ob-
servable on these two states will be not smaller than p. Since p > 0 is a determinate
number, this leads to a contradiction.7 Therefore, two (protected) wave functions
correspond to different ontic states, and so do two (unprotected) wave functions by
the preparation noncontextuality assumption.
The above argument, like the existing ψ-ontology theorems, is also based on
an auxiliary assumption, the preparation noncontextuality assumption this time.8
However, the argument can be further improved to avoid this auxiliary assumption.
The key is to notice that the result of a protective measurement depends only on
the measured observable and the ontic state of the measured system. If the result
is also determined by other factors such as the ontic state of the measuring device
or the protection setting, then the result may be different for the same measured
observable and wave function. This will contradict the predictions of quantum me-
chanics, according to which the result of a protective measurement is always the
expectation value of the measured observable in the measured wave function. Now
consider two (unprotected) wave functions, and select an observable whose expec-
tation values in these two states are different. The results of the protective mea-
surements of the observable on these two states are different with certainty. If these
two wave functions are compatible with the same ontic state λ, then according to
the above analysis, the results of the protective measurements of the observable
on these two states will be the same. This leads to a contradiction. Therefore, two
different wave functions correspond to different ontic states.
There is also a direct argument for ψ-ontology in terms of protective measure-
ments, which is not based on auxiliary assumptions either. As argued above, the
result of a protective measurement is determined only by the measured observ-
able and the ontic state of the measured system. Since the measured observable
also refers to the measured system, this further means that the result of a protec-
tive measurement, namely the expectation value of the measured observable in the
measured wave function, is determined only by the properties of the measured sys-
tem. Therefore, the expectation value of the measured observable in the measured
wave function is also a property of the measured system. Since a wave function can
7 Note that it is indeed true that for any given realistic condition one can always assume that there exists some
probability p that the two measured wave functions correspond to the same ontic state λ. However, the point
is that if the unitary dynamics of quantum mechanics is valid, the realistic condition can always approach the
ideal condition arbitrarily closely, and thus the probability p must be arbitrarily close to zero, which means
that any ψ-epistemic model with finite overlap probability p is untenable. Certainly, our argument will be
invalid if quantum mechanics breaks down when reaching certain realistic condition.
8 Since the above argument only considers individual quantum systems and makes no appeal to entanglement,
it avoids the preparation independence assumption for multiple systems used by the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph
theorem (Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph, 2012).
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be constructed from the expectation values of a sufficient number of observables,
the wave function also represents the property of a single quantum system.
4.3 With more strength
The above arguments for ψ-ontology, like the other ψ-ontology theorems, are based
on the second assumption of the ontological models framework, according to which
when a measurement is performed, the behaviour of the measuring device is deter-
mined by the ontic state of the measured system (along with the physical properties
of the measuring device) immediately before the measurement, whether the ontic
state of the measured system changes or not during the measurement. This is a
simplified assumption, and it may be not valid in general. A more reasonable as-
sumption is that the ontic state of the measured system may be disturbed and thus
evolve in a certain way during a measurement, and the behaviour of the measuring
device is determined by the total evolution of the ontic state of the system during
the measurement, not simply by the initial ontic state of the system. For example,
for a projective measurement it is the total evolution of the ontic state of the mea-
sured system during the measurement that determines the probabilities for different
results of the measurement. Certainly, if the measuring interval is extremely short
and the change of the ontic state of the measured system is continuous, then the
ontic state will be almost unchanged during the measurement, and thus the orig-
inal simplified assumption will be still valid. However, if the change of the ontic
state of the measured system is not continuous but discontinuous, then even during
an arbitrarily short time interval the ontic state may also change greatly, and the
original simplified assumption will be wrong.
It seems that the existing ψ-ontology theorems such as the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph
theorem will be invalid under the above new assumption. The reason is that under
this assumption, even if two nonorthogonal states correspond to the same ontic
state initially, they may correspond to different evolution of the ontic state, which
may lead to different probabilities of measurement results. Then the proofs of the
ψ-ontology theorems by reduction to absurdity cannot go through. However, it can
be seen that the above arguments for ψ-ontology in terms of protective measure-
ments can still go through under the new assumption.
For a protective measurement, there are two sources which may interfere with
the spontaneous evolution of the ontic state of the measured system: one is the
protection procedure, and the other is the measuring device. However, no matter
how they influence the evolution of the ontic state of the measured system, they
cannot generate the definite result of the protective measurement, namely the ex-
pectation value of the measured observable in the measured wave function, since
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they contain no information about the measured wave function.9 The measuring
device only contains information about the measured observable, and it does not
contain information about the measured wave function. Compared with the mea-
suring device, the protection procedure “knows” less. The protection procedure is
either a protective potential or a Zeno measuring device. In each case, the protec-
tion procedure contains no information about both the measured observable and
the measured wave function.10 Thus, if the information about the measured wave
function is not contained in the measured system, then the result of a protective
measurement cannot be the expectation value of the measured observable in the
measured wave function.
On the other hand, as noted before, if the result of a protectie measurement is also
determined by the ontic state of the measuring device or the protection procedure
due to their influences on the evolution of the ontic state of the measured system,
then the result may be different for the same measured observable and the same
measured wave function. This contradicts the predictions of quantum mechanics,
according to which the result of a protective measurement is always the expectation
value of the measured observable in the measured wave function.
Therefore, the definite result of a protective measurement, namely the expecta-
tion value of the measured observable in the measured wave function, is determined
by the spontaneous evolution of the ontic state of the measured system during the
measurement. Since the spontaneous evolution of the ontic state of the measured
system is an intrinsic property of the system independent of the protective mea-
surement, the expectation value of the measured observable in the measured wave
function is also a property of the system. This then proves the reality of the wave
function, which can be constructed from the expectation values of a sufficient num-
ber of observables.
In the following, I will present a more detailed analysis of how a protective mea-
surement obtains the expectation value of the measured observable in the measured
wave function. The analysis may help understand the above result by further clar-
ifing the roles the measured system, the protection procedure, and the measuring
device play in a protective measurement.
9 In other words, the properties of the protection setting and the measuring device and their time evolution do
not determine the measured wave function.
10 Certainly, the measurer who does the protective measurement knows more information than that contained in
the measuring device and protection procedure. Besides the measured observable, the measurer also knows
the measured wave function is one of infinitely many known states (but she needs not know which one the
measured wave function is). In the case of protective potential, the measurer knows that the measured wave
function is one of infinitely many nondegenerate discrete energy eigenstate of the Hamiltonian of the
measured system. In the case of Zeno protection, the measurer knows that the measured wave function is one
of infinitely many nondegenerate eigenstates of an observable. Note that this permits the possibility that the
measurer can cheat us by first measuring which one amongst these infinitely many states the measured wave
function is (e.g. by measuring the eigenvalue of energy for the case of protective potential) and then
calculating the expectation value and outputing it through a device. Then the result will have no implications
for the reality of the wave function. But obviously this is not a protective measurement.
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By a projective measurement on a single quantum system, one obtains one of the
eigenvalues of the measured observable, and the expectation value of the observ-
able can only be obtained as the statistical average of eigenvalues for an ensemble
of identically prepared systems. Thus it seems surprising that a protective measure-
ment can obtain the expectation value of the measured observable directly from a
single quantum system. In fact, however, this result is not as surprising as it seems
to be. The key point is to notice that the pointer shift rate at any time during a
projective measurement is proportional to the expectation value of the measured
observable in the measured wave function at the time. Concretely speaking, for a
projective measurement of an observable A, whose interaction Hamiltonian is given
by the usual form HI = g(t)PA, where g(t) is the time-dependent coupling strength
of the interaction, and P is the conjugate momentum of the pointer variable, the
pointer shift rate at each instant t during the measurement is:
d〈X〉
dt
= g(t)〈A〉, (4.1)
where X is the pointer variable, 〈X〉 is the center of the pointer wavepacket at
instant t, and 〈A〉 is the expectation value of the measured observable A in the
measured wave function at instant t. This pointer shift rate formula indicates that
at any time during a projective measurement, the pointer shift after an infinitesimal
time interval is proportional to the expectation value of the measured observable
in the measured wave function at the time. As is well known, however, since the
projective measurement changes the wave function of the measured system greatly,
and especially it also results in the pointer wavepacket spreading greatly, the point
shift after the measurement does not represent the actual measurement result, and it
cannot be measured either. Moreover, even if the point shift after the measurement
represents the actual measurement result (e.g. for collapse theories), the result is not
definite but random, and it is not the expectation value of the measured observable
in the initial measured wave function either.
Then, how to make the expectation value of the measured observable in the mea-
sured wave function, which is hidden in the process of a projective measurement,
visible in the final measurement result? This requires that the pointer wavepacket
should not spread considerably during the measurement so that the final pointer
shift is qualified to represent the measurement result, and moreover, the final pointer
shift should be also definite. A direct way to satisfy the requirement is to protect
the measured wave function from changing as a protective measurement does. Take
the Zeno protection scheme as an example. We make frequent projective measure-
ments of an observable O, of which the measured state |ψ〉 is a nondegenerate
eigenstate, in a very short measurement interval [0, τ]. For instance, O is measured
in [0, τ] at times tn = (n/N)τ, n = 1, 2, ...,N, where N is an arbitrarily large number.
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At the same time, we make the same projective measurement of an observable A in
the interval [0, τ] as above. Different from the derivation given in Section 1.3, here
I will calculate the post-measurement state in accordance of the order of time evo-
lution. This will let us see the process of protective measurement more clearly.11
The state of the combined system immediately before t1 = τ/N is given by
e−
i
~
τ
N g(t1)PA |ψ〉 |φ(x0)〉 =
∑
i
ci |ai〉
∣∣∣∣∣φ(x0 + τN g(t1)ai)
〉
= |ψ〉
∣∣∣∣∣φ(x0 + τN g(t1)〈A〉)
〉
+
τ
N
g(t1)(A − 〈A〉) |ψ〉
∣∣∣∣∣φ′(x0 + τN g(t1)〈A〉)
〉
+O(
1
N2
), (4.2)
where |φ(x0)〉 is the pointer wavepacket centered in initial position x0, |ai〉 are the
eigenstates of A, and ci are the expansion coefficients. Note that the second term
in the r.h.s of the formula is orthogonal to the measured state |ψ〉. Then the branch
of the state of the combined system after t1 = τ/N, in which the projective mea-
surement of O results in the state of the measured system being in |ψ〉, is given
by
|ψ〉 〈ψ|e− i~ τN g(t1)PA |ψ〉 |φ(x0)〉 = |ψ〉
∣∣∣∣∣φ(x0 + τN g(t1)〈A〉)
〉
+ O(
1
N2
). (4.3)
Thus after N such measurements and in the limit of N → ∞, the branch of the state
of the combined system, in which each projective measurement of O results in the
state of the measured system being in |ψ〉, is
|t = τ〉 = |ψ〉
∣∣∣∣∣φ(x0 + ∫ τ
0
g(t)dt〈A〉)
〉
= |ψ〉 |φ(x0 + 〈A〉)〉 . (4.4)
Since the modulus squared of the amplitude of this branch approaches one when
N → ∞, this state will be the state of the combined system after the protective
measurement.
By this derivation, it can be clearly seen that the role of the protection proce-
dure is not only to protect the measured wave function from the change caused
11 Note that in the derivation given in Section 1.3, the measurement result of a protective measurement, namely
the expectation value of the measured observable in the measured wave function, is already contained in the
measurement operator which describes the measurement procedure. But this does not imply what the
measurement measures is not the property of the measured system, but the property of the measurement
procedure such as the protection procedure (cf. Combes et al, 2015). Otherwise, for example, diseases will
exist not in patients, but in doctors or expert systems for disease diagnosis.
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by the projective measurement, but also to prevent the pointer wavepacket from
the spreading caused by the projective measurement. As a result, the pointer shift
after the measurement can represent a valid measurement result, and moreover, it
is also definite, being natually the expectation value of the measured observable in
the initial measured wave function.
In fact, since the width of the pointer wavepacket keeps unchanged during the
above protective measurement, and the pointer shift rate at any time during the
measurement is proportional to the expectation value of the measured observable
in the measured wave function at the time,12 which is the same as the initial mea-
sured wave function, we can obtain the final measurement result at any time during
the protective measurement (when the time-dependent coupling strength is known).
This indicates that the result of a protective measurement is determined by the ini-
tial ontic state of the measured system, not by the evolution of the ontic state of
the system during the measurement, whether spontaneous or not. Thus the sec-
ond, simplified assumption of the ontological models framework is still valid for
protective measurements, so do my previous arguments for the reality of the wave
function based on this assumption.
It has been conjectured that the result of a protective measurement is determined
not by the ontic state of the measured system but by the protection procedure,
which may lead to a certain evolution of the ontic state of the system that may
generate the measurement result (Combes et al, 2015). If this is true, then protec-
tive measurements will have no implications for the reality of the wave function.
However, as I have argued in the beginning of this section, this conjecture cannot
be correct. The essential reason is that the protection procedure does not “know”
the measured wave function, and thus it cannot generate the measurement result,
the expectation value of the measured observable in the measured wave function.13
In addition, the above analysis clearly shows that the result of a protective mea-
surement is generated not by the protection procedure. The expectation value of
the measured observable in the measured wave function is already hidden in the
process of the projective measurement, and what the protection procedure does is
12 Since the pointer shift is always continuous and smooth during a protective measurement, it is arguable that
the evolution of the ontic state of the measured system (which determines the pointer shift) is also
continuous. Then for an ideal situation where the protective measurement is instantaneous, the ontic state of
the measured system will be unchanged after the measurement and my previous arguments for ψ-ontology in
terms of protective measurements will be still valid. Note that the evolution of the position of the pointer as
its ontic state may be discontinuous in an ψ-epistemic model. However, the range of the position variation is
limited by the width of the pointer wavepacket, which can be arbitrarily small in principle. Thus such
discontinuous evolution cannot be caused by the evolution of the ontic state of the measured system, whether
continuous or discontinuous.
13 Note that in the ψ-epistemic models given by Combes et al (2015), it is implicitly assumed that the protection
procedure knows the measured wave function. Thus it is not surprising that the models can reproduce the
predictions of quantum mechanics for protective measurements.
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to make it visible in the final measurement result by keeping the measured wave
function unchanged.
In conclusion, the above analysis of how a protective measurement influences the
measured system and obtains its result does not refute but strengthen my previous
arguments for ψ-ontology in terms of protective measurements.
4.4 A weaker criterion of reality
The first assumption of the ontological models framework is that if a quantum
system is prepared such that quantum mechanics assigns a pure state to it, then
after preparation the system has a well-defined set of physical properties (Harrigan
and Spekkens, 2010; Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph, 2012). The ψ-ontology theorems,
including the above arguments in terms of protective measurements, are all based
on this assumption. If one drops this assumption as anti-realists would like to do,
then one can still restore the (non-realist) ψ-epistemic view or assume another non-
realist view. In this section, I will give a stronger proof of the reality of the wave
function based not on this realistic assumption but on a weaker criterion of reality.
The analysis is beyond the ontological models framework.
A well-known criterion of reality is the EPR criterion of reality, which says that
“If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e. with
probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an ele-
ment of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.” (Einstein, Podol-
sky and Rosen, 1935).14 The main difficulty of applying this criterion of reality is to
determine whether the measured system is disturbed during a measurement. Since
we don’t know the ontic state of the measured system and its dynamics during a
measurement before our analysis using the criterion of reality, the requirement of
“without in any way disturbing a system” in the criterion seems difficult or even
impossible to justify. In addition, disturbing the measured system does not neces-
sarily exclude the possibility that the measurement result reflects the property of
the measured system. The disturbance may not influence the parts of the ontic state
of the measured system which generate the measurement result (see, e.g. Spekkens,
2007 for an example).
Here, based on the analysis given in the last section, I suggest an improved cri-
terion of reality that may avoid the above problems. It is that if a measurement of
a physical quantity on a system obtains a definite result, which is denoted by the
value of a pointer variable after the measurement, and during the measurement the
pointer shift rate is also determined by the value, then the measurement result re-
14 Note that Hetzroni and Rohrlich (2014) gave an argument for ψ-ontology based on protective measurements
and the EPR criterion of reality, and Gao (2014b) improved the argument by revising the criterion of reality
so that it can also be applied to realistic protective measurements.
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flects a physical property of the measured system. This criterion of reality provides
a direct link from the mathematical quantities in a realistic theory to the properties
of a physical system via experience. By using it to analyze the ontological content
of a theory, we need not care about the underlying ontic state of a physical system
and its possible dynamics during a measurement. Thus the analysis will be simpler.
It can be seen that this suggested criterion of reality can be directly applied to
classical mechanics. Moreover, due to the existence of protective measurements, it
can also be applied to quantum mechanics to analyze the ontological status of the
wave function. As I have pointed out in the last section, a protective measurement
on a physical system will obtain a definite result, namely the expectation value of
the measured observable in the measured wave function, and during the measure-
ment the pointer shift rate is also determined by the expectation value. Thus, ac-
cording to the suggested criterion of reality, the expectation value of the measured
observable in the measured wave function is a physical property of the measured
system. Since the wave function can be constructed from the expectation values
of a sufficient number of observables, the measured wave function also represents
a physical property of the measured system. This proves the reality of the wave
function in quantum mechanics.
Since the suggested criterion of reality does not necessarily require that a quan-
tum system have properties, it is weaker than the realistic assumption of the onto-
logical models framework. Even though some people refuse to attribute properties
to quantum systems, they may well accept this criterion of reality. On the one hand,
this criterion of reality can be perfectly applied to classical mechanics, and one can
use it to get the anticipant ontological content of the theory. On the other hand,
people usually think that this criterion of reality cannot be applied to quantum
mechanics in general (although it can be applied to the measurements of the eigen-
states of the measured observable), and thus it does not influence the anti-realist
views of the theory. However, the existence of protective measurements must be
a surprise for these people. It will be interesting to see whether some anti-realists
will reject this criterion of reality due to the existence of protective measurements.
Certainly, one can also restore the (non-realist) ψ-epistemic view by rejecting
the suggested criterion of reality. However, there is a good reason why this is not
a good choice. it is arguable that a reasonable, universal criterion of reality, which
may provide a plausible link between theory and reality via experience, is useful
or even necessary for realistic theories. The criterion of reality is not necessarily
complete, being able to derive all ontological content of a theory, which seems to
be an impossible task. However, we can at least derive the basic ontological content
of a realistic theory by using this criterion of reality. If one admits the usefulness
and universality of such a criterion of reality, then the similarity between classical
measurements and protective measurements will require that if one assumes a re-
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alist view of classical mechanics, admitting the ontological content of the theory
derived from the suggested criterion of reality, then one must also admit the onto-
logical content of quantum mechanics derived from this criterion of reality, such as
the reality of the wave function. The essential point is not that the suggested crite-
rion of reality must be true, but that if we accept the usefulness and universality of
such a criterion of reality and apply it to classical mechanics and macroscopic ob-
jects to derive the anticipant classical ontology, we should also apply it to quantum
mechanics and microscopic objects to derive the quantum ontology, no matter how
strange it is. Otherwise we will have to divide the world into a quantum part and a
classical part artificially, and we will not have a unified world view as a result.
5
Origin of the Schro¨dinger equation
I have argued that the wave function in the Schro¨dinger equation of quantum me-
chanics represents the physical state of a single system. In this chapter, I will pro-
vide additional evidence supporting this conclusion by analyzing the origin of the
Schro¨dinger equation.
Many quantum mechanics textbooks provide a heuristic derivation of the Schro¨dinger
equation (see, e.g. Schiff, 1968; Landau and Lifshitz, 1977; Greiner, 1994). It be-
gins with the assumption that the state of a free microscopic particle has the form
of a plane wave ei(kx−ωt). When combining with the de Broglie relations for mo-
mentum and energy p = ~k and E = ~ω, this state becomes ei(px−Et)/~. Then it
uses the nonrelativistic energy-momentum relation E = p2/2m to obtain the free
Schro¨dinger equation. Lastly, this equation is generalized to include an external
potential, and the end result is the Schro¨dinger equation.
In the following sections, I will show that the heuristic derivation of the free
Schro¨dinger equation can be made more rigorous by resorting to spacetime trans-
lation invariance and relativistic invariance. Spacetime translation gives the defi-
nitions of momentum and energy, and spacetime translation invariance entails that
the state of a free quantum system with definite momentum and energy assumes
the plane wave form ei(px−Et). Moreover, the relativistic transformations of the gen-
erators of space translation and time translation further determine the relativistic
energy-momentum relation, whose nonrelativistic approximation is E = p2/2m.
Although the requirements of these invariances are already well known, an explicit
and complete derivation of the free Schro¨dinger equation using them seems still
missing in the literature.1 The new analysis may not only answer why the physical
1 Note that several authors have claimed that the free Schro¨dinger equation can be derived in terms of Galilean
invariance and a few other assumptions (Musielak and Fry, 2009a, 2009b). But the derivation is arguably
problematic (Gao, 2014e). In addition, there are also attempts to derive the Schro¨dinger equation from
Newtonian mechanics, a typical example of which is Nelson’s stochastic mechanics (Nelson, 1966). It has
been pointed out that Nelson’s stochastic mechanics is not equivalent to quantum mechanics (Grabert,
Ha¨nggi and Talkner, 1979; Wallstrom, 1994). Moreover, Nelson himself also showed that there is an
5.1 Spacetime translation invariance 45
state of a single system is described by a wave function, but also help answer why
the linear nonrelativistic time evolution of the wave function is governed by the
Schro¨dinger equation.
5.1 Spacetime translation invariance
It is well known that the laws of motion that govern the time evolution of an iso-
lated system satisfies spacetime translation invariance.2 In this section, I will ana-
lyze how the requirement of spacetime translation invariance restricts the possible
forms of the laws of motion. For the sake of simplicity, I will mainly analyze one-
dimensional motion. The physical state of an isolated system is assumed to be
represented by a general analytic function with respect to both x and t, ψ(x, t).3 A
space translation operator can be defined as
T (a)ψ(x, t) = ψ(x − a, t). (5.1)
It means translating rigidly the state of the system, ψ(x, t), by an infinitesimal
amount a in the positive x direction.4 T (a) can be further expressed as
T (a) = e−iapˆ, (5.2)
where pˆ is the generator of space translation.5 By expanding ψ(x − a, t) in order of
a, we can further get
pˆ = −i ∂
∂x
. (5.3)
empirical difference between the predictions of quantum mechanics and his stochastic mechanics when
considering quantum entanglement and nonlocality (Nelson, 2005). But it seems still possible to obtain
quantum mechanics “as a statistical mechanics canonical ensemble average of classical variables obeying
classical dynamics.” (Pearle, 2005) Adler’s (2004) trace dynamics is an excellent example. In the theory, it is
shown that under plausible assumptions, thermodynamic averages leads to the Schro¨dinger equation, while
fluctuations around the averages leads to a stochastic modification of the Schro¨dinger equation, which may
naturally explain the collapse of the wave function and the Born rule.
2 This is due to the homogeneity of space and time. The homogeneity of space ensures that the same
experiment performed at two different places gives the same result, and the homogeneity in time ensures that
the same experiment repeated at two different times gives the same result.
3 It is arguable that ψ(x, t) is the most general scalar representation of the physical state of a system. As we will
see later, however, the equation that governs the time evolution of the state will restrict the possible forms of
ψ(x, t).
4 There are in general two different pictures of translation: active transformation and passive transformation.
The active transformation corresponds to displacing the studied system, and the passive transformation
corresponds to moving the coordinate system. Physically, the equivalence of the active and passive pictures is
due to the fact that moving the system one way is equivalent to moving the coordinate system the other way
by an equal amount. Here I will analyze spacetime translations in terms of active transformations.
5 In order to differentiate the momentum and energy eigenvalues from the momentum and energy operators, I
add a hat to the momentum and energy operators as usual. But I omit the hat for all other operators in this
book. In addition, for convenience of later discussion I introduce the imaginary unit i in the expression. This
does not influence the validity of the following derivation.
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Similarly, a time translation operator can be defined as
U(t)ψ(x, 0) = ψ(x, t). (5.4)
And it can also be expressed as U(t) = e−itEˆ , where
Eˆ = i
∂
∂t
(5.5)
is the generator of time translation. In order to know the laws of motion, we need
to find the concrete manifestation of Eˆ for a physical system, which means that we
need to find the evolution equation of state:
i
∂ψ(x, t)
∂t
= Hψ(x, t), (5.6)
where H is a to-be-determined operator that depends on the properties of the stud-
ied system, and it is also called the generator of time translation.6 In the following
analysis, I assume H is a linear operator independent of the evolved state, namely
the evolution is linear, which is an important presupposition in my derivation of the
free Schro¨dinger equation.
Let us now see the implications of spacetime translation invariance for the laws
of motion. First of all, time translational invariance requires that H have no time
dependence, namely dH/dt = 0. This can be demonstrated as follows (see also
Shankar, 1994, p.295). Suppose an isolated system is in state ψ0 at time t1 and
evolves for an infinitesimal time δt. The state of the system at time t1 + δt, to first
order in δt, will be
ψ(x, t1 + δt) = [I − iδtH(t1)]ψ0. (5.7)
If the evolution is repeated at time t2, beginning with the same initial state, the state
at t2 + δt will be
ψ(x, t2 + δt) = [I − iδtH(t2)]ψ0. (5.8)
Time translational invariance requires the outcome state should be the same:
ψ(x, t2 + δt) − ψ(x, t1 + δt) = iδt[H(t1) − H(t2)]ψ0 = 0. (5.9)
Since the initial state ψ0 is arbitrary, it follows that H(t1) = H(t2). Moreover,
since t1 and t2 are also arbitrary, it follows that H is time-independent, namely
6 Similarly I also introduce the imaginary unit i in the equation for convenience of later discussion.
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dH/dt = 0. It can be seen that this result relies on the linearity of time evolution.
If H depends on the state, then obviously we cannot obtain dH/dt = 0 because the
state is time-dependent. But we still have H(t1, ψ0) = H(t2, ψ0), which means that
the state-dependent H also satisfies time translational invariance.
Secondly, space translational invariance requires [T (a),U(t)] = 0, which further
leads to [pˆ, Eˆ] = 0 and [pˆ,H] = 0. This can be demonstrated as follows (see also
Shankar, 1994, p.293). Suppose at t = 0 two observers A and B prepare identical
isolated systems at x = 0 and x = a, respectively. Let ψ(x, 0) be the state of the
system prepared by A. Then T (a)ψ(x, 0) is the state of the system prepared by B,
which is obtained by translating (without distortion) the state ψ(x, 0) by an amount
a to the right. The two systems look identical to the observers who prepared them.
After time t, the states evolve into U(t)ψ(x, 0) and U(t)T (a)ψ(x, 0). Since the time
evolution of each identical system at different places should appear the same to the
local observers, the above two systems, which differed only by a spatial translation
at t = 0, should differ only by the same spatial translation at future times. Thus
the state U(t)T (a)ψ(x, 0) should be the translated version of A’s system at time t,
namely we have U(t)T (a)ψ(x, 0) = T (a)U(t)ψ(x, 0). This relation holds true for
any initial state ψ(x, 0), and thus we have [T (a),U(t)] = 0, which says that space
translation operator and time translation operator are commutative. Again, it can
be seen that the linearity of time evolution is an important presupposition of this
result. If U(t) depends on the state, then the space translational invariance will only
lead to U(t,Tψ)T (a)ψ(x, 0) = T (a)U(t, ψ)ψ(x, 0), from which we cannot obtain
[T (a),U(t)] = 0.
When dH/dt = 0, the solutions of the evolution equation Eq.(5.6) assume the
basic form
ψ(x, t) = ϕE(x)e−iEt, (5.10)
and their linear superpositions, where E is an eigenvalue of H, and ϕE(x) is an
eigenfunction of H and satisfies the time-independent equation:
HϕE(x) = EϕE(x). (5.11)
Moreover, the commutative relation [pˆ,H] = 0 further implies that pˆ and H have
common eigenfunctions. Since the eigenfunction of pˆ = −i ∂∂x is eipx (except a nor-
malization factor), where p is the eigenvalue, the basic solutions of the evolution
equation Eq.(5.6) for an isolated system assume the form ei(px−Et), which repre-
sents the state of an isolated system with definite properties p and E. In quantum
mechanics, pˆ and Eˆ, the generators of space translation and time translation, are
also called momentum operator and energy operator, respectively, and H is called
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the Hamiltonian of the system. Correspondingly, ei(px−Et) is the eigenstate of both
momentum and energy, and p and E are the corresponding momentum and energy
eigenvalues, respectively. Then the state ei(px−Et) describes an isolated system (e.g.
a free electron) with definite momentum p and energy E.
5.2 The energy-momentum relation
The energy-momentum relation can be further determined by considering the rela-
tivistic transformations of the generators of space translation and time translation.
The operator Pˆµ = (Eˆ/c,−pˆ) = i( 1c ∂∂t ,∇) is a four-vector operator. In order that
its eigenvalue equation holds in all inertial frames, its eigenvalues must transform
as a four-vector too. In other words, every eigenvalue of the four-vector operator
Pˆµ, (E/c,−p), is also a four-vector. Since the dot product of two four-vectors is
Lorentz invariant (a Lorentz scalar), we can form a Lorentz scalar p2 − E2/c2 with
the four-vector (E/c,−p). Then the energy-momentum relation is:
E2 = p2c2 + E20, (5.12)
where p and E are the momentum and energy of a microscopic particle, respec-
tively, and E0 is the energy of the particle when its momentum is zero, called the
rest energy of the particle.7 By defining m = E0/c2 as the (rest) mass of the particle,
we can further obtain the familiar energy-momentum relation
E2 = p2c2 + m2c4. (5.13)
In the nonrelativistic domain, this energy-momentum relation reduces to E = p2/2m.
5.3 Derivation of the Schro¨dinger equation
Since the operators Eˆ and pˆ have common eigenfunctions for an isolated system,
the relation between their eigenvalues E and p or the energy-momentum relation
implies the corresponding operator relation between Eˆ and pˆ. In the nonrelativistic
domain, the operator relation is Eˆ = pˆ2/2m for an isolated system. Then we can
obtain the free Schro¨dinger equation:
i
∂ψ(x, t)
∂t
= − 1
2m
∂2ψ(x, t)
∂x2
. (5.14)
Here it needs to be justified that the only parameter m in this equation assumes
real values; otherwise the existence of the imaginative unit i in the equation will
7 For other derivations of the energy-momentum relation see Sonego and Pin (2005) and references therein.
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be an illusion and the equation will be distinct from the free Schro¨dinger equa-
tion. Since velocity assumes real values, this is equivalent to proving that momen-
tum or the eigenvalue of the generator of space translation assumes real values,
namely that the generator of space translation itself is Hermitian. This is indeed
the case. Since the space translation operator T (a) preserves the norm of the state:∫ ∞
−∞ ψ
∗(x, t)ψ(x, t)dx =
∫ ∞
−∞ ψ
∗(x − a, t)ψ(x − a, t)dx, T (a) is unitary, satisfying
T †(a)T (a) = I. Thus the generator of space translation, pˆ, which is defined by
T (a) = e−iapˆ, is Hermitian.
In addition, it is worth noting that the reduced Planck constant ~ with dimension
of action is missing in the above free Schro¨dinger equation. However, this is in
fact not a problem. The reason is that the dimension of ~ can be absorbed in the
dimension of m. For example, we can stipulate the dimensional relations as p =
1/L, E = 1/T and m = T/L2, where L and T represent the dimensions of space
and time, respectively (see Duff, Okun and Veneziano, 2002 for a more detailed
analysis). Moreover, the value of ~ can be set to the unit of number 1 in principle.
Thus the above equation is essentially the free Schro¨dinger equation in quantum
mechanics.
When assuming the time evolution due to interaction is still linear, we can further
obtain the Schro¨dinger equation under an external potential V(x, t):
i
∂ψ(x, t)
∂t
= − 1
2m
∂2ψ(x, t)
∂x2
+ V(x, t)ψ(x, t). (5.15)
The concrete form of the potential in a given situation is determined by a theory of
interactions, such as the nonrelativistic approximation of interacting quantum field
theory.
The Schro¨dinger equation for one-body systems can also be extended to many-
body systems. For simplicity, consider a free two-body system containing two sub-
systems m1 and m2. When ignoring the interaction between the two subsystems,
the Schro¨dinger equation that governs the evolution of this system will be
i
∂[ψ1(x1, t)ψ2(x2, t)]
∂t
= −[ 1
2m1
∂2
∂x21
+
1
2m2
∂2
∂x22
][ψ1(x1, t)ψ2(x2, t)]. (5.16)
wherer x1 and x2 are the coordinates of the two subsystems, respectively, and
ψ1(x1, t) and ψ2(x2, t) are their wave functions, respectively. When considering the
interaction between the two subsystems and assuming the time evolution due to in-
teraction is still linear, the interaction will form an entangled state of the whole
system which is defined in a six-dimensional configuration space, and the free
Schro¨dinger equation that governs the evolution of this interacting two-body sys-
tem will be
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i
∂ψ(x1, x2, t)
∂t
= −[ 1
2m1
∂2
∂x21
+
1
2m2
∂2
∂x22
]ψ(x1, x2, t) + V12(x1, x2, t)ψ(x1, x2, t),
(5.17)
where the entangled wave function ψ(x1, x2, t) describes the whole two-body sys-
tem, and the potential energy term V12(x1, x2, t) describes the interaction between
its two subsystems.
5.4 Further discussion
I have derived the free Schro¨dinger equation based on an analysis of spacetime
translation invariance and relativistic invariance. The new analysis may not only
make the Schro¨dinger equation in quantum mechanics more logical and under-
standable, but also help understand the origin of the complex and multi-dimensional
wave function.
As noted before, the free Schro¨dinger equation is usually derived in quantum
mechanics textbooks by analogy and correspondence with classical physics. There
are at least two mysteries in this heuristic derivation. First of all, even if the be-
havior of microscopic particles likes wave and thus a wave function is needed to
describe them, it is unclear why the wave function must assume a complex form.
Indeed, when Schro¨dinger invented his equation, he was also puzzled by the in-
evitable appearance of the imaginary unit “i” in the equation. Next, one doesn’t
know why there are the de Broglie relations for momentum and energy and why
the nonrelativistic energy-momentum relation is E = p2/2m.
According to the analysis given in the previous sections, the key to unveiling
these mysteries is to analyze spacetime translation invariance of laws of motion.
Spacetime translation gives the definitions of momentum and energy in quantum
mechanics. The momentum operator pˆ is defined as the generator of space trans-
lation, and it is Hermitian and its eigenvalues are real. Moreover, the form of the
momentum operator is uniquely determined by its definition, which turns out to
be pˆ = −i∂/∂x, and its eigenfunctions are eipx , where p is the corresponding real
eigenvalue. Similarly, the energy operator Eˆ is defined as the generator of time
translation, and its universal form is Eˆ = i∂/∂t. But the concrete manifestation of
this operator for a physical system, denoted by H and called the Hamiltonian of the
system, is determined by the concrete situation.
Fortunately, for an isolated system, the form of H, which determines the evo-
lution equation of state, can be fixed for linear evolution by the requirements of
spacetime translation invariance and relativistic invariance. Concretely speaking,
time translational invariance requires that dH/dt = 0, and this implies that the so-
lutions of the evolution equation i∂ψ(x, t)/∂t = Hψ(x, t) are ϕE(x)e−iEt and their
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superpositions, where ϕE(x) is the eigenfunction of H. Moreover, space transla-
tional invariance requires [pˆ,H] = 0. This means that pˆ and H have common
eigenfunctions, and thus ϕE(x) = eipx. Therefore, ei(px−Et) and their superpositions
are solutions of the evolution equation for an isolated system, where ei(px−Et) rep-
resents the state of the system with momentum p and energy E. In other words,
the state of an isolated system (e.g. a free electron) with definite momentum and
energy assumes the plane wave form ei(px−Et). Furthermore, the relation between
p and E or the energy-momentum relation can be determined by considering the
relativistic transformation of the generators of space translation and time transla-
tion, and in the nonrelativistic domain it is E = p2/2m. Then we can obtain the
Hamiltonian of an isolated system, H = pˆ2/2m, and the free Schro¨dinger equation,
Eq.(5.14).
Finally, I emphasize again that the linearity of time evolution is an important
presupposition in the above derivation of the free Schro¨dinger equation. It is only
for linear evolution that spacetime translation invariance of laws of motion can
help determine the precise form of the equation of motion for isolated systems. It
is possible that the free evolution equation also contains nonlinear evolution terms.
However, although nonlinear time evolution can also satisfy spacetime translation
invariance, the invariance requirement cannot help determine the precise form of
the nonlinear evolution equation. Nonlinear time evolution, if it exists, must have
an additional physical origin. I will discuss this issue in Chapter 8.
6
The ontology of quantum mechanics (I)
I have argued in the previous chapters that the wave function in quantum mechanics
represents the physical state of a single system. The next question is: What physical
state does the wave function represent? We must answer this question in order to
know the ontology of quantum mechanics.
Unfortunately, like the nature of the wave function, the ontological meaning of
the wave function has also been a hot topic of debate since the early days of quan-
tum mechanics. Today it is still unclear what ontic state the wave function repre-
sents in the realistic alternatives to quantum mechanics, such as Bohm’s theory,
Everett’s theory, and collapse theories. It can be expected that the ψ-ontology the-
orems, which says that the wave function is ontic, may have further implications
for the ontological meaning of the wave function. The reason is that these theo-
rems say that the ontic state of a physical system, which is represented by the wave
function, has certain efficacy during a measurement, and a further analysis of the
efficacy of the ontic state may help find what the ontic state really is.
According to the existing ψ-ontology theorems such as the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph
theorem, which are based on an analysis of projective measurements, the efficacy
of the ontic state of a physical system is to determine the probabilities for differ-
ent results of a projective measurement on the system. It seems that such efficacy
says little about what the ontic state of a physical system is (see also Dorato and
Laudisa, 2014). Moreover, whether the efficacy exists or not also depends on the
solutions to the measurement problem, e.g. it does not exist in deterministic theo-
ries such as Bohm’s theory. In contrast, my arguments for ψ-ontology in terms of
protective measurements says something different. According to these arguments,
the efficacy of the ontic state of a physical system is to determine the definite result
of a protective measurement on the system, not probabilities. This direct, definite
link is obviously stronger than the above indirect, probabilistic link. Moreover, the
efficacy exists in any realist theory consistent with the predictions of quantum me-
chanics, independently of the solutions to the measurement problem. Therefore,
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the efficacy revealed by protective measurements may tell us something about the
underlying ontology.
For a quantum system whose wave function is ψ(x) at a given instant, we can
measure the density |ψ(x)|2 in each position x in space by a protective measurement
(see Section 1.3). In other words, the density |ψ(x)|2 as part of the ontic state has
efficacy to shift the pointer of the measuring device and yield the result of the pro-
tective measurement. Then, what density is the density |ψ(x)|2? Since a measure-
ment must always be realized by certain physical interaction between the measured
system and the measuring device, the density must be, in the first place, the den-
sity of certain interacting charge. For example, if the measurement is realized by
an electrostatic interaction between the measured system (with charge Q) and the
measuring device, then the density multiplied by the charge of the system, namely
|ψ(x)|2Q, will be charge density. It is such concrete properties that have the actual
efficiencies during a measurement.
In this chapter, I will analyze the existence and origin of the charge distribu-
tion of a quantum system. As we will see, the analysis will help unveil the deeper
ontological meaning of the wave function.
6.1 Schro¨dinger’s charge density hypothesis
In quantum mechanics, an electron has an electric charge represented by −e in the
potential term of the Schro¨dinger equation, −eϕψ(x, t), where ψ(x, t) is the wave
function of the electron, and ϕ is an external electric scalar potential. An intriguing
question is: how is the charge of the electron distributed in space? We can measure
the total charge of an electron by electromagnetic interaction and find it in a certain
region of space. Thus it seems that the charge of an electron must exist in space
with a certain distribution. When Schro¨dinger introduced the wave function and
founded his wave mechanics in 1926, he also suggested an answer to this ques-
tion. Schro¨dinger assumed that the charge of an electron is distributed in the whole
space, and the charge density in position x at instant t is −e|ψ(x, t)|2, where ψ(x, t) is
the wave function of the electron. In the following, I will give a detailed historical
and logical analysis of Schro¨dinger’s charge density hypothesis.
In his paper on the equivalence between wave mechanics and matrix mechan-
ics (Schro¨dinger, 1926b), Schro¨dinger suggested that it might be possible to give
an extraordinarily visualizable and intelligible interpretation of the intensity and
polarization of radiation by assuming the wave function, which was then called
mechanical field scalar, is the source of the radiation. In particular, he assumed that
the charge density of an electron as the source of radiation is given by the real part
of −eψ∂ψ∗/∂t, where ψ is the wave function of the electron. In his third paper on
wave mechanics (Schro¨dinger, 1926c), which deals with perturbation theory and
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its application to the Stark effect, Schro¨dinger noted in an addendum in proof that
the correct charge density of an electron was given by −e|ψ|2. Then in his fourth
paper on wave mechanics and his 1927 Solvay report (Schro¨dinger, 1926d, 1928),
Schro¨dinger further showed how this gives rise to a sensible notion of charge den-
sity for several electrons, each contribution being obtained by integrating over the
other electrons. Concretely speaking, for a many-body system, select one subsys-
tem and keep the coordinates of the subsystem that describe its position fixed at a
given position and integrate |ψ|2 over all the rest of the coordinates of the system
and multiply the charge of the subsystem, and do a similar thing for each subsys-
tem, in each case fixing the selected subsystem at the same given position. Then
the sum of all these partial results gives the charge density at the given position.
At the 1927 Solvay conference, Born posed an objection relating to quadrupole
moments to Schro¨dinger’s charge density hypothesis (Bacciagaluppi and Valen-
tini, 2009, p.426). Born considered two microscopic particles with charge e whose
wave function is ψ(x1, x2), where x1 and x2 stand for all the coordinates of the two
particles. According to Schro¨dinger, the charge density is
ρ(x) = e
∫
|ψ(x, x2)|2dx2 + e
∫
|ψ(x1, x)|2dx1 . (6.1)
But the electric quadrupole moment
e
∫ ∫
x1x2|ψ(x1, x2)|2dx1dx2
cannot be expressed using the function ρ(x). As a result, one cannot reduce the
radiation of the quadrupole to the motion of a charge distribution ρ(x) in the usual
three-dimensional space. Born then concluded that interpreting the quantity |ψ|2 as
charge density leads to difficulties in the case of quadrupole moments.
However, it can be seen by a more careful analysis that the above problem is
not really a problem of Schro¨dinger’s charge density hypothesis, but a problem
of Schro¨dinger’s interpretation of the wave function in terms of charge density. In
fact, Schro¨dinger also clearly realized this problem. As early as in his equivalence
paper (Schro¨dinger, 1926b), Schro¨dinger already noticed the difficulty relating to
the problem of several electrons, which lies in the fact that the wave function is a
function in configuration space, not in real space. Although the charge distribution
in three-dimensional space can be consistently defined for an N-body system, it
does not reflect all information encoded in the wave function of the system which
lives in a 3N-dimensional configuration space. Therefore, although the existence
of charge distribution may provide an approximate classical explanation for some
phenomena of radiation, it cannot account for all experimental observations, e.g.
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as Born rightly pointed out, the motion of a charge distribution cannot explain the
radiation of the quadrupole.
Besides this incompleteness problem for many-body systems, Schro¨dinger (1928)
also realized that the charge distribution of a quantum system such as an electron
cannot be purely classical either, because his equation does not include the usual
Coulomb interaction between the distributions. In particular, there is no electro-
static self-interaction of the charge distribution of a quantum system. Moreover,
according to the Schro¨dinger equation, the interacting systems should be treated
as a whole, whose wave function is defined in a multi-dimensional configuration
space, and cannot be decomposed into a direct product of the wave functions of
all interacting systems. This makes the interaction between two charged quantum
systems more complex than the interaction between two classical charges.
Schro¨dinger’s interpretation of the wave function in terms of charge density was
latter investigated and extended by a few authors (see, e.g. Madelung, 1926, 1927;
Ja´nossy, 1962; Jaynes, 1973; Barut, 1988).1 Due to the above problems, however,
this semiclassical interpretation cannot be satisfactory in the final analysis. More-
over, although this fact does not imply the non-existence of the charge distribution
of an electron, the very limited success of the interpretation does not provide a
convincing argument for its existence either. Presumably because people thought
that the hypothetical charge distribution of an electron cannot be directly measured
and its existence also lacks a consistent physical explanation, Schro¨dinger’s charge
density hypothesis has been largely ignored.2
6.2 Is an electron a charge cloud?
In order to answer the question of whether a quantum system such as an electron
has a well-defined charge distribution as Schro¨dinger assumed, we need to first de-
termine what exists in quantum mechanics. According to the extended ontological
models framework or the suggested criterion of reality (see Chapter 4), the definite
result obtained by a protective measurement reflects a property of the measured
quantum system. While what property the measured property is depends on the
concrete interaction between the measured system and the measuring device dur-
ing the protective measurement. In this section, I will analyze the existence of the
charge distribution of a quantum system with the help of protective measurements.
1 It is worth noting that Wallace and Timpson’s (2010) “spacetime state realism” can be regarded as a
generation of Schro¨dinger’s interpretation in some sense (see also Wallace, 2012, chap. 8). Although this
view may avoid the problems of wave function realism (Albert, 1996, 2013), it has the same problems as
Schro¨dinger’s interpretation. For a critical analysis of this view see Norsen (2016).
2 However, there is a modern variant of Schro¨dinger’s charge density hypothesis, which has been called mass
density ontology (Ghirardi, Grassi and Benatti, 1995; Ghirardi, 1997, 2016). I will briefly discuss it later in
Section 8.5.
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6.2.1 Two simple examples
Before my analysis of the charge distribution of a quantum system, I will give
two simple examples to explain how to determine whether a physical system has a
well-defined charge distribution.
Figure 6.1 Scheme of a non-disturbing measurement of the charge distribution of
a classical system
First of all, I will analyze the charge distribution of a classical system. Consider
a classical particle with charge Q, which is trapped in a small box. A measuring
electron is shot along a straight line near the box, and then detected on a screen
after passing by the box. According to Newton’s laws of motion and Coulomb’s
law, the deviation of the trajectory of the measuring electron is determined by the
charge of the measured particle, as well as by the distance between the electron
and the particle. If there were no charged particle in the box, the trajectory of the
electron would be a straight line as denoted by position “0” in Figure 6.1. Now the
trajectory of the electron will be deviated by a definite amount as denoted by posi-
tion “1” in Figure 6.1. Then according to the second assumption of the ontological
models framework or the suggested criterion of reality, a simple analysis of the
definite measurement result will tell us that the measured particle has a charge Q
in the box as its property, which has the efficacy to deviate the measuring electron.
Certainly, such ontological content of classical mechanics is already well-known.
However, this is because the theory was founded based on the classical ontology.
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Here I show that the ontology of the theory can be derived from its connections
with experience and a connecting rule between experience and reality such as the
suggested criterion of reality. This approach to the ontology of a physical theory is
universal, and it can be applied to all physical theories.
Here it may be necessary to further clarify the meaning of charge distribution
as a property of a physical system. As noted before, any physical measurement
is necessarily based on certain interaction between the measured system and the
measuring system. Concretely speaking, the measuring system is influenced by the
measured system through an interaction that depends on the measured property,
and the definite change of the measuring system then reflects this property of the
measured system (in accordance with the ontological models framework or the sug-
gested criterion of reality). For example, a position measurement must depend on
the existence of certain position-dependent interaction between the measured sys-
tem and the measuring system such as electrostatic interaction between two electric
charges. The existence of an electrostatic interaction during a measurement, which
is indicated by the deviation of the trajectory of the charged measuring system such
as an electron, then tells us that the measured system also has a charge responsible
for the interaction. Moreover, since the strength of the interaction relates to the dis-
tance between the two interacting systems, the measurement result may also reflect
the charge distribution of the measured system in space. In the above example, the
definite deviation of the trajectory of the measuring electron will tell us that there
exists a definite amount of charge in the box, and the extent of the deviation will
further tell us the amount of the charge there.
Secondly, I will analyze the charge distribution of a quantum system being in a
position eigenstate. Consider a quantum system with charge Q whose wave func-
tion is localized in a small box. A measuring electron, whose initial state is a Gaus-
sian wavepacket narrow in both position and momentum, is shot along a straight
line near the box. The electron is detected on a screen after passing by the box.
According to the Schro¨dinger equation with an external Coulomb potential, the
deviation of the trajectory of the electron wavepacket is determined by the charge
of the measured particle in the box, as well as by the distance between the elec-
tron and the particle. If there were no charged quantum system in the box, then the
trajectory of the electron wavepacket will be a straight line as denoted by position
“0” in Figure 6.2. Now, the trajectory of the electron wavepacket will be deviated
by a definite amount as denoted by position “1” in Figure 6.2. In an ideal situation
where the size of the box can be ignored, this can be regarded as a conventional
projective measurement of an eigenstate of the system’s charge in the box. Then
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Figure 6.2 Scheme of a projective measurement of the charge distribution of a
quantum system
according to the ontological models framework or the suggested criterion of real-
ity, an analysis of the definite measurement result will tell us that the measured
system has a charge Q in the box as its property.
In general, when a quantum system is in an eigenstate of an observable, a projec-
tive measurement of the observable will obtain a definite result, namely the eigen-
value of the observable corresponding to the eigenstate. Then, similarly, the sys-
tem has a property with value being the eigenvalue. This result is also called the
eigenvalue-eigenstate half link, which says that if a system is in an eigenstate of an
observable, the system has a property with value being the eigenvalue correspond-
ing to the eigenstate (see Section 2.2). This link provides a very limited connection
between quantum mechanics and reality.
6.2.2 The answer of protective measurement
I have analyzed the charge distributions of a classical system and a quantum system
being in a position eigenstate. It is demonstrated that a classical charged particle
has a well-defined charge distribution; the charge is localized in the definite posi-
tion in space where the particle is. Similarly, a charged quantum system being in a
position eigenstate also has a well-defined charge distribution; the charge is local-
ized in a definite position in space, which is the position eigenvalue corresponding
to the position eigenstate. Then, is there also a well-defined charge distribution
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for a quantum system being in a superposition of position eigenstates? And if the
answer is yes, what is the charge distribution of the system?
According to quantum mechanics, a projective position measurement of a su-
perposition of position eigenstates will change the state greatly by entanglement
and possible wavefunction collapse, and the measurement result is not definite but
random with certain probability in accordance with the Born rule. Thus neither the
ontological models framework nor the suggested criterion of reality can be used
to analyze the charge distributions of such superpositions when considering only
projective measurements. However, as I have argued before (in Chapter 4), both the
ontological models framework and the suggested criterion of reality can be applied
to a general quantum state when considering protective measurements; the definite
result obtained by a protective measurement reflects a property of the measured
system. In the following, I will demonstrate that protective measurements can tell
us that a quantum system has a well-defined charge distribution in the same sense
that classical measurements can tell us that a classical system has a charge distri-
bution and projective measurements can tell us that a quantum system being in a
position eigenstate has a charge distribution.
Consider a quantum system with charge Q whose wave function is
ψ(x, t) = aψ1(x, t) + bψ2(x, t), (6.2)
where ψ1(x, t) and ψ2(x, t) are two normalized wave functions respectively local-
ized in their ground states in two small identical boxes 1 and 2, and |a|2 + |b|2 = 1.
A measuring electron, whose initial state is a Gaussian wavepacket narrow in both
position and momentum, is shot along a straight line near box 1 and perpendicu-
lar to the line of separation between the two boxes. The electron is detected on a
screen after passing by box 1. Suppose the separation between the two boxes is
large enough so that a charge Q in box 2 has no observable influence on the elec-
tron. Then if the system is in box 2, namely |a|2 = 0, the trajectory of the electron
wavepacket will be a straight line as denoted by position “0” in Figure 6.3, indi-
cating that there is no charge in box 1. If the system is in box 1, namely |a|2 = 1,
the trajectory of the electron wavepacket will be deviated by a maximum amount
as denoted by position “1” in Figure 6.3, indicating that there is a charge Q in box
1. As noted above, these two measurements are conventional projective measure-
ments of two eigenstates of the system’s charge in box 1, and their results can tell
us that the measured system has a well-defined charge distribution in box 1 as its
property. However, when 0 < |a|2 < 1, i.e. when the measured system is in a su-
perposition of two eigenstates of its charge in box 1, such projective measurements
cannot obtain definite results and thus cannot tell us whether there is a well-defined
charge distribution in box 1.
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Figure 6.3 Scheme of a protective measurement of the charge distribution of a
quantum system
Now let us make a protective measurement of the charge of the system in box
1 for the superposition ψ(x, t).3 Then the trajectory of the electron wavepacket is
only influenced by the expectation value of the charge of the system in box 1, and
thus the electron wavepacket will reach the definite position “|a|2” between “0” and
“1” on the screen as denoted in Figure 6.3. According to the extended ontological
models framework or the suggested criterion of reality, this definite result of the
protective measurement indicates that the measured system has a charge |a|2Q in
box 1 as its property.
This result can be generalized to an arbitrary superposition of position eigen-
states. For a quantum system with charge Q whose wave function is ψ(x) at a given
instant, we can make a protective measurement of the charge of the system in a
3 An adiabatic-type protective measurement can be realized as follows (Aharonov, Anandan and Vaidman,
1993). Since the state ψ(x, t) is degenerate with its orthogonal state ψ⊥(x, t) = b∗ψ1(x, t) − a∗ψ2(x, t), we first
need an artificial protection procedure to remove the degeneracy, e.g. joining the two boxes with a long tube
whose diameter is small compared to the size of the box. By this protection ψ(x, t) will be a nondegenerate
energy eigenstate. Then we need to realize the adiabatic condition and the weakly interacting condition,
which are required for a protective measurement. These conditions can be satisfied when assuming that (1)
the measuring time of the electron is long compared to ~/∆E, where ∆E is the smallest of the energy
differences between ψ(x, t) and the other energy eigenstates, and (2) at all times the potential energy of
interaction between the electron and the system is small compared to ∆E. Then the measurement by means
of the electron trajectory is a realistic protective measurement, and when the conditions approach ideal
conditions, the measurement will be an (ideal) protective measurement with certainty. Note that weak
measurements have been implemented in experiments (see, e.g. Lundeen et al, 2011), and it can be
reasonably expected that adiabatic-type protective measurements can also be implemented in the near future
with the rapid development of quantum technologies (Cohen, 2016).
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small spatial region V having volume v near position x. This means to protectively
measure the following observable:
A =
Q, if x ∈ V ,0, if x < V . (6.3)
The result of the measurement is
〈A〉 = Q
∫
V
|ψ(x, t)|2dv. (6.4)
It indicates that the measured system has a charge Q
∫
V |ψ(x, t)|2dv in region V .
Then when v→ 0 and after performing measurements in sufficiently many regions
V , we can find that the measured system has a charge distribution in the whole
space, and the charge density in each position x is |ψ(x)|2Q.4
To sum up, I have argued with the help of protective measurements that a quan-
tum system has a well-defined charge distribution in space, in exactly the same
sense that a classical system has a well-defined charge distribution in space. More-
over, it is shown that the charge of a charged quantum system is distributed through-
out space, and the charge density in each position is equal to the modulus squared
of the wave function of the system there multiplied by the charge of the system.
Thus, visually speaking, a charged quantum system such as an electron is a charge
cloud. This confirms Schro¨dinger’s original charge density hypothesis.
6.3 The origin of charge density
In this section, I will further investigate the physical origin of the charge distri-
bution of a quantum system such as an electron. As we will see, the answer may
provide an important clue to the ontological meaning of the wave function.
As I have pointed out previously, there are at least two good motivations for
investigating of the origin of the charge distribution of a quantum system. First,
although the charge distribution can be consistently defined for a many-body sys-
tem, the distribution contains no information about the entanglement between the
subsystems of the many-body system. This indicates that the charge distribution is
an incomplete manifestation of the underlying physical state and thus must have a
deeper physical origin.5 Second, even for one-body systems the charge distribution
4 Similarly, we can protectively measure another observable B = ~2mi (A∇ + ∇A). The measurements will tell us
the measured system also has an electric flux distribution in space, and the electric flux density in position x
is jQ(x) =
~Q
2mi (ψ
∗∇ψ − ψ∇ψ∗). These results can also be generalized to a many-body system.
5 This conclusion is also supported by the seemingly puzzling fact that although each charged quantum system
has a charge distribution in space, the electrostatic interaction between two charged quantum systems is
described not by certain charge density terms but by the potential terms in the Schro¨dinger equation. Since
62 The ontology of quantum mechanics (I)
also has some puzzling features, e.g. the charge distribution of a single electron has
no electrostatic self-interaction. These puzzling features are in want of a reasonable
explanation, which may be provided by the origin of the charge distribution. In ad-
dition, the charge distribution has two possible forms, and we need to determine
which form is the actual form. Again, this is closely related to the physical origin
of the distribution.
Then, what kind of entity or process generates the charge distribution of a quan-
tum system in space, |ψ(x, t)|2Q? There are two possibilities. The charge distri-
bution can be generated by either (1) a continuous charge distribution with den-
sity |ψ(x, t)|2Q or (2) the motion of a discrete point charge Q with spending time
|ψ(x, t)|2dvdt in the infinitesimal spatial volume dv around x in the infinitesimal
time interval [t, t + dt].6 Correspondingly, the underlying physical entity is either a
continuous field or a discrete particle. For the first possibility, the charge distribu-
tion exists throughout space at the same time. For the second possibility, at every
instant there is only a localized, point-like particle with the total charge of the sys-
tem, and its motion during an infinitesimal time interval forms the effective charge
distribution. Concretely speaking, at a particular instant the charge density of the
particle in each position is either zero (if the particle is not there) or singular (if the
particle is there), while the time average of the density during an infinitesimal time
interval around the instant gives the effective charge density. Moreover, the motion
of the particle is ergodic in the sense that the integral of the formed charge density
in any region is equal to the expectation value of the total charge in the region.
6.3.1 Electrons are particles
In the following, I will try to determine the existent form of the charge distribution
of a quantum system.
If the charge distribution of a quantum system is continuous in nature and exists
throughout space at the same time, then any two parts of the distribution (e.g. the
charge density (and electric flux density) are not a complete manifestation of the physical state of a two-body
system, e.g. they do not contain the entanglement between the sub-systems of the two-body system, they are
not enough to describe the interaction between these two sub-systems when there is entanglement between
them in general cases. However, when there is no entanglement between two quantum systems in special
cases such as during a protective measurement, the charge density (and electric flux density) are enough to
describe the interaction and can also be directly manifested, e.g. in the results of protective measurements.
6 Note that the expectation value of an observable at a given instant, such as 〈A〉 = Q ∫V |ψ(x, t)|2dx, is either
the physical property of a quantum system at the precise instant (like the position of a classical particle) or
the limit of the time-averaged property of the system at the instant (like the standard velocity of a classical
particle). These two interpretations correspond to the above two possibilities. For the later, the observable
assumes an eigenvalue at each instant, and its value spreads all eigenvalues during an infinitesimal time
interval around the given instant. Moreover, the spending time in each eigenvalue is proportional to the
modulus squared of the wave function of the system there. In this way, such ergodic motion may generate the
expectation value of the observable (see also Aharonov and Cohen, 2014). I will discuss in the next chapter
whether this picture of ergodic motion applies to properties other than position.
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two partial charges in box 1 and box 2 in the example discussed in the last section),
like two electrons, will arguably have electrostatic interaction too.7 The existence
of such electrostatic self-interaction for individual quantum systems contradicts the
superposition principle of quantum mechanics (at least for microscopic systems
such as electrons). Moreover, the existence of the electrostatic self-interaction for
the charge distribution of an electron is incompatible with experimental observa-
tions either. For example, for the electron in the hydrogen atom, since the potential
of the electrostatic self-interaction is of the same order as the Coulomb potential
produced by the nucleus, the energy levels of hydrogen atoms would be remark-
ably different from those predicted by quantum mechanics and confirmed by ex-
periments if there existed such electrostatic self-interaction. In contrast, if there is
only a localized particle with charge at every instant, and the charge distribution
is effective, formed by the motion of the particle, then it is understandable that
there exists no such electrostatic self-interaction for the effective charge distribu-
tion. This is consistent with the superposition principle of quantum mechanics and
experimental observations.
Here is a further clarification of the above analysis. As noted before, the non-
existence of electrostatic self-interaction for the charge distribution of a single
quantum system poses a puzzle. According to quantum mechanics, two charge
distributions such as two electrons, which exist in space at the same time, have
electrostatic interaction described by the potential term in the Schro¨dinger equa-
tion, but in the two-box example discussed in the last section, the two charges in
box 1 and box 2 have no such electrostatic interaction. In fact, this puzzle does
not depend so much on the actual existence of the charge distribution as a property
of a quantum system. It is essentially that according to quantum mechanics, the
wavepacket ψ1 in box 1 has electrostatic interaction with any test electron, so does
the wavepacket ψ2 in box 2, but these two wavepackets, unlike two electrons, have
no electrostatic interaction.
Facing this puzzle one may have two responses. The usual one is simply ad-
mitting that the non-existence of the self-interaction of the charge distribution is a
distinct feature of the laws of quantum mechanics, but insisting that the laws are
what they are and no further explanation is needed. However, this response seems
to beg the question and is unsatisfactory in the final analysis. A more reasonable
response is to try to explain this puzzling feature, e.g. by analyzing its relationship
with the existent form of the charge distribution. The charge distribution has two
possible existent forms after all. On the one hand, the non-existence of the self-
interaction of the distribution may help determine which form is the actual one.
7 The interaction will be described by an additional potential term in the Schro¨dinger equation. Moreover, the
two parts of the distribution will be entangled, and their wave function will be defined in a six-dimensional
configuration space.
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For example, one form is inconsistent with this distinct feature, while the other
form is consistent with it. On the other hand, the actual existent form of the charge
distribution may also help explain the non-existence of the self-interaction of the
distribution.
This is just what the previous analysis has done. The analysis establishes a con-
nection between the non-existence of the self-interaction of the charge distribu-
tion of a quantum system and the actual existent form of the distribution. The rea-
son why two wavepackets of an electron, each of which has part of the electron’s
charge, have no electrostatic interaction is that these two wavepackets, unlike two
electrons, do not exist at the same time, and their charges are formed by the motion
of a localized particle with the total charge of the electron. Since there is only a lo-
calized particle at every instant, there exists no electrostatic self-interaction of the
effective charge distribution formed by the motion of the particle. In contrast, if the
two wavepackets with charges, like two electrons, existed at the same time, then
they would also have the same form of electrostatic interaction as two electrons.8
To sum up, I have argued that the superposition principle of quantum mechanics
requires that the charge distribution of a quantum system such as an electron is
effective; at every instant there is only a localized particle with the total charge
of the system, while during an infinitesimal time interval around the instant the
ergodic motion of the particle forms the effective charge distribution at the instant.
6.3.2 The motion of a particle is discontinuous
Which sort of ergodic motion then? If the ergodic motion of a particle is contin-
uous, then it can only form an effective charge distribution during a finite time
interval. But, according to quantum mechanics, the charge distribution is required
to be formed by the ergodic motion of the particle during an infinitesimal time in-
terval (not during a finite time interval) around a given instant. Thus it seems that
the ergodic motion of a particle cannot be continuous. This is at least what the
existing theory says. However, this argument may have a possible loophole. Al-
though the classical ergodic models that assume continuous motion of particles are
inconsistent with quantum mechanics due to the existence of finite ergodic time,
they may be not completely refuted by experiments if only the ergodic time is ex-
tremely short. After all quantum mechanics is only an approximation of a more
fundamental theory of quantum gravity, in which there may exist a minimum time
interval such as the Planck time (see also Section 8.4.1). Therefore, we need to
investigate the classical ergodic models more thoroughly.
First, consider an electron being in a momentum eigenstate. For this state the
8 For further discussion of this argument see Epilogue.
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charge distribution is even in the whole space at any time. If the motion of the
electron as a particle is continuous, moving with a finite speed, then it is obvious
that the motion cannot generate a charge distribution in the whole space during a
finite time interval, whether the distribution is even or not. The reason is that during
a finite time interval the particle can only move in a finite spatial region. Thus it
seems that only if the electron moves with an infinite speed at every instant, can it
form the required charge distribution in the whole space. But in this case, it seems
already meaningless to say that the motion of the electron is continuous.
Next, consider an electron being in a superposition of two momentum eigen-
states with opposite momenta. For this state the charge distribution is cyclical in
the whole space at all times. Similarly, the continuous motion of the electron with
a finite speed cannot generate the charge distribution during any finite time inter-
val.9 Moreover, even if the electron moves with an infinite speed at every instant,
it can only form an even charge distribution in the whole space, and it cannot form
a cyclical charge distribution in the whole space. Thus it seems that the continuous
motion of the electron cannot form the required charge distribution in this case.
This conclusion also holds true for general superpositions of momentum eigen-
states which spread in the whole space.
Thirdly, consider an electron in a one-dimensional box in the first excited state
(Aharonov and Vaidman, 1993). For this state the charge distribution is symmetry
relative to the center of the box, and the charge density is zero at the center of
the box, as well as at the two ends of the box. Since the charge distribution only
exists in a finite spatial region, it seems that the continuous motion of the electron
with a finite speed may generate the charge distribution during a very short time
interval.10 However, since the amount of time the electron spends around a given
position is proportional to the charge density in the position, the electron can spend
no time at the center of the box where the charge density is zero; in other words,
it must move at infinite velocity at the center. Although the appearance of infinite
velocities at an instant may be not a fatal problem (since the infinite potential is
only an ideal situation), it seems difficult to explain why the electron speeds up at
the node and where the infinite energy required for the acceleration comes from
(Aharonov and Vaidman, 1993).
Lastly, consider an electron in a superposition of two energy eigenstates in two
boxes. In this case, even if the electron can move with infinite velocity, it cannot
9 Even if this is possible, it is also difficult to explain why the electron moves back and forth in space.
10 Note that in Nelson’s stochastic mechanics, the electron, which is assumed to undergo Brownian motion,
moves only within a region bounded by the nodes (Nelson, 1966). This ensures that the theory can be
equivalent to quantum mechanics in a limited sense. Obviously this sort of motion is not ergodic and cannot
generate the right charge distribution. This conclusion also holds true for the motion of particles in Bohm’s
theory (Bohm, 1952), as well as in some variants of stochastic mechanics and Bohm’s theory (Bell, 1986b;
Vink, 1993; Barrett, Leifer and Tumulka, 2005).
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continuously move from one box to another due to the restriction of box walls.
Therefore, any sort of continuous motion cannot generate the required charge dis-
tribution. One may still object that this is merely an artifact of the idealization of
infinite potential. However, even in this ideal situation, the ergodic motion of the
electron should also be able to generate the required charge distribution; otherwise
the model will be inconsistent with quantum mechanics.
In view of these serious drawbacks of classical ergodic models and their incon-
sistency with quantum mechanics, I conclude that the ergodic motion of a particle
cannot be continuous. If the motion of a particle is essentially discontinuous, then
the particle can readily move throughout all regions where the wave function is
nonzero during an arbitrarily short time interval around a given instant. Further-
more, when the probability density that the particle appears in each position is
equal to the modulus squared of its wave function there at every instant, the discon-
tinuous motion will be ergodic and can generate the right charge distribution, for
which the charge density in each position is proportional to the modulus squared of
its wave function there. This will solve the above problems plagued by the classical
ergodic models. The discontinuous ergodic motion requires no finite ergodic time.
Moreover, a particle undergoing discontinuous motion can also “jump” from one
region to another spatially separated region, whether there is an infinite potential
wall between them or not. Finally, discontinuous motion has no problem of infinite
velocity. The reason is that no classical velocity and acceleration can be defined for
discontinuous motion, and energy and momentum will require new definitions and
understandings as in quantum mechanics.
In summary, I have argued that the ergodic motion of a particle is discontinuous,
and the probability density that the particle appears in each position is equal to the
modulus squared of its wave function there.
6.3.3 An argument for random discontinuous motion
For the discontinuous motion of a particle, since quantum mechanics provides no
further information about the position of the particle at each instant, it seems that
the discontinuous motion should be also essentially random according to the the-
ory. In the following, I will give a further argument for the existence of random
discontinuous motion of particles.
In order to know whether the motion of particles is random or not, we need to
analyze the cause of motion. For example, if motion has no deterministic cause,
then it will be random and determined only by a probabilistic cause. This may be
also the right way to find how particles move. Since motion involves change in
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position, if we can find the cause or instantaneous condition that determines the
change,11 we will be able to find how particles move in reality.
Consider the simplest states of motion of a free particle, for which the instan-
taneous condition determining the change of its position is constant during the
motion. The instantaneous condition can be deterministic or indeterministic. That
the instantaneous condition is deterministic means that it leads to a deterministic
change of the position of the particle at each instant. That the instantaneous con-
dition is indeterministic means that it only determines the probability density that
the particle appears in each position in space at each instant. If the instantaneous
condition is deterministic, then the simplest states of motion of the free particle
will be continuous motion with constant velocity, for which the equation of mo-
tion is x(t + dt) = x(t) + vdt, where the deterministic instantaneous condition v is
a constant.12 On the other hand, if the instantaneous condition is indeterministic,
then the simplest states of motion of the free particle will be random discontinuous
motion with even position probability distribution; at each instant the probability
density that the particle appears in every position is the same.
In order to know whether the instantaneous condition is deterministic or not, we
need to determine which sort of simplest states of free motion are the solutions of
the equation of free motion in quantum mechanics (i.e. the free Schro¨dinger equa-
tion).13 According to the analysis given in the previous subsections, the momen-
tum eigenstates of a free particle, which are the solutions of the free Schro¨dinger
equation, describe the ergodic motion of the particle with even position probability
distribution in space. Therefore, the simplest states of free motion with a constant
probabilistic instantaneous condition are the solutions of the equation of free mo-
tion in quantum mechanics. On the other hand, it can be seen that the simplest states
of free motion with a constant deterministic instantaneous condition are the solu-
tions of the equation of free motion in classical mechanics, and not the solutions of
the equation of free motion in quantum mechanics.
When assuming that the instantaneous condition determining the position change
of a particle is always deterministic or indeterministic for any state of motion, the
above result then implies that motion, whether it is free or forced, has no determin-
istic cause, and thus it is random and discontinuous, determined only by a proba-
bilistic cause. This argument for random discontinuous motion may be improved
by further analyzing this seemingly reasonable assumption, but I will leave this for
future work.
11 The word “cause” used here only denotes a certain instantaneous condition determining the change of
position, which may appear in the laws of motion. My following analysis is independent of whether the
condition has a causal power or not.
12 This deterministic instantaneous condition has been often called intrinsic velocity (Tooley, 1988).
13 I have derived this equation of free motion from a few fundamental physical principles in Chapter 5. This
makes the argument given here more complete.
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6.4 Further discussion
Historically, it is Schro¨dinger who first assumed the existence of the charge distri-
bution of an electron in space in 1926. According to his charge density hypothesis,
the charge of a quantum system is distributed throughout space, and the charge
density in each position is equal to the modulus squared of the wave function of
the system there multiplied by the charge of the system. Schro¨dinger’s purpose was
not to simply assume the existence of the charge distribution of a quantum system,
but to interpret the wave function of the system in terms of its charge distribution.
This is the first attempt to give an ontological interpretation of the wave function.
In the previous sections, I have re-examined Schro¨dinger’s charge density hy-
pothesis. It is argued that although Schro¨dinger’s ontological interpretation of the
wave function in terms of charge density meets serious problems and is unsatisfac-
tory, this does not imply that the charge distribution of an electron does not exist.
Moreover, I have argued with the help of protective measurements that a quan-
tum system has a well-defined charge distribution, and the charge density in each
position is equal to the modulus squared of the wave function of the system there
multiplied by the charge of the system. This confirms Schro¨dinger’s original charge
density hypothesis.
In order to explain the puzzling behaviours of the charge distribution of a quan-
tum system, I have also investigated the physical origin of the distribution. It is
argued that the charge distribution of a quantum system is effective, that is, it is
formed by the ergodic motion of a localized particle with the total charge of the
system. Visually speaking, the ergodic motion of a particle will form a particle
“cloud” extending throughout space (during an infinitesimal time interval around a
given instant), and the density of the cloud in each position, which represents the
probability density that the particle appears there, is |ψ(x, t)|2, where ψ(x, t) is the
wave function of the particle. For a charged particle such as an electron, the cloud
will be a charged cloud, and the density |ψ(x, t)|2, when multiplied by the charge of
the particle, will be the charge density of the cloud. This picture of ergodic motion
of a particle may explain some puzzling behaviours of the charge distribution of a
quantum system such as the non-existence of electrostatic self-interaction for the
distribution.
Although the charge distribution can be consistently defined for a many-body
system, the distribution contains no information about the entanglement between
its subsystems. In order to further solve this incompleteness problem, we need to
extend the above picture of ergodic motion of a particle for one-body systems to
many-body systems. At a given instant, an N-body quantum system can be rep-
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Figure 6.4 Three electron clouds in a hydrogen atom
resented by a point in a 3N-dimensional configuration space. During an infinites-
imal time interval around the instant, the representative point performs ergodic
motion in the configuration space, which is also random and discontinuous, and
forms a cloud there. Then, similar to the single particle case, the representative
point is required to spend in each volume element in the configuration space a
time that is proportional to the modulus squared of the wave function of the sys-
tem there. In other words, the density of the cloud in the configuration space is
ρ(x1, x2, ...xN , t) = |ψ(x1, x2, ...xN , t)|2, where ψ(x1, x2, ...xN , t) is the wave function
of the system. Since such ergodic motion in the configuration space contains en-
tanglement between the subsystems, its existence will solve the incompleteness
problem for the charge distribution of a many-body system.14
Here appears an intriguing question. Are there N particles in three-dimension
space for an N-body quantum system? Or there is only one particle in configuration
space for an N-body quantum system? According to my previous analysis, the
ontology for a one-body quantum system is a particle with the mass and charge
of the system, which undergoes ergodic motion in three-dimension space. If this
analysis is valid, it does require that the ontology for many-body quantum systems
is also discrete particle, not continuous field in configuration space; otherwise when
the wave function of a many-body system is a product state of the wave functions of
one-body systems, the ontology for one-body systems is not particle. However, the
analysis does not require that the ontology for N-body quantum systems should
be N particles in three-dimension space, not one particle in configuration space.
In order to answer the above question, we need to further analyze the nature of
configuration space and the ontological meaning of the many-body wave function
defined in the space. This will be the main task of the next chapter.
14 I will give a detailed analysis of quantum entanglement in Chapters 7 and 9.
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The ontology of quantum mechanics (II)
I have analyzed the ontology of quantum mechanics for one-body quantum sys-
tems such as an electron. The analysis suggests that the electron is a particle, and
its motion is random and discontinuous. In this chapter, I will extend this picture
of random discontinuous motion of particles for one-body systems to many-body
systems. I will argue that the wave function of an N-body quantum system repre-
sents the state of random discontinuous motion of N particles in three-dimensional
space, and in particular, the modulus squared of the wave function gives the proba-
bility density that the particles appear in every possible group of positions in space.
Moreover, I will present a more detailed analysis of random discontinuous motion
of particles and the interpretation of the wave function in terms of it.
7.1 Wave function realism?
The wave function of a physical system is in general a mathematical object de-
fined in a high-dimensional configuration space. For an N-body system, the con-
figuration space in which its wave function is defined is 3N-dimensional. Before
presenting my analysis of the nature of configuration space and the meaning of the
wave function, I will first examine a widely-discussed view, wave function real-
ism,1 which regards the wave function as a description of a real, physical field in a
fundamental high-dimensional space (Albert, 1996, 2013, 2015).
In recent years, wave function realism seems to become an increasingly popu-
lar position among philosophers of physics and metaphysicians (Ney and Albert,
2013). This view is composed of two parts. The first part says that configuration
space is a real, fundamental space. Albert (1996) writes clearly,
The space we live in, the space in which any realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics
1 Since a realist interpretation of the wave function does not necessarily imply that the wave function describes
a real, physical field in configuration space, the appellation “wave function realism” seems misleading. But
for the sake of convenience I will still use this commonly used appellation in the following disussion.
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is necessarily going to depict the history of the world as playing itself out ... is configu-
ration-space. And whatever impression we have to the contrary (whatever impression we
have, say, of living in a three-dimensional space, or in a four-dimensional space-time) is
somehow flatly illusory. (Albert, 1996, p.277)
The second part of this view states what kind of entity the wave function is in the
configuration space. Again, according to Albert (1996),
The sorts of physical objects that wave functions are, on this way of thinking, are (plainly)
fields - which is to say that they are the sorts of objects whose states one specifies by
specifying the values of some set of numbers at every point in the space where they live,
the sorts of objects whose states one specifies (in this case) by specifying the values of two
numbers (one of which is usually referred to as an amplitude, and the other as a phase at
every point in the universe’s so-called configuration space.
The values of the amplitude and the phase are thought of (as with all fields) as intrinsic
properties of the points in the configuration space with which they are associated. (Albert,
1996, p.278)
Note that configuration space conventionally refers to an abstract space that is used
to represent possible configurations of particles in three-dimensional space, and
thus when assuming wave function realism it is not accurate to call the high-
dimensional space in which the wave function exists “configuration space”. For
wave function realism, there are no particles and their configurations, and the high-
dimensional space is also fundamental, whose dimensionality is defined in terms
of the number of degrees of freedom needed to capture the wave function of the
system. But I will still use the appellation “configuration space” in my discussion
of wave function realism for the sake of convenience.
Here it is also worth noting that Bell (1987) once gave a clear recognition of the
prima facie argument for wave function realism (see also Lewis, 2004). Concerning
Bohm’s (1952) theory, Bell writes,
No one can understand this theory until he is willing to think of ψ as a real objective field
rather than just a ‘probability amplitude’. Even though it propagates not in 3-space but in
3N-space. (emphasis in original) (Bell, 1987, p.128)
Concerning Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber’s (1986) dynamical collapse theory, he
also writes,
There is nothing in this theory but the wavefunction. It is in the wavefunction that we
must find an image of the physical world, and in particular of the arrangement of things in
ordinary three-dimensional space. But the wavefunction as a whole lives in a much bigger
space, of 3N-dimensions. (Bell, 1987, p.204)
There are two main motivations for adopting wave function realism. The first,
broader motivation is that it seems to be the simplest, most straightforward, and
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most flat-footed way of thinking about the wave function realistically (Albert,
1996). In Lewis’s (2004) words,
The wavefunction figures in quantum mechanics in much the same way that particle con-
figurations figure in classical mechanics; its evolution over time successfully explains our
observations. So absent some compelling argument to the contrary, the prima facie conclu-
sion is that the wavefunction should be accorded the same status that we used to accord to
particle configurations. Realists, then, should regard the wavefunction as part of the basic
furniture of the world... This conclusion is independent of the theoretical choices one might
make in response to the measurement problem; whether one supplements the wavefunction
with hidden variables (Bohm 1952), supplements the dynamics with a collapse mechanism
(Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber 1986), or neither (Everett 1957), it is the wavefunction that
plays the central explanatory and predictive role. (Lewis, 2004)
The end result is then the assumption of a physical space with a geometrical struc-
ture isomorphic to the configuration space and a set of physical properties isomor-
phic to the amplitude and phase of the wave function.
The second, more specific motivation for adopting wave function realism is
entanglement or nonseparability of quantum mechanical states. In classical me-
chanics, the state of a system of N particles can be represented as a point in a
3N-dimensional configuration space, and the configuration space representation is
simply a convenient summary of the positions of all these particles. In quantum
mechanics, however, the wave function of an entangled N-body system, which is
defined in a 3N-dimensional configuration space, cannot be broken down into indi-
vidual three-dimensional wave functions of its subsystems. Thus the configuration
space representation cannot be regarded as a convenient summary of the individ-
ual subsystem states in three-dimensional space; there are physical properties of
an entangled N-body system that cannot be represented in terms of the sum of
the properties of N subsystems moving in three-dimensional space (Lewis, 2004,
2016). Therefore, wave function realism seems to be an inescapable consequence,
according to which there exist a configuration space entity, the wave function, as a
basic physical ingredient of the world.
In the following, I will first analyze the above motivations for wave function
realism and then analyze its potential problems. To begin with, the first broader
motivation to adopt wave function realism is debatable, since the approach of read-
ing off the nature of the physical entity represented directly from the structure of
the mathematical representation is problematic (Maudlin, 2013). The problem has
two aspects. On the one hand, a physical theory may have different mathematical
formulations. If one reads off the physical ontology of the theory directly from
the mathematical structure used to formulate the theory, then one will in general
obtain different, conflicting ontologies of the same theory. This means that one at
least needs to consider the reasons to choose one ontology rather than another.
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Take standard quantum mechanics as an example (Maudlin, 2013). When the
wave function is multiplied by a constant phase, the new wave function yields the
same empirical predictions. Thus standard quantum mechanics has two empirically
equivalent mathematical formulations: one in terms of vectors in Hilbert space, and
the other in terms of elements of projective Hilbert space. Obviously, taking the
mathematics of these two formulations at face value will lead to different physical
ontologies. Moreover, choosing the former, namely assuming wave function real-
ism, is obviously inconsistent with the widely accepted view that gauge degrees
of freedom are not physical, and thus one also needs to explain why the overall
phase of the wave function, which is in principle unobservable, represents a real
physical degree of freedom. In contrast, choosing the latter will avoid this thorny
issue. As a result, even if it is reasonable to read off the physical ontology directly
from the mathematical structure, it seems that one should not choose the Hilbert
space formulation and assume wave function realism.2
On the other hand, a mathematical representation may represent different physi-
cal ontologies, and one also needs to explain why choose one ontology rather than
another. Although wave function realism is the straightforward way of thinking
about the wave function realistically, there are also other possible realistic inter-
pretations of the wave function. For example, as argued by Monton (2002, 2013)
and Lewis (2013), the wave function of an N-body quantum system may represent
the property of N particles in three-dimensional space.3 Moreover, according to
their analysis, this interpretation is devoid of several potential problems of wave
function realism (see later discussion). Thus, it seems that even if one chooses the
Hilbert space formulation one should not assume wave function realism either.
To sum up, as Maudlin (2013) concluded, studying only the mathematics in
which a physical theory is formulated is not the royal road to grasp its ontology.
As I have argued in the previous chapters, we also need to study the connection
between theory and experience in order to grasp the ontology of a physical theory.
Next, I will analyze the second concrete motivation to adopt wave function re-
alism, the existence of quantum entanglement. Indeed, quantum mechanical states
are distinct from classical mechanical states in their nonseparability or entangle-
ment. The wave function of an entangled N-body system, which is defined in
a 3N-dimensional space, cannot be decomposed of individual three-dimensional
wave functions of its subsystems. Schro¨dinger took this as the defining feature of
quantum mechanics (Schro¨dinger, 1935b). However, contrary to the claims of Ney
(2012), this feature does not necessarily imply that the 3N-dimensional space is
fundamental and real, and the wave function represents a real, physical field in this
2 For a more detailed analysis of this problem see Maudlin (2013).
3 As I have argued in Section 2.2.4, however, Monton’s (2002) argument for this view based on the
eigenstate-eigenvaue half link is problematic.
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space. As pointed out by French (2013), there is at least an alternative understand-
ing of entanglement in terms of the notion of “nonsupervenient” relations holding
between individual physical entities existing in three-dimensional space (Teller,
1986; French and Krause, 2006). In addition, as noted above, one can also inter-
pret the wave function of an N-body quantum system as the property of N particles
in three-dimensional space (Monton, 2002, 2013; Lewis, 2013).4 The existence of
these alternatives undoubtedly reduces the force of the second motivation to adopt
wave function realism.
In the following, I will analyze the potential problems of wave function realism.
The most obvious problem is how to explain our three-dimensional impressions,
which has been called the “problem of perception” (Sole´, 2013). Albert clearly
realized this problem:
The particularly urgent question (again) is where, in this picture, all the tables, and chairs,
and buildings, and people are. The particularly urgent question is how it can possibly have
come to pass, on a picture like this one, that there appear to us to be multiple particles
moving around in a three-dimensional space (Albert, 2013, p.54).
The first possible solution to this problem is the so-called instantaneous solution,
which attempts to extract an image of a three-dimensional world from the instanta-
neous 3N-dimensional wave function (Lewis, 2004). However, as argued by Mon-
ton (2002), this solution faces a serious objection. It is that a point in configuration
space alone does not pick out a unique arrangement of objects in three-dimensional
space, as this solution obviously requires. A point in configuration space is given by
specifying the values of 3N parameters, but nothing intrinsic to the space specifies
which parameters correspond to which objects in three-dimensional space. There-
fore, the 3N-dimensional wave function at a particular instant cannot underpin our
experiences of a three-dimensional world at that instant (except there is a preferred
coordinatization of the 3N-dimensional space that wave function realism seems to
lack).
The second possible solution is the so-called dynamical solution, which attempts
to show that the dynamical evolution of the 3N-dimensional wave function over
time produce the illusion of N particles moving around in a three-dimensional
space (Albert, 1996; Lewis, 2004). The key is to notice that the Hamiltonian gov-
erning the evolution of the wave function takes a uniquely simple form for a partic-
ular grouping of the coordinates of the wave function into ordered triples. In a clas-
sical mechanical world, the same form of Hamiltonian provides a notion of three-
dimensional inter-particle distance, which can play a natural physical role since it
“reliably measures the degree to which the particles in question can dynamically
4 It is worth noting that there is also another possibility, namely the wave function is a multiple-field, a
configuration of which assigns properties to sets of N points in three-dimensional space (Forrest, 1988,
Chapter 5; Belot, 2012).
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affect one another” (Albert, 1996). Thus inhabitants living in such a world will
perceive the system as containing N particles in a three-dimensional space. How
about the quantum mechanical world then? According to Albert (1996), if inhab-
itants in such a world don’t look too closely, the appearances they encounter will
also correspond with those of their classical counterparts. The reason is roughly
that for a everyday object its true representation in terms of the evolution of a wave
function can be approximated by the corresponding evolution of a point in a clas-
sical configuration space (Lewis, 2004).5 Therefore, even though wave function
realism says that the world is 3N-dimensional, we perceive it as having only three
dimensions.
However, as argued by Lewis (2004, 2013), this dynamical solution to the “prob-
lem of perception” is also problematic. The reason is that the dynamical laws are
not invariant under the coordinate transformations of the 3N-dimensional space,
but invariant under the coordinate transformations of a three-dimensional space.
This indicates that the configuration space has a three-dimensional structure. In
other words, although the wave function is a function of 3N independent parame-
ters, but the transformational properties of the Hamiltonian require that these pa-
rameters refer to only three different spatial directions. Then, according to Lewis
(2004), Albert’s dynamical solution is not only impossible but also unnecessary.
It is impossible because the Hamiltonian takes exactly the same form under ev-
ery choice of coordinates in three-dimensional space, and thus no choice makes it
particularly simple. It is unnecessary because the outcome that the coordinates are
naturally grouped into threes is built into the structure of configuration space, and
thus does not need to be generated as a mere appearance based on the simplicity of
the dynamics.
It is worth emphasizing that Lewis’s (2004) argument based on invariance of
dynamical laws also poses a serious threat to wave function realism. It strongly
suggests that the quantum mechanical configuration space is not a real, fundamen-
tal space, but a space of configurations of particles existing in a three-dimensional
space, quite like the classical mechanical configuration space. Correspondingly, the
wave function is not a physical field in the high-dimensional configuration space
either. This conclusion is also supported by a recent analysis of Myrvold (2015).
He argued that since quantum mechanics arises from a relativistic quantum field
theory, and in particular, the wave function of quantum mechanics and the con-
figuration space in which it is defined are constructed from field operators defined
on ordinary spacetime, the configuration space is not fundamental, but rather is
5 However, as admited by Albert (2013, p.56), “The business of actually filling in the details of these accounts
is not an altogether trivial matter and needs to be approached separately, and anew, for each particular way of
solving the measurement problem, and requires that we attend carefully to exactly how it is that the things we
call particles actually manifest themselves in our empirical experience of the world.” For a further analysis of
this issue see Albert (2015).
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derivative of structures defined in three-dimensional space, and the wave function
is not like a physical field either.
However, as Lewis (2004) also admitted, the above analysis does not provide a
direct interpretation of the wave function. In his view, the wave function is a dis-
tribution over three-dimensional particle configurations, while a distribution over
particle configurations is not itself a particle configuration. Then, what is the state
of distribution the wave function represents? Are there really particles existing in
three-dimensional space? I will try to answer these intriguing questions in the next
section.
7.2 A new ontological analysis of the wave function
A better way to analyze the relationship between the wave function and the physi-
cal entity it describes is not only analyzing the structure of the wave function itself,
but also analyzing the whole Schro¨dinger equation, which governs the evolution of
the wave function over time. The Schro¨dinger equation contains more information
about a quantum system than the wave function of the system, an important piece
of which is the mass and charge properties of the system that are responsible for
the gravitational and electromagnetic interactions between it and other systems.6
Mainly based on an analysis of these properties, I will argue that what the wave
function of an N-body system describes is not one physical entity, either a contin-
uous field or a discrete particle, in a 3N-dimensional space, but N physical entities
in our ordinary three-dimensional space. Moreover, by a new ontological analysis
of the entangled states of an N-body quantum system, I will further argue that these
physical entities are not continuous fields but discrete particles, and the motion of
these particles is discontinuous and random.
7.2.1 Understanding configuration space
In order to know the meaning of the wave function, we need to first know the
meaning of the coordinates on the configuration space of a quantum system, in
which the wave function of the system is defined. As we have seen above, there are
already some analyses of this issue. Here I will give a new analysis.
One way to understand configuration space is to see how the wave function trans-
forms under a Galilean transformation between two inertial frames. Consider the
6 In this sense, the wave function is not a complete description of a physical system, since it contains no
information about the mass and charge of the system. Note that other authors have already analyzed the
Hamiltonian that governs the evolution of the wave function in analyzing the meaning of the wave function,
but what they have analyzed is only the coordinates of the Hamiltonian, not the other important parameters
of the Hamiltonian such as mass and charge and their relations with the coordinates.
7.2 A new ontological analysis of the wave function 77
wave function of an N-body quantum system, ψ(x1, y1, z1, ..., xN , yN , zN , t), in an in-
ertial frame S with coordinates (x, y, z, t). The coordinates (x1, y1, z1, ..., xN , yN , zN)
are coordinates on the 3N-dimensioanl configuration space of the system, and the
wave function of the system is defined in this space. Now, in another inertial frame
S ′ with coordinates (x′, y′, z′, t′), where (x′, y′, z′, t′) = G(x, y, z, t) is the Galilean
transformation, the wave function becomes ψ
′
(x
′
1, y
′
1, z
′
1, ..., x
′
N , y
′
N , z
′
N , t
′), where
(x
′
i , y
′
i , z
′
i , t
′) = G(xi, yi, zi, t) for i = 1, ...,N. Then the transformation of the ar-
guments of the wave function already tells us the meaning of these arguments or
the meaning of the coordinates on the configuration space of the system. It is that
the 3N coordinates of a point in the configuration space of an N-body quantum
system are N groups of three position coordinates in three-dimensional space. Un-
der the Galilean transformation between two inertial coordinate systems S and S ′,
each group of three coordinates (xi, yi, zi) of the 3N coordinates on configuration
space also transforms according to the Galilean transformation.
In addition, the interaction Hamiltonian of an N-body quantum system says the
same thing. For example, the interaction Hamiltonian of an N-body quantum sys-
tem under an external potential V(x, y, z) is
∑N
i=1 V(xi, yi, zi), and the corresponding
term in the Schro¨dinger equation is
∑N
i=1 V(xi, yi, zi)ψ(x1, y1, z1, ..., xN , yN , zN , t).
Obviously the arguments of the potential function are the three position coordi-
nates in our ordinary three-dimensional space, so do the corresponding group of
three arguments of the wave function.
Another way to understand configuration space is to resort to experience. The
Born rule (for projective measurements) also tells us the meaning of the coor-
dinates on the configuration space of a quantum system. According to the Born
rule, the modulus squared of the wave function of an N-body quantum system,
|ψ(x1, y1, z1, ..., xN , yN , zN , t)|2, represents the probability density that the first sub-
system is detected in position (x1, y1, z1) in our three-dimensional space and the
second subsystem is detected in position (x2, y2, z2) in our three-dimensional space
and so on. Thus, each group of three coordinates (xi, yi, zi) of the 3N coordinates
on configuration space are the three position coordinates in our ordinary three-
dimensional space. Similarly, the result of a protective measurement on an N-body
quantum system says the same thing. For example, the result of a protective mea-
surement of the charge density of an N-body quantum system in position (x, y, z)
in our three-dimensional space is:
ρ(x, y, z) =
∑
i
∫
...
∫
Qi|ψ(x1, ..., zi−1, x, y, z, xi+1, ...zN , t)|2dx1...dzi−1dxi+1...dzN ,
(7.1)
where Qi is the charge of the i-th subsystem. This formula also tells us that each
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group of three arguments (xi, yi, zi) of the wave function are the three position co-
ordinates in our three-dimensional space.
In summary, I have argued that the 3N coordinates of a point in the configuration
space of an N-body quantum system are N groups of three position coordinates in
our ordinary three-dimensional space.
7.2.2 Understanding subsystems
In order to know the ontological meaning of the wave function of an N-body quan-
tum system, we also need to understand the characteristics of the subsystems which
constitute the system.
First of all, the Schro¨dinger equation tells us something about subsystems. In the
Schro¨dinger equation for an N-body quantum system, there are N mass parameters
m1, m2, ..., mN (as well as N charge parameters etc). These parameters are not
natural constants, but properties of the system; they may be different for different
systems. Moreover, each mass parameter describes the same mass property, and
it may assume different values for different subsystems. Therefore, it is arguable
that these N mass parameters describe the same mass property of N subsystems.
In other words, an N-body quantum system contains N subsystems or N physical
entities, each of which has its respective mass and charge properties, and the wave
function of the system describes the state of these physical entities. This conclusion
is obvious when the wave function of an N-body quantum system is a product state
of N wave functions.
Moreover, these N physical entities exist in our three-dimensional space, not
in the 3N-dimensional configuration space. The reason is that in the Schro¨dinger
equation for an N-body quantum system, each mass parameter mi is only corre-
lated with each group of three coordinates (xi, yi, zi) of the 3N coordinates on con-
figuration space, while these three coordinates (xi, yi, zi), according to the above
analysis, are the three position coordinates in our three-dimensional space. Here
it is also worth noting that the configuration space (as a fundamental space) can-
not accommodate mass and charge distributions. For example, consider a product
state of a two-body quantum system, in which there are point masses m1 and m2 in
two positions in our three-dimensional space. This requires that in the correspond-
ing single position in the six-dimensional configuration space of the system there
should exist two distinguishable point masses m1 and m2. But in every position in
the configuration space there can only exist one total point mass (if the space is real
and fundamental).
Secondly, the connection of quantum mechanics with experience also tells us
the same thing. Recall the Born rule says that the modulus squared of the wave
function of an N-body quantum system, |ψ(x1, y1, z1..., xN , yN , zN , t)|2, represents
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the probability density that the first subsystem with mass m1 is detected in po-
sition (x1, y1, z1) and the second subsystem with mass m2 is detected in position
(x2, y2, z2) and so on. Thus the Born rule also says that each subsystem with its
respective mass mi is correlated with each group of three coordinates (xi, yi, zi) of
the 3N coordinates on configuration space. Moreover, the results of the measure-
ments of the masses and charges of an N-body quantum system also indicate that
the system is composed of N subsystems with their respective masses and charges.
To sum up, it is arguable that for an N-body quantum system, there are N sub-
systems or N physical entities with respective masses and charges in our three-
dimensional space.
7.2.3 Understanding entangled states
As I noted at the end of the last chapter, when the picture of random discontinuous
motion of a particle for one-body systems is extended to many-body systems, it
needs to be determined whether the ontology for an N-body quantum system is N
particles in our three-dimension space or one particle in the configuration space of
the system. Now according to the above analysis, there are N physical entities in
our three-dimensional space for an N-body quantum system. Therefore, the picture
of random discontinuous motion for an N-body quantum system will be random
discontinuous motion of N particles in our three-dimensional space. In the follow-
ing, I will present a new ontological analysis of the entangled states of an N-body
quantum system. The analysis will provide further support for the existence of par-
ticles and their random discontinuous motion.
Consider a two-body system whose wave function is defined in a six-dimensional
configuration space. First of all, suppose the wave function of the system is local-
ized in one position (x1, y1, z1, x2, y2, z2) in the space at a given instant. This wave
function can be decomposed into a product of two wave functions which are lo-
calized in positions (x1, y1, z1) and (x2, y2, z2) in the same three-dimensional space,
our ordinary three-dimensional space, respectively. It is uncontroversial that this
wave function describes two independent physical entities, which are localized in
positions (x1, y1, z1) and (x2, y2, z2) in our three-dimensional space, respectively.
Moreover, as I have argued previously, the Schro¨dinger equation that governs the
evolution of the system further indicates that these two physical entities have re-
spective masses such as m1 and m2 (as well as respective charges such as Q1 and
Q2 etc).
Next, suppose the wave function of the two-body system is localized in two
positions (x1, y1, z1, x2, y2, z2) and (x3, y3, z3, x4, y4, z4) in the six-dimensional con-
figuration space at a given instant. This is an entangled state, which can be gen-
erated from a product state by the Schro¨dinger evolution of the system. In this
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case, there are still two physical entities with the original masses and charges in
three-dimensional space, since the Schro¨dinger evolution does not create or anni-
hilate physical entities,7 and the mass and charge properties of the system do not
change during its evolution either. According to the above analysis, the wave func-
tion of the two-body system being localized in position (x1, y1, z1, x2, y2, z2) means
that physical entity 1 with mass m1 and charge Q1 exists in position (x1, y1, z1) in
three-dimensional space, and physical entity 2 with mass m2 and charge Q2 ex-
ists in position (x2, y2, z2) in three-dimensional space. Similarly, the wave function
of the two-body system being localized in position (x3, y3, z3, x4, y4, z4) means that
physical entity 1 exists in position (x3, y3, z3) in three-dimensional space, and phys-
ical entity 2 exists in position (x4, y4, z4) in three-dimensional space. These are two
ordinary physical situations. Then, when the wave function of these two physical
entities is an entangled state, being localized in both positions (x1, y1, z1, x2, y2, z2)
and (x3, y3, z3, x4, y4, z4), how do they exist in three-dimensional space?
Since the state of the physical entities described by the wave function is de-
fined either at a precise instant or during an infinitesimal time interval around a
given instant as the limit of a time-averaged state, there are two possible exis-
tent forms.8 One is that the above two physical situations exist at the same time
at the precise given instant in three-dimensional space. This means that physical
entity 1 exists in positions (x1, y1, z1) and (x3, y3, z3), and physical entity 2 ex-
ists in positions (x2, y2, z2) and (x4, y4, z4). Since there is no correlation between
the positions of the two physical entities, the wave function that describes this
existent form is not an entangled state but a product state, which is localized in
four positions (x1, y1, z1, x2, y2, z2), (x3, y3, z3, x4, y4, z4), (x1, y1, z1, x4, y4, z4), and
(x3, y3, z3, x2, y2, z2) in the six-dimensional configuration space. Thus this possib-
lity is excluded.
The other possible existent form, which is thus the actual existent form, is that
the above two physical situations exist “at the same time” during an arbitrarily short
time interval or an infinitesimal time interval around the given instant in three-
dimensional space. Concretely speaking, the situation in which physical entity 1
is in position (x1, y1, z1) and physical entity 2 is in position (x2, y2, z2) exists in
one part of the continuous time flow, and the situation in which physical entity
1 is in position (x3, y3, z3) and physical entity 2 is in position (x4, y4, z4) exists
in the other part. The restriction is that the temporal part in which each situation
exists cannot be a continuous time interval during an arbitrarily short time interval;
otherwise the wave function describing the state in the time interval will be not
7 In other words, when the state of the two physical entities evolves from a product state to an entangled state,
the interaction between them does not annihilate any of them from the three-dimensional space.
8 I have discussed these two possibilities when analyzing the origin of the charge distribution of a quantum
system in the last chapter.
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the original superposition of two branches, but one of the branches. This means
that the set of the instants at which each situation exists is not a continuous instant
set but a discontinuous, dense instant set. At some discontinuous instants, physical
entity 1 with mass m1 and charge Q1 exists in position (x1, y1, z1) and physical
entity 2 with mass m2 and charge Q2 exists in position (x2, y2, z2), while at other
discontinuous instants, physical entity 1 exists in position (x3, y3, z3) and physical
entity 2 exists in position (x4, y4, z4). By this way of time division, the above two
physical situations exist “at the same time” during an arbitrarily short time interval
or during an infinitesimal time interval around the given instant.
Figure 7.1 Two entangled physical entities in space at six neighboring instants
This way of time division implies a picture of discontinuous motion for the in-
volved physical entities, which is as follows. Physical entity 1 with mass m1 and
charge Q1 jumps discontinuously between positions (x1, y1, z1) and (x3, y3, z3), and
physical entity 2 with mass m2 and charge Q2 jumps discontinuously between po-
sitions (x2, y2, z2) and (x4, y4, z4). Moreover, they jump in a precisely simultaneous
way. When physical entity 1 jumps from position (x1, y1, z1) to position (x3, y3, z3),
physical entity 2 always jumps from position (x2, y2, z2) to position (x4, y4, z4),
and vice versa. In the limit case where position (x2, y2, z2) is the same as posi-
tion (x4, y4, z4), physical entities 1 and 2 are no longer entangled, while physical
entity 1 with mass m1 and charge Q1 still jumps discontinuously between positions
(x1, y1, z1) and (x3, y3, z3). This means that the picture of discontinuous motion also
exists for one-body systems. As argued before, since quantum mechanics does not
provide further information about the positions of the physical entities at each in-
stant, the discontinuous motion described by the theory is essentially random too.
This result can be illustrated more vividly with the Schro¨dinger’s cat state. For
Schro¨dinger’s cat which is in a superposition of both alive and dead states, at each
instant the cat is either alive or dead in a purely random way, while during a time
interval the cat discontinuously jumps between the alive and dead states. The fol-
lowing figure depicts Schro¨dinger’s cat at six neighboring instants.9
9 The cats in the figure are copied from Physics Today 23(9), 30-35 (1970), with the permission of the
American Institute of Physics. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/1.3022331.
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Figure 7.2 Schro¨dinger’s cat at six neighboring instants
The above analysis may also tell us what these physical entities are. A physi-
cal entity in our three-dimensional space may be a continuous field or a discrete
particle. For the above entangled state of a two-body system, since each physical
entity is only in one position in space at each instant (when there are two positions
it may occupy), it is not a continuous field but a localized particle. In fact, there
is a more general reason why these physical entities are not continuous fields in
three-dimensional space. It is that for an entangled state of an N-body system we
cannot even define N continuous fields in three-dimensional space which contain
the whole information of the entangled state.
Since a general position entangled state of a many-body system can be decom-
posed into a superposition of the product states of the position eigenstates of its
subsystems, the above analysis applies to all entangled states. Therefore, it is ar-
guable that an N-body quantum system is composed not of N continuous fields
but of N discrete particles in our three-dimensional space. Moreover, the motion
of these particles is not continuous but discontinuous and random in nature, and
especially, the motion of entangled particles is precisely simultaneous.10
7.3 The wave function as a description of random discontinuous motion of
particles
In classical mechanics, we have a clear physical picture of motion. It is well under-
stood that the trajectory function x(t) in the theory describes continuous motion of
a particle. In quantum mechanics, the trajectory function x(t) is replaced by a wave
function ψ(x, t). If the particle ontology is still viable in the quantum world, then
it seems natural that the wave function should describe some sort of more funda-
mental motion of particles, of which continuous motion is only an approximation
10 Note that the analysis and its results given in this section also hold true for other instantaneous properties. I
will discuss this point later.
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in the classical domain, as quantum mechanics is a more fundamental theory of the
physical world, of which classical mechanics is an approximation. The previous
analysis provides a strong support for this conjecture. It says that a quantum sys-
tem is a system of particles that undergo random discontinuous motion.11 Here the
concept of particle is used in its usual sense. A particle is a small localized object
with mass and charge, and it is only in one position in space at each instant. As a
result, the wave function in quantum mechanics can be regarded as a description of
the more fundamental motion of particles, which is essentially discontinuous and
random. In this section, I will give a more detailed analysis of random discontin-
uous motion of particles and the ontological meaning of the wave function (Gao,
1993, 1999, 2000, 2003, 2006b, 2008, 2011a, 2011b, 2014b, 2015a).
7.3.1 A mathematical viewpoint
Compared with continuous motion of particles, the picture of random discontin-
uous motion of particles seems strange and unnatural for most people. This is
not beyond expectations, since we are most familiar with the apparent continuous
motion of objects in our everyday world. However, it can be argued that random
discontinuous motion is more natural and logical than continuous motion from a
mathematical point of view. Let us see why this is the case.
The motion of a particle can be described by a functional relation between each
instant and its position at this instant in mathematics. In this way, continuous mo-
tion is described by continuous functions, while discontinuous motion is described
by discontinuous functions. The question is: Which sort of functions universally
exist in the mathematical world? This question can also be put in another more
appropriate way. Since motion does not exist at an instant, the state of motion of
a particle at a given instant is defined not by its position at the precise instant, but
by its positions during an infinitesimal time interval around the instant. This means
that the state of motion of a particle at a given instant will be described by a set of
points in space and time, in which each point represents the position of the particle
at each instant during an infinitesimal time interval around the given instant. Then
the question is: What is the general form of such a set of points? Is it a continuous
line? Or is it a discontinuous set of points? The former corresponds to continuous
motion, while the latter corresponds to discontinuous motion.
The right answers to these questions had not been found until the late 19th and
11 We may say that an electron is a quantum particle in the sense that its motion is not continuous motion
described by classical mechanics, but random discontinuous motion described by quantum mechanics.
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Figure 7.3 Continuous motion vs. discontinuous motion
early 20th centuries. Before then only continuous functions were studied in math-
ematics. The existence of continuous functions accords with everyday experience.
In particular, the motion of macroscopic objects is apparently continuous, and thus
can be directly described by continuous functions. However, mathematics became
more and more dependent on logic rather than on experience in the second half
of the 19th century. Many discontinuous functions were invented during that pe-
riod. For example, a famous discontinuous function is that its value is zero at each
rational point and is one at each irrational point.
At first, most elder mathematicians were very hostile to discontinuous functions.
They called them pathological functions. As Poincare´ remarked in 1899,
Logic sometimes makes monsters. For half a century we have seen a mass of bizarre func-
tions which appear to be forced to resemble as little as possible honest functions which
serve some purpose. More of continuity, or less of continuity, more derivatives, and so
forth... In former times when one invented a new function it was for a practical purpose; to-
day one invents them purposely to show up defects in the reasoning of our fathers. (Quoted
in Kline, 1990, p. 973)
However, several young mathematicians, notably Borel and Lebesgue, took dis-
continuous functions seriously. They discovered that these functions could also be
strictly analyzed with the help of the set theory. As a result, they led a revolu-
tion in mathematical analysis, which transformed classical analysis into modern
analysis.12 A core notion introduced by them is measure. A measure of a set is a
generalization of the concepts of the length of a line, the area of a plane figure, and
the volume of a solid, and it can be intuitively understood as the size of the set.
Length can only be used to describe continuous lines, which are very special sets
of points, while measure can be used to describe more general sets of points. For
example, the set of all rational points between 0 and 1 in a real line is a dense set
12 It is well known that in the same period there also happened a revolution in physics, which transformed
classical mechanics into quantum mechanics. I will argue below that there is a connection between modern
analysis in mathematics and quantum mechanics in physics.
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of points, and its measure is zero. Certainly, the measure of a line still equals to its
length.
The above questions can now be answered by using the measure theory. All
functions form a set, whose measure can be set to one. Then according to the
measure theory, the measure of the subset of all continuous functions is zero, while
the measure of the subset of all discontinuous functions is one. This means that
continuous functions are extremely special functions, and nearly all functions are
discontinuous functions. As Poincare´ also admitted,
Indeed, from the point of view of logic, these strange functions are the most general...
If logic were the sole guide of the teacher, it would be necessary to begin with the most
general functions. (Quoted in Kline, 1990, p. 973)
Similarly, a general set of points in an infinitesimal region of space-time, which
represents a general local state of motion of a particle, is a discontinuous, dense set
of points. And a continuous line in the region is an extremely special set of points,
and the measure of the subset of all continuous lines is zero.
Therefore, from a mathematical point of view, random discontinuous motion,
which is described by general discontinuous functions and discontinuous sets of
points, is more natural and logical than continuous motion, which is described by
extremely special continuous functions and continuous lines. Moreover, if the great
book of nature is indeed written in the language of mathematics, as Galileo once
put it, then it seems that it is discontinuous motion of particles, not continuous
motion of particles, that universally exists in the physical world.
7.3.2 Describing random discontinuous motion of particles
In the following, I will give a strict description of random discontinuous motion
of particles based on the measure theory. For the sake of simplicity, I will mainly
analyze one-dimensional motion. The results can be readily extended to the three-
dimensional situation.
Consider the state of random discontinuous motion of a particle in finite intervals
∆t and ∆x around a space-time point (ti,x j) as shown in Figure 7.2. The positions
of the particle form a random, discontinuous trajectory in this square region.13 We
study the projection of this trajectory in the t-axis, which is a dense instant set in
13 Unlike deterministic continuous motion of particles, the discontinuous trajectory function, x(t), no longer
provides a useful description for random discontinuous motion of particles. Recall that a trajectory function
x(t) is essentially discontinuous if it is not continuous at every instant t. A trajectory function x(t) is
continuous if and only if for every t and every real number ε > 0, there exists a real number δ > 0 such that
whenever a point t0 has distance less than δ to t, the point x(t0) has distance less than ε to x(t).
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Figure 7.4 Describing random discontinuous motion of a particle
the time interval ∆t. Let W be the discontinuous trajectory of the particle and Q be
the square region [x j, x j +∆x]× [ti, ti +∆t]. The dense instant set can be denoted by
pit(W ∩ Q) ∈ <, where pit is the projection on the t-axis. According to the measure
theory, we can define the Lebesgue measure:
M∆x,∆t(x j, ti) =
∫
pit(W∩Q)∈<
dt. (7.2)
Since the sum of the measures of the dense instant sets in the time interval ∆t for
all x j is equal to the length of the continuous time interval ∆t, we have:
∑
j
M∆x,∆t(x j, ti) = ∆t. (7.3)
Then we can define the measure density as follows:
ρ(x, t) = lim
∆x,∆t→0
M∆x,∆t(x, t)/(∆x · ∆t). (7.4)
We call ρ(x, t) position measure density or position density in brief. This quan-
tity provides a strict description of the position distribution of the particle in an
infinitesimal space interval dx around position x during an infinitesimal interval
dt around instant t, and it satisfies the normalization relation
∫ +∞
−∞ ρ(x, t)dx = 1
by (7.3). Note that the existence of the above limit relies on the precondition that
the probability density that the particle appears in each position x at each instant
t, which may be denoted by %(x, t), is differentiable with respect to both x and
t. It can be seen that ρ(x, t) is determined by %(x, t), and there exists the relation
ρ(x, t) = %(x, t).
Since the position density ρ(x, t) changes with time in general, we may further
define the position flux density j(x, t) through the relation j(x, t) = ρ(x, t)v(x, t),
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where v(x, t) is the velocity of the local position density. It describes the change
rate of the position density. Due to the conservation of measure, ρ(x, t) and j(x, t)
satisfy the continuity equation:
∂ρ(x, t)
∂t
+
∂ j(x, t)
∂x
= 0. (7.5)
The position density ρ(x, t) and position flux density j(x, t) provide a complete
description of the state of random discontinuous motion of a particle.14
This description of the motion of a particle can be extended to the motion of
many particles. At each instant a quantum system of N particles can be repre-
sented by a point in an 3N-dimensional configuration space. During an arbitrar-
ily short time interval or an infinitesimal time interval around each instant, these
particles perform random discontinuous motion in three-dimensional space, and
correspondingly, this point performs random discontinuous motion in the config-
uration space. Then, similar to the single particle case, the state of the system
can be described by the position density ρ(x1, x2, ...xN , t) and position flux den-
sity j(x1, x2, ...xN , t) defined in the configuration space. There is also the relation
ρ(x1, x2, ...xN , t) = %(x1, x2, ...xN , t), where %(x1, x2, ...xN , t) is the probability den-
sity that particle 1 appears in position x1 and particle 2 appears in position x2 ...
and particle N appears in position xN . When these N particles are independent with
each other, the position density can be reduced to the direct product of the position
density for each particle, namely ρ(x1, x2, ...xN , t) =
∏N
i=1 ρ(xi, t).
7.3.3 Interpreting the wave function
Although the motion of particles is essentially discontinuous and random, the dis-
continuity and randomness of motion are absorbed into the state of motion, which
is defined during an infinitesimal time interval around a given instant and described
by the position density and position flux density. Therefore, the evolution of the
state of random discontinuous motion of particles may obey a deterministic con-
tinuous equation. By assuming the nonrelativistic equation of random discontinu-
ous motion is the Schro¨dinger equation and considering the form of the resulting
continuity equation,15 we can obtain the relationship between the position density
14 It is also possible that the position density ρ(x, t) alone provides a complete description of the state of random
discontinuous motion of a particle. Which possibility is the actual one depends on the laws of motion. As we
will see later, quantum mechanics requires that a complete description of the state of random discontinuous
motion of particles includes both the position density and the position flux density.
15 I have given a rigorous derivation of the free Schro¨dinger equation in Chapter 5. The derivation is based not
on the position density and position flux density, but directly on the wave function. Thus it avoids
Wallstrom’s (1994) objections to Nelson’s stochastic mechanics (see also Bacciagaluppi, 1999; Schmelzer,
2011).
88 The ontology of quantum mechanics (II)
ρ(x, t), position flux density j(x, t) and the wave function ψ(x, t). ρ(x, t) and j(x, t)
can be expressed by ψ(x, t) as follows:16
ρ(x, t) = |ψ(x, t)|2, (7.6)
j(x, t) =
~
2mi
[ψ∗(x, t)
∂ψ(x, t)
∂x
− ψ(x, t)∂ψ
∗(x, t)
∂x
]. (7.7)
Correspondingly, the wave function ψ(x, t) can be uniquely expressed by ρ(x, t) and
j(x, t) or v(x, t) (except for an overall phase factor):
ψ(x, t) =
√
ρ(x, t)eim
∫ x
−∞ v(x
′,t)dx′/~. (7.8)
In this way, the wave function ψ(x, t) also provides a complete description of
the state of random discontinuous motion of a particle. A similar one-to-one re-
lationship between the wave function and position density, position flux density
also exists for random discontinuous motion of many particles. For the motion of
many particles, the position density and position flux density are defined in a 3N-
dimensional configuration space, and thus the many-particle wave function, which
is composed of these two quantities, also lives on the 3N-dimensional configuration
space.
It is well known that there are several ways to understand objective probability,
such as frequentist, propensity, and best-system intepretations (Ha´jek, 2012). In
the case of random discontinuous motion of particles, the propensity interpretation
seems more appropriate. This means that the wave function in quantum mechanics
should be regarded not simply as a description of the state of random discontinuous
motion of particles, but more suitably as a description of the instantaneous property
of the particles that determines their random discontinuous motion at a deeper level.
In particular, the modulus squared of the wave function represents the propensity
property of the particles that determines the probability density that they appear
in every possible group of positions in space.17 In contrast, the position density
and position flux density, which are defined during an infinitesimal time interval
16 Note that the relation between j(x, t) and ψ(x, t) depends on the concrete form of the external potential under
which the studied system evolves, and the relation given below holds true for an external scalar potential. In
contrast, the relation ρ(x, t) = |ψ(x, t)|2 holds true universally, independently of the concrete evolution of the
studied system.
17 Note that the propensity here denotes single case propensity, as long run propensity theories fail to explain
objective single-case probabilities. For a helpful analysis of the single-case propensity interpretation of
probability in GRW theory see Frigg and Hoefer (2007). In addition, it is worth emphasizing that the
propensities possessed by particles relate to their objective motion, not to the measurements on them. In
contrast, according to the existing propensity interpretations of quantum mechanics, the propensities a
quantum system has relate only to measurements; a quantum system possesses the propensity to exhibit a
particular value of an observable if the observable is measured on the system (Sua´rez, 2004, 2007).
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around a given instant, are only a description of the state of the resulting random
discontinuous motion of particles, and they are determined by the wave function.
In this sense, we may say that the motion of particles is “guided” by their wave
function in a probabilistic way.
7.3.4 On momentum, energy and spin
I have been analyzing random discontinuous motion of particles in position space.
Does the picture of random discontinuous motion exist for other observables such
as momentum, energy and spin? Since there are also momentum wave functions
etc in quantum mechanics, it seems tempting to assume that the above interpre-
tation of the wave function in position space also applies to the wave functions
in momentum space etc. This means that when a particle is in a superposition of
the eigenstates of an observable, it also undergoes random discontinuous motion
among the eigenvalues of this observable. For example, a particle in a superposition
of momentum eigenstates also undergoes random discontinuous motion among all
momentum eigenvalues. At each instant the momentum of the particle is definite,
randomly assuming one of the momentum eigenvalues with probability density
given by the modulus squared of the wave function at this momentum eigenvalue,
and during an infinitesimal time interval around each instant the momentum of the
particle spreads throughout all momentum eigenvalues.
Indeed, it can be argued that if an observable has a definite value at each instant,
then, like position, it will also undergo random discontinuous change over time.
Recall that there are two arguments for the existence of random discontinuous mo-
tion of particles. The first argument is based on an analysis of the origin of the
charge distribution of a one-body quantum system such as an electron (see Section
6.3), and the second argument is based on an analysis of the entangled states of a
many-body system (see Section 7.2). Although the first argument applies only to
position in general,18 the second argument applies to all observables of a quantum
system which have a definite value at each instant.
However, there is a well-known constraint on ascribing definite values to the ob-
servables of a quantum system. It is the Kochen-Specker theorem, which proves
the impossibility of ascribing sharp values to all observables of a quantum system
simultaneously, while preserving the functional relations between commuting ob-
servables (Kochen and Specker, 1967). There are two possible ways to deal with
this constraint. The first way is to still ascribe sharp values to all observables of
a quantum system and take all of them as physical properties of the system. This
18 The reason is that the interaction Hamiltonian usually relates to position, not to momentum and energy, and
thus the non-existence of electrostatic self-interaction of the charge distribution of an electron only suggests
the picture of ergodic motion of a particle in position space.
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requires that the functional relations between commuting observables should not
be always preserved for the values assigned to them.19 There is an argument sup-
porting this option. As Vink (1993) has noticed, it is not necessary to require that
the functional relations between commuting observables should hold for the val-
ues assigned to them for an arbitrary wave function; rather, the requirement must
only hold for post-measurement wave functions (which are effectively eigenstates
of the measured observable) and for observables that commute with the measured
observable, which is enough to avoid conflicts with the predictions of quantum
mechanics.20 In this way, the picture of random discontinuous motion of particles
may exist for all observables including momentum, energy and spin observables
along all directions. But the functional relations between commuting observables
will fail to hold for the values assigned to them in general.
The second way to deal with the constraint of the Kochen-Specker theorem is
to ascribe sharp values to a finite number of observables of a quantum system and
only take them as physical properties of the system. In this way, the functional
relations between commuting observables can be preserved for the values assigned
to them, while the picture of random discontinuous motion exists only for a finite
number of observables. The question is: Which observables?
First of all, since the proofs of the Kochen-Specker theorem do not prohibit as-
cribing sharp values to the position, momentum and energy (and their functions)
of a quantum system simultaneously, the picture of random discontinuous motion
may exist also for momentum and energy. Next, it needs a more careful analy-
sis whether the picture of random discontinuous motion exists for spin. Consider
a free quantum system with spin one. The Kochen-Specker theorem requires that
only the system’s squared spin components along a finite number of directions can
be ascribed sharp values simultaneously (when the functional relations between
commuting observables are preserved). However, it can be argued that there is only
one special direction for the spin of the system. It is the direction along which the
spin of the system is definite. Thus it seems more reasonable to assume that only
the spin observable along this direction can be ascribed a sharp value and taken
19 Note that incompatible observables can also have sharp values simultaneously and thus have a joint
probability distribution when the functional relations between these observables are not preserved for the
values assigned to them. The joint probability distribution of incompatible observables may be a product
form, which fulfills the requirement that the marginal for every observable is the same given by quantum
mechanics. The proofs of nonexistence of such a joint probability distribution require that the functional
relations between these noncommuting observables should be preserved for the values assigned to them,
which is a problematic assumption (see, e.g. Nelson, 2001, p. 95).
20 Note that this strategy to circumvent the Kochen-Specker theorem does not apply to the straightforward
solution of the measurement problem provided by the realist ψ-epistemic view, which explains the collapse
of the wave function merely as the effect of acquiring new information (see Section 2.2.2). For this solution,
the functional relations between commuting observables must hold for the values assigned to them for an
arbitrary wave function in order to avoid conflicts with the predictions of quantum mechanics, since these
values do not change during the measurement process. In contrast, for the ψ-ontic solutions to the
measurement problem, the values of commuting observables may change during the measurement process.
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as a physical property of the system.21 Under this assumption, the picture of ran-
dom discontinuous motion does not exist for the spin of a free quantum system.
But if the spin state of a quantum system is entangled with its spatial state due to
interaction and the branches of the entangled state are well separated in space, the
system in different branches will have different spin, and it will also undergo ran-
dom discontinuous motion between these different spin states. This is the situation
that usually happens during a spin measurement.
The key to decide which way is right is to determine whether the functional rela-
tions between commuting observables should be preserved for the values assigned
to them for an arbitrary wave function. In my view, although this requirement is
not necessary as Vink (1993) has argued, there is no compelling reason to drop it
either. Moreover, dropping this requirement and taking all observables including
infinitely many related spin observables along various directions as physical prop-
erties of a quantum system seems to be superfluous in ontology and inconsistent
with Occam’s razor. Therefore, I think the second way is the right way to deal with
the constraint of the Kochen-Specker theorem.
To sum up, I have argued that the picture of random discontinuous motion also
exists for some observables of a quantum system other than position, such as mo-
mentum and energy. But spin is a distinct property; the spin of a free quantum
system is always definite along a certain direction, and it does not undergo random
discontinuous motion.
7.4 Similar pictures of motion through history
Although the picture of random discontinuous motion of particles seems very strange,
similar ideas have been proposed for different purposes in history. In this section, I
will briefly discuss these ideas.
7.4.1 Epicurus’s atomic swerve and Al-Nazzam’s leap motion
The ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus first considered the randomness of mo-
tion seriously. He presented the well-known idea of atomic “swerve” on the basis
of Democritus’s atomic theory (Englert, 1987). Like Democritus, Epicurus also
21 This analysis of spin also applies to projection operators on a system’s Hilbert space (of dimension greater
than or equal to 3). According to the Kochen-Specker theorem, only a finite number of projection operators
can be ascribed sharp values simultaneously when the functional relations between commuting projection
operators are preserved for the values assigned to them. Since there is no special direction for the set of
orthogonal rays in the Hilbert space, all projection operators have the same status and no one is special.
Therefore, it is arguable that the number of the projection operators which can be ascribed sharp values
simultaneously should be either zero or infinity, depending on whether the functional relations between
commuting observables are preserved for the values assigned to them. In particular, if this constraint for
commuting observables is always satisfied, then projection operators on a system’s Hilbert space do not
correspond to properties of the system.
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held that the elementary constituents of the world are atoms, which are indivis-
ible microscopic bits of matter, moving in empty space. He, however, modified
Democritus’s strict determinism of elementary processes. Epicurus thought that
occasionally the atoms swerve from their course at random times and places. Such
swerves are uncaused motions. The main reason for introduing them is that they
are needed to explain why there are atomic collisions. According to Democritus’s
atomic theory, the natural tendency of atoms is to fall straight downward at uniform
velocity. If this were the only natural atomic motion, the atoms would never have
collided with one another, forming macroscopic bodies. Therefore, Epicurus saw
it necessary to introduce the random atomic swerves.
In order to solve Zeno’s paradoxes, the 9th-century Islamic theologian Abu Ishaq
Ibrahim Al-Nazzam proposed the idea of discontinuous motion, and called it the
theory of “leap” (Jammer, 1974, p.258). He argued that if a finite distance cannot
be subdivided into a finite number of fractions but is subject to infinite divisibility,
then an object in motion has to perform a leap (tafra) since not every imaginable
point in space can be touched. In this way, “The mobile may occupy a certain
place and then proceed to the third place without passing through the intermediate
second place on the fashion of a leap.” (Jammer, 1974, p.259). Moreover, a leap
from position A to position B consists of two interlocking sub-events; the original
body in position A ceases to exist, and an “identical” body comes into being in
position B.
It can be seen that neither Epicurus’s atomic swerve nor Al-Nazzam’s leap mo-
tion is exactly the random discontinuous motion of particles; the atomic swerve is
random but lack of explicit discontinuity, while the leap motion is discontinuous
but lack of explicit randomness. In a sense, the picture of random discontinuous
motion can be considered as an integration of Epicurus’s random swerve and Al-
Nazzam’s discontinuous leap. However, the above reasons for introducing random
and discontinuous motion are no longer valid as seen today.
7.4.2 Bohr’s discontinuous quantum jumps
The picture of motion, which was proposed in modern times and more like random
discontinuous motion, is Bohr’s discontinuous quantum jumps.
In 1913, Bohr proposed what is now called the Bohr model of the atom (Bohr,
1913). He postulated that electrons as particles undergo two kinds of motion in
atoms; they either move continuously around the nucleus in certain stationary orbits
or discontinuously jump between these orbits. These discontinuous quantum jumps
are supposed to be also truly random and uncaused. Indeed, Rutherford once raised
the issue of causality. In a letter to Bohr dated 20 March 1913, he wrote:
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There appears to me one grave difficulty in your hypothesis, which I have no doubt you
fully realize, namely, how does an electron decide what frequency it is going to vibrate at
when it passes from one stationary state to the other? It seems to me that you would have
to assume that the electron knows beforehand where it is going to stop. (Quoted in Pais,
1991, p.152-153)
Bohr admitted that “the dynamical equilibrium of the systems in the stationary
states can be discussed by help of the ordinary mechanics, while the passing of
the systems between different stationary states cannot be treated on that basis.”
(Bohr, 1913, p.7) However, he did not offer a further analysis of his discontinuous
quantum jumps.
Although the electrons in Bohr’s atomic model only undergo the random, discon-
tinuous jumps occasionally (which is like Epicurus’s atomic swerve), these jumps
let us perceive the flavor of random discontinuous motion of particles in the quan-
tum world.
7.4.3 Schro¨dinger’s snapshot description
In his 1927 Solvay congress report, Schro¨dinger gave a further visualizable ex-
planation of his interpretation of the wave function in terms of charge density. He
said,
The classical system of material points does not really exist, instead there exists something
that continuously fills the entire space and of which one would obtain a ‘snapshot’ if one
dragged the classical system, with the camera shutter open, through all its configurations,
the representative point in q-space spending in each volume element dτ a time that is
proportional to the instantaneous value of ψψ∗. (Bacciagaluppi and Valentini, 2009, p.409)
If this description in terms of a snapshot is understood literally, then it seems to
suggest that a quantum system is composed of point particles, and the continuous
charge distribution of the system in space is formed by the ergodic motion of the
system’s point particles. Moreover, since the snapshot picture also requires that
the spending time of the particles in each volume element is proportional to the
instantaneous value of ψψ∗ there, it seems that the ergodic motion of the particles
should be not continuous but discontinuous (as I have argued in the last chapter).
Indeed, what Schro¨dinger said later in his report seems to also support this anal-
ysis. He said,
The pure field theory is not enough, it has to be supplemented by performing a kind of indi-
vidualisation of the charge densities coming from the single point charges of the classical
model, where however each single ‘individual’ may be spread over the whole of space, so
that they overlap. (Bacciagaluppi and Valentini, 2009, p.415)
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However, it is arguable that this picture of ergodic motion of particles was not the
actual picture in Schro¨dinger’s mind then, and he did not even mean by the above
statement that the snapshot description is real. The reason is that Schro¨dinger later
gave a clearer explanation of the above statement in the discussion of his report,
which totally avoided the snapshot description. He said,
It would seem that my description in terms of a snapshot was not very fortunate, since it
has been misunderstood. Perhaps the following explanation is clearer. The interpretation
of Born is well-known, who takes ψψ∗dτ to be the probability for the system being in the
volume element dτ of the configuration space. Distribute a very large number N of systems
in the configuration space, taking the above probability as ‘frequency function’. Imagine
these systems as superposed in real space, dividing however by N the charge of each point
mass in each system. In this way, in the limiting case where N = ∞ one obtains the wave
mechanical picture of the system. (Bacciagaluppi and Valentini, 2009, p.423)
Schro¨dinger never referred to his snapshot description, which he called a “some-
what naive but quite concrete idea”, in his later publications.
It is interesting to note that like Schro¨dinger’s snapshot description, Bell once
gave a statement which may also suggest the picture of random discontinuous mo-
tion of particles. In his well-known article “Against Measurement”, after discussing
Schro¨dinger’s interpretation of the wave function in terms of charge density, Bell
wrote:
Then came the Born interpretation. The wavefunction gives not the density of stuff, but
gives rather (on squaring its modulus) the density of probability. Probability of what ex-
actly? Not of the electron being there, but of the electron being found there, if its position
is ‘measured’.
Why this aversion to ‘being’ and insistence on ‘finding’? The founding fathers were
unable to form a clear picture of things on the remote atomic scale. (Bell, 1990)
It seems that by this statement Bell supported the following two claims: (1) the
wave function should give (on squaring its modulus) the density of probability of
the electron being in certain position in space, and (2) the wave function should
also give the density of stuff. The key is to understand the meaning of probability
in the first claim. If the probability means subjective probability, then the electron
will be in a definite position which we don’t know with certainty. But this result
contradicts the second claim. The wave function of the electron giving the density
of stuff means that the electron cannot be in only one position, but fill in the whole
space in certain way with local density given by the modulus squared of its wave
function.
On the other hand, if the above probability means objective probability, then, as
I have argued in the last chapter, the two claims can be reconciled and the resulting
picture will be random discontinuous motion of particles. The electron appears in
every position in space with objective probability density given by the modulus
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squared of its wave function there, and during an arbitrarily short time interval
such random discontinuous motion forms the density of stuff everywhere, which is
also proportional to the modulus squared of the wave function of the electron.
7.4.4 Bell’s Everett (?) theory
Although the above analysis may be an overinterpretation of Bell’s statement, it
can be argued that Bell’s Everett (?) theory indeed suggests the picture of random
discontinuous motion of particles.
According to Bell (1981), Everett’s theory can be regarded as Bohm’s theory
without the continuous particle trajectories. Thus
instantaneous classical configuration x are supposed to exist, and to be distributed in the
comparison class of possible worlds with probability |ψ|2. But no pairing of configuration
at different times, as would be effected by the existence of trajectories, is supposed. (Bell,
1987, p.133)
Obviously, in Bell’s Everett (?) theory, a quantum system is composed of parti-
cles, which have a definite position in space at each instant. Moreover, these parti-
cles jump among all possible configurations with probability |ψ|2, and such jumps
are random and discontinuous. This is clearly the picture of random discontinuous
motion of particles. I will analyze Bell’s Everett (?) theory in more detail in the
next chapter.
8
Implications for solving the measurement problem
There are two fundamental problems in the conceptual foundations of quantum
mechanics. The first one concerns the physical meaning of the wave function in
the theory. The second one is the measurement problem. I have analyzed the on-
tological status and meaning of the wave function, and suggested a new ontolog-
ical interpretation of the wave function in terms of random discontinuous motion
(RDM) of particles. In this chapter, I will further analyze possible implications of
this new interpretation of the wave function for the solutions to the measurement
problem. That is, I will analyze how to solve the measurement problem when as-
suming the suggested interpretation of the wave function is true. The analysis will
also answer whether the ontology described by the wave function is enough to ac-
count for our experience, e.g. whether additional ontology such as many worlds or
hidden variables is needed to account for our definite experience.
8.1 The measurement problem revisited
Before analyzing the implications of my new interpretation of the wave function
for solving the measurement problem, I will first give a new formulation of the
problem and present an analysis of its solutions based on the formulation.
8.1.1 A new formulation
Quantum mechanics assigns a wave function to an appropriately prepared physi-
cal system and specifies that the evolution of the wave function is governed by the
Schro¨dinger equation. However, when assuming the wave function is a complete
description of the system, the linear dynamics is apparently incompatible with the
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existence of definite results of measurements on the system. This leads to the mea-
surement problem.1
According to Maudlin’s (1995a) formulation, the measurement problem origi-
nates from the incompatibility of the following three claims:
(C1). the wave function of a physical system is a complete description of the
system;
(C2). the wave function always evolves in accord with a linear dynamical equa-
tion, e.g. the Schro¨dinger equation;
(C3). each measurement has a definite result (which is one of the possible mea-
surement results whose probability distribution satisfies the Born rule).
The proof of the inconsistency of these three claims is familiar. Suppose a mea-
suring device M measures the x-spin of a spin one-half system S that is in a su-
perposition of two different x-spins 1/
√
2(|up〉S + |down〉S ). If (C2) is correct, then
the state of the composite system after the measurement must evolve into the super-
position of M recording x-spin up and S being x-spin up and M recording x-spin
down and S being x-spin down:
1/
√
2(|up〉S |up〉M + |down〉S |down〉M). (8.1)
The question is what kind of state of the measuring device this represents. If (C1)
is also correct, then this superposition must specify every physical fact about the
measuring device. But by symmetry of the two terms in the superposition, this
superposed state cannot describe a measuring device recording either x-spin up or
x-spin down. Thus if (C1) and (C2) are correct, (C3) must be wrong.
It can be seen that there are three basic approaches to solving the measurement
problem thus formulated.2 The first approach is to deny the claim (C1), and add
some additional variables and corresponding dynamics to explain definite measure-
ment results. A well-known example is Bohm’s theory (Bohm, 1952; Goldstein,
2013).3 The second approach is to deny the claim (C2), and revise the Schro¨dinger
equation by adding certain nonlinear and stochastic evolution terms to explain defi-
nite measurement results. Such theories are called collapse theories (Ja´nossy, 1952;
1 The measurement problem was originally fomulated in the context of standard quantum mechanics. The
theory does not define measurement precisely, and as a result, it is unclear when the collapse postulate can be
applied during the evolution of the wave function (Albert, 1992).
2 It has been debated whether the consistent histories approach to quantum mechanics can solve the
measurement problem (Griffiths, 1984, 2002, 2013, 2015; Omne`s, 1988; 1999; Hartle and Gell-Mann, 1993;
Dowker and Kent, 1995, 1996; Okon and Sudarsky, 2014a, 2014b, 2015). I will not discuss this approach
here.
3 Two other interesting examples are the modal interpretations (Lombardi and Dieks, 2012) and the
two-state-vector formalism (Aharonov and Vaidman, 2008). In the two-state-vector formalism, the ontology
is composed of the normal wave function and another backwards evolving wave function, which can be taken
as a hidden variable. It has been demonstrated that a special final boundary condition on the universe may
propagate backwards in time to account for all measurement results and draw the line between classical and
quantum mechanics (Aharonov et al, 2014).
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Ghirardi, 2016). The third approach is to deny the claim (C3), and assume the ex-
istence of many equally real worlds to accommodate all possible results of mea-
surements (Everett, 1957; Barrett and Byrne, 2012; Barrett, 2014; Vaidman, 2016).
In this way, it may also explain definite measurement results in each world in-
cluding our own world. This approach is called Everett’s interpretation of quantum
mechanics or Everett’s theory.
It has been realized that the measurement problem in fact has two levels: the
physical level and the mental level, and it is essentially the determinate-experience
problem (Barrett, 1999, 2005). The problem is not only to explain how the linear
dynamics can be compatible with the existence of definite measurement results ob-
tained by physical devices, but also, and more importantly, to explain how the linear
dynamics can be compatible with the existence of definite experience of conscious
observers. However, the mental aspect of the measurement problem is ignored in
Maudlin’s (1995a) formulation. Here I will suggest a new formulation of the mea-
surement problem which lays more stress on the psychophysical connection. In this
formulation, the measurement problem originates from the incompatibility of the
following two assumptions:
(A1). the mental state of an observer supervenes on her wave function;
(A2). the wave function always evolves in accord with a linear dynamical equa-
tion, e.g. the Schro¨dinger equation.
The proof of the inconsistency of these two claims is similar to the above proof.
Suppose an observer M measures the x-spin of a spin one-half system S that is in
a superposition of two different x-spins, 1/
√
2(|up〉S + |down〉S ). If (A2) is correct,
then the physical state of the composite system after the measurement will evolve
into the superposition of M recording x-spin up and S being x-spin up and M
recording x-spin down and S being x-spin down:
1/
√
2(|up〉S |up〉M + |down〉S |down〉M). (8.2)
If (A1) is also correct, then the mental state of the observer M will supervene
on this superposed wave function. Since the mental states corresponding to the
physical states |up〉M and |down〉M differ in their mental content, the observer M
being in the superposition (8.2) will have a conscious experience different from
the experience of M being in each branch of the superposition by the symmetry
of the two branches. In other words, the record that M is consciously aware of is
neither x-spin up nor x-spin down when she is physically in the superposition (8.2).
This is inconsistent with experimental observations. Therefore, (A1) and (A2) are
incompatible.
By this new formulation of the measurement problem, we can look at the three
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major solutions of the problem from a new angle. First of all, the solution to the
measurement problem must deny either the claim (A1) or the claim (A2). If (A1) is
correct (as usually thought), then (A2) must be wrong. In other words, if the mental
state of an observer supervenes on her wave function, then the Schro¨dinger equa-
tion must be revised and the solution to the measurement problem will be along the
direction of collapse theories. On the other hand, if (A2) is correct, then (A1) must
be wrong. This means that if the wave function always evolves in accord with the
Schro¨dinger equation, then the mental state of an observer cannot supervene on her
wave function. There are two other forms of psychophysical supervenience. One
is that when a wave function corresponds to many observers, the mental state of
each observer supervenes on one branch of the wave function,4 and the other is that
the mental state of an observer supervenes on other additional variables. The first
form corresponds to Everett’s theory, and the second form corresponds to Bohm’s
theory.
To sum up, the three major solutions to the measurement problem correspond to
three different forms of psychophysical supervenience. In fact, there are only three
types of physical states on which the mental state of an observer may supervene,
which are (1) the wave function, (2) certain branches of the wave function, and (3)
other additional variables. The question is: Exactly what physical state does the
mental state of an observer supervene on? It can be expected that an analysis of
this question will help solve the measurement problem.
8.1.2 Everett’s theory
I will first analyze Everett’s theory. The theory claims that for the above post-
measurement state (8.2) there are two observers, and each of them is consciously
aware of a definite record, either x-spin up or x-spin down.5
There are in general two ways of understanding the notion of multiplicity in
Everett’s theory. One is the strong form which claims that there are two physical
observers (in material content) after the quantum measurement (see, e.g. DeWitt
and Graham, 1973). The resulting theory is called many-worlds theory. In this the-
ory, a physical observer always has a unique mental state, and the mental state also
supervenes on the whole physical state of the observer, although which may be
only a branch of the post-measurement superposition. Thus this theory is consis-
tent with the common assumption of psychophysical supervenience, according to
4 If an observer always has a unique mental state and the mental state supervenes only on a certain branch of
her wave function, then the psychophysical supervenience will be obviously violated. This is the case of the
single-mind theory (Albert and Loewer, 1988; Barrett, 1999). Although I will not discuss this theory below,
some of my analyses also apply to it.
5 Note that in Wallace’s (2012) latest formulation of Everett’s theory the number of the emergent observers
after the measurement is not definite due to the imperfectness of decoherence. I will discuss this point later.
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which the mental state of a physical observer supervenes on her whole physical
state. As is well known, however, this theory has serious problems such as viola-
tion of mass-energy conservation and inconsistency with the dynamical equations
(Albert and Loewer, 1988). The problem of inconsistency can also be seen as fol-
lows. The existence of many worlds is only relative to decoherent observers, not
relative to non-decoherent observers, who can measure the whole superposition
corresponding to the many worlds (e.g. by protective measurements) and confirm
that there is no increase in the total mass-energy and number of particles.
The other way of understanding the notion of multiplicity is the weak form
which claims that there is one physical observer (in material content), but there are
two mental observers or two mental states of the same physical observer, after the
quantum measurement (see, e.g. Zeh, 1981, 2016a, 2016b). Wallace’s (2012) for-
mulation of Everett’s theory is arguably this view in nature (see also Kent, 2010).6
In order to derive the multiplicity prediction of the weak form of Everett’s theory,
a physical observer cannot always have a unique mental state, and when she has
more than one mental states, each mental state does not supervene on her whole
physical state either. For example, when the observer is in one of the two physical
states |up〉M and |down〉M, she has a unique mental state and the mental state also
supervenes on her whole physical state. While when she is in a superposition of
these two physical states such as (8.2), she has two mental states but each mental
state does not supervene on her whole physical state; rather, each mental state su-
pervenes only on a part of the whole physical state, such as one of the two terms in
the superposition (8.2). Therefore, different from the strong form of Everett’s the-
ory, the weak form of Everett’s theory obviously violates the common assumption
of psychophysical supervenience.7
One may object that the psychophysical supervenience is not really violated
here, since the sum of all mental states of a physical observer do supervene on
her whole physical state. However, this objection seems invalid. First of all, since
these mental states may be incompatiable with each other, the sum of these men-
6 In Wallace’s formulation, it is claimed that there are more than one emergent physical observers after the
quantum measurement, but their existence is only in the sense of branch structure (i.e. the structure of certain
parts of the whole physical state), not in the sense of material content. Therefore, strictly speaking, there is
only one physical observer with her whole physical state after the quantum measurement. This means that
Wallace’s formulation of Everett’s theory is essentially a weak form of the theory. If such a theory is also
regarded as a many-worlds theory, then these worlds should be not physical worlds but mental worlds. In my
opinion, it is the failure to clearly distinguish between the weak form and the strong form of Everett’s theory
or between physical worlds and mental worlds in the literature that causes much confusion in understanding
the theory. In addition, it is worth noting that even if assuming the functionalist approach to consciousness
and considering decoherence, the existence of many structures in a wave function does not necessarily lead
to the appearance of many emergent worlds including emergent observers (Gao, 2016).
7 The common assumption of psychophysical supervenience is arguably reasonable. A whole physical state is
independent, while any two parts of the state are not independent; once one part is selected, the other part
will be also fixed. Since a mental state is usually assumed to be autonomous, it is arguable that a mental state
should supervene on a whole physical state, not on any part of the state.
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tal states is arguably not a valid mental state. For instance, the combination of the
mental state of seeing a cat and the mental state of not seeing a cat seems mean-
ingless. Thus, strictly speaking, this form of supervenience is not really a form
of psychophysical supervenience. Next, it can be further argued that if one wants
psychophysical supervenience, then one presumably wants the mental state that
determines one’s experience and the only mental state to which one has epistemic
access to supervene on one’s physical state (Barrett, 1999, p.196). But in the weak
form of Everett’s theory, when a physical observer has many mental states, each
mental observer can only have epistemic access to her own mental state, and thus
the sum of all these mental states is certainly not a mental state that satisfies this
requirement of psychophysical supervenience.
In fact, it can be shown by a concrete example that in the weak form of Ev-
erett’s theory, although the total wave function of a physical observer does not
change after a unitary evolution, the mental state of each mental observer, which
supervenes on each branch of the wave function, may change. Consider again the
post-measurement superposition (8.2). There exists a unitary time evolution oper-
ator, which changes the first branch of the superposition to its second branch and
changes the second branch to the first branch. It is similar to the NOT gate for
a single q-bit. Then after the evolution the total superposition does not change.
However, after the evolution the mental state which supervenes on either branch
of the superposition will change; the mental state supervening on the first branch
will change from being aware of x-spin up to being aware of x-spin down, and
the mental state supervening on the second branch will change from being aware
of x-spin down to being aware of x-spin up.s Therefore, even though the sum of
all mental states of a physical observer supervenes on her whole physical state, it
seems that the psychophysical supervenience is also violated by the weak form of
Everett’s theory.
Certainly, one may also insist that the common assumption of psychophysical
supervenience is not universally valid in the quantum domain. But even though
this is true, one still needs to explain why, in particular, why this assumption ap-
plies to the physical states |up〉M and |down〉M, but not to any superposition of
them. This is similar to the preferred basis problem. It seems that the only differ-
ence one can think is that being in the superposition the physical observer has no
definite mental state which contains a definite conscious experience about the mea-
surement result, while being in each branch of the superposition, |up〉M or |down〉M,
she has a definite mental state which contains a definite conscious experience about
the measurement result. However, it has been argued that the common assumption
of psychophysical supervenience can be applied to any physical state, and more-
over, under this assumption a physical observer being in a post-measurement su-
perposition such as (8.2) also has a definite mental state which contains a definite
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conscious experience about the measurement result (Gao, 2016). Note that these
analyses also apply to the many-minds theory, which is similar to the weak form
of Everett’s theory in many aspects (Albert and Loewer, 1988; Barrett, 1999).
Finally, I will give a brief comment on the relationship between Everett’s theory
and decoherence. It is usually thought that the appearance of many observers after
a quantum measurement is caused by decoherence. However, even if this claim is
true for the strong form of Everett’s theory, it seems that it cannot be true for the
weak form of the theory. The reason is that the generation of a superposed state of a
physical observer (e.g. a superposition of two physical states |up〉M and |down〉M),
as well as the psychophysical supervenience, have nothing to do with decoherence.
In addition, resorting to decoherence seems to cause a further difficulty for the
application of the doctrine of psychophysical supervenience. Since decoherence is
never perfect, there will be no definite physical states on which the mental states
can supervene.8
8.1.3 Bohm’s theory
Let us now turn to Bohm’s theory. In this theory, there are two suggested forms
of psychophysical supervenience. The first one is that the mental state supervenes
on the branch of the wave function occupied by Bohmian particles, and the second
one is that the mental state supervenes only on the (relative) positions of Bohmian
particles.
The first form of psychophysical supervenience has been the standard view un-
til recently, according to which the mental state of an observer being in a post-
measurement superposition like (8.2) supervenes only on the branch of the super-
position occupied by her Bohmian particles. Indeed, Bohm initially assumed this
form of psychophysical supervenience. He said: “the packet entered by the appara-
tus [hidden] variable... determines the actual result of the measurement, which the
observer will obtain when she looks at the apparatus.” (Bohm, 1952, p.182). In this
case, the role of the Bohmian particles is merely to select the branch from amongst
the other non-overlapping branches of the superposition.
The first form of psychophysical supervenience is also called Bohm’s result as-
sumption (Brown and Wallace, 2005), and it has been widely argued to be prob-
lematic (Stone, 1994; Brown, 1996; Zeh, 1999; Brown and Wallace, 2005; Lewis,
2007). For example, according to Brown and Wallace (2005), in the general case
each of the non-overlapping branches in the post-measurement superposition has
the same credentials for representing a definite measurement result as the single
branch does in the predictable case (i.e. the case in which the measured system
8 This problem is more serious when assuming that the mental states cannot be reduced to the physical states.
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is in an eigenstate of the measured observable). The fact that only one of them
carries the Bohmian particles does nothing to remove these credentials from the
others, and adding the particles to the picture does not interfere destructively with
the empty branches either.
In my view, the main problem with the first form of psychophysical superve-
nience is that the empty branches and the occupied branch have the same qualifi-
cation to be supervened by the mental state. Moreover, although it is imaginable
that the Bohmian particles may have influences on the occupied branch, e.g. dis-
abling it from being supervened by the mental state, it is hardly conceivable that
the Bohmian particles have influences on all other empty branches, e.g. disabling
them from being supervened by the mental state.
In view of the first form of psychophysical supervenience being problematic,
most Bohmians today seem to support the second form of psychophysical superve-
nience (e.g. Holland, 1993, p.334), although they sometimes do not state it explic-
itly (e.g. Maudlin, 1995b). If assuming this form of psychophysical supervenience,
namely assuming the mental state supervenes only on the (relative) positions of
Bohmian particles, then the above problems can be avoided. However, it has been
argued that this form of psychophysical supervenience is inconsistent with the pop-
ular functionalist approach to consciousness (Brown and Wallace, 2005; see also
Bedard, 1999). The argument can be summarized as follows. If the functionalist
assumption is correct, for consciousness to supervene on the Bohmian particles but
not the wave function, the Bohmian particles must have some functional property
that the wave function do not share. But the functional behaviour of the Bohmian
particles is arguably identical to that of the branch of the wave function in which
they reside. Moreover, it has been argued that this form of psychophysical super-
venience also leads to another problem of allowing superluminal signaling (Brown
and Wallace, 2005; Lewis, 2007). If the mental state supervenes on the positions of
Bohmian particles, then an observer can in principle know the configuration of the
Bohmian particles in her brain with a greater level of accuracy than that defined by
the wave function. This will allow superluminal signaling and lead to a violation
of the no-signaling theorem (Valentini, 1992).9
A more serious problem with the second form of psychophysical supervenience,
in my view, is that it seems inconsistent with the Born rule. Consider again an ob-
server being in the post-measurement superposition (8.2). According to the Born
rule, the modulus squared of the amplitude of each branch of this superposition rep-
resents the probability of obtaining the measurement result corresponding to the
branch. For example, the modulus squared of the amplitude of the branch |up〉M
9 In my view, this problem is not as serious as usually thought, since the existence of such superluminal
signaling is not inconsistent with experience, and superluminal signaling may also exist in other theories
such as collapse theories (Gao, 2004, 2014d).
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represents the probability of obtaining the x-spin up result. This means that the
Born rule requires that the quantities that represent the measurement results should
be correlated with these branches of the superposition.10 Then, in order that the
measurement result is represented by the relative positions of Bohmian particles
as required by the second form of psychophysical supervenience, there must ex-
ist a correspondence between different branches of the superposition and different
relative positions of the Bohmian particles, and in particular, the relative positions
of the Bohmian particles corresponding to different branches of the superposition
must be different.
However, Bohm’s theory does not give such a corresponding relationship, and
thus it is at least incomplete when assuming the second form of psychophysical
supervenience. Moreover, it can be argued that the corresponding relationship may
not exist. The probability of the Bohmian particles appearing at a location in con-
figuration space is equal to the modulus squared of the amplitude of the wave func-
tion at the location. It is permitted by the linear dynamics that one branch of the
post-measurement superposition (8.2) is a spatial translation of the other branch,
e.g. the spatial part of |down〉M is ψ(x1, y1, z1, ..., xN , yN , zN , t), and the spatial part
of |up〉M is ψ(x1 + a, y1, z1, ..., xN + a, yN , zN , t). Then if a relative configuration of
the Bohmian particles appears in the region of one branch in configuration space,
it may also appear in the region of the other branch in configuration space. More-
over, the probability densities that the configuration appears in both regions are
the same. This means that a relative configuration of the Bohmian particles can
correspond to either branch of the superposition, and there does not exist a corre-
sponding relationship between different branches of the superposition and different
relative configurations of the Bohmian particles.
Since the Born rule requires that there should exist such a corresponding re-
lationship when assuming the second form of psychophysical supervenience, the
non-existence of the corresponding relationship then means that the second form of
psychophysical supervenience is inconsistent with the Born rule. This can be seen
more clearly as follows. If assuming the second form of psychophysical superve-
nience, namely if the measurement result is represented by the relative positions of
Bohmian particles, then no matter which branch of the post-measurement super-
position the Bohmian particles reside in, the measurement result will be the same.
This is obviously inconsistent with the Born rule.
Finally, I note that the above analysis of psychophysical supervenience also
raises a doubt about the whole strategy of Bohm’s theory to solve the measure-
ment problem. Why add hidden variables such as positions of Bohmian particles
to quantum mechanics? It has been thought that adding these variables which have
10 Note that this requirement is independent of whether the wave function is ontic or not.
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definite values at every instant is enough to ensure the definiteness of measurement
results and further solve the measurement problem. However, if the mental state
cannot supervene on these additional variables, then even though these variables
have definite values at every instant, they are unable to account for our definite
experience and thus do not help solve the measurement problem (see also Barrett,
2005).
8.1.4 Collapse theories
I have argued that one will meet some serious difficulties if assuming the mental
state of an observer supervenes either on certain branches of her wave function or
on other additional variables, and thus it seems that Everett’s and Bohm’s theories
are not promising solutions to the measurement problem. This also suggests that the
mental state of an observer supervenes directly on her wave function, and collapse
theories may be in the right direction to solve the measurement problem.
However, it has been known that collapse theories are still plagued by a few seri-
ous problems such as the tails problem (Albert and Loewer, 1996). In particular, the
structured tails problem has not been solved in a satisfactory way (see McQueen,
2015 and references therein). The problem is essentially that collapse theories such
as the GRW theory predicts that the post-measurement state is still a superposition
of different outcome branches with similar structure (although the modulus squared
of the coefficient of one branch is close to one), and they need to explain why high
modulus-squared values are macro-existence determiners (McQueen, 2015). In my
view, the key to solving the structured tails problem is not to analyze the connec-
tion between high modulus-squared values and macro-existence, but to analyze the
connection between these values and our experience of macro-existence, which re-
quires us to further analyze how the mental state of an observer supervenes on her
wave function.
Admittedly this is an unsolved, difficult issue. I will give a few speculations here.
I conjecture that the mental content of an observer being in a post-measurement
superposition like (8.2) is composed of the mental content corresponding to every
branch of the superposition, and in particular, the modulus squared of the ampli-
tude of each branch determines the vividness of the mental content corresponding
to the branch (Gao, 2016). Under this assumption, when the modulus squared of
the amplitude of a branch is close to zero, the mental content corresponding to the
branch will be the least vivid. It is conceivable that below a certain threshold of
vividness an ordinary observer or even an ideal observer will not be consciously
aware of the corresponding mental content. Then even though in collapse theories
the post-measurement state of an observer is still a superposition of different out-
come branches with similar structure, the observer can only be consciously aware
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of the mental content corresponding to the branch with very high amplitude, and
the mental content corresponding to the branches with very low amplitude will not
appear in the whole mental content of the observer. This may solve the structured
tails problem of collapse theories.
8.2 Can RDM of particles directly solve the measurement problem?
According to the suggested interpretation of the wave function in terms of RDM
of particles, a quantum system is composed of particles, and the wave function of
the system represents an instantaneous property of the particles of the system that
determines their random discontinuous motion. It is obvious that the underlying
RDM of particles adds an additional variable, the particle configuration, and its
random dynamics to quantum mechanics. In this sense, the resulting theory may
be regarded as a stochastic “hidden” variables theory. The question is: Can RDM
of particles provide a direct solution to the measurement problem?
Interestingly, Bell (1981) already gave a positive answer to this question when
analyzing his Everett (?) theory, which interprets Everett’s theory as Bohm’s theory
without trajectories. The reason is that the picture of RDM of particles is arguably
the same as the picture given by Bell’s Everett (?) theory (see Section 7.4.4), and
it has been argued that Bell’s Everett (?) theory can account for our definite expe-
rience and be consistent with the predictions of quantum mechanics (Bell, 1981;
Barrett, 1999). In the following, I will explain how the RDM of particles can di-
rectly solve the measurement problem, and why the solution is unsatisfactory due
to its potential problems.11
Consider a simple x-spin measurement, in which an observer M measures the x-
spin of a spin one-half system S that is in a superposition of two different x-spins.
According to the linear Schro¨dinger equation, the state of the composite system
after the measurement will be the superposition of M recording x-spin up and S
being x-spin up and M recording x-spin down and S being x-spin down:
α |up〉S |up〉M + β |down〉S |down〉M , (8.3)
where α and β are not zero and satisfy the normalization condition |α|2 + |β|2 = 1.
According to the picture of RDM of particles, the positions of the particles repre-
senting the measurement record of M are definite at each instant. Moreover, these
particles discontinuously and randomly jump between the two states |up〉M and
|down〉M over time, and the probability of they being in these two states at each in-
stant are |α|2 and |β|2, respectively. Then when assuming that an observer’s mental
11 My explanation basically follows Barrett’s (1999) analysis of Bell’s Everett (?) theory.
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state is well-defined at an instant, and it also supervenes on the particle config-
uration of the observer at the instant, the observer M will at each instant have a
determinate record corresponding to one of the two terms in the above superpo-
sition, that is, at each instant M’s particle configuration will effectively select one
of the two terms in the superposition as actual and thus M’s mental state will be
the state with the determinate record x-spin up or the determinate record x-spin
down. Moreover, which particle configuration M ends up with, and thus which
determinate record he gets, is randomly determined at the instant, and the proba-
bility of M getting a particular record is equal to the modulus squared of the wave
function associated with the record, namely the probability of M ending up with a
configuration recording x-spin up is |α|2 and the probability of M ending up with a
configuration recording x-spin down is |β|2. This means that the Born probabilities
come from the objective probabilities inherent in the RDM of particles directly.
Obviously, due to the essential discontinuity and randomness of RDM, the ob-
server M’s measurement record will change in a random and discontinuous way
over time and thus be unreliable as a record of what actually happened. As Bell
(1981) argued, however, that there is no association of the particular present with
any particular past does not matter. “For we have no access to the past. We have
only our ‘memories’ and ‘records’. But these memories and records are in fact
present phenomena. The theory should account for the present correlations be-
tween these present phenomena. And in this respect we have seen it to agree with
ordinary quantum mechanics, in so far as the latter is unambiguous.” (Bell, 1981)
Here is a more detailed explanation of Bell’s argument. Suppose the observer M
gets the result x-spin up for the result of her first measurement. When she repeats
her measurement, the state of the composite system after this second measurement
will be
α |up〉S |up, up〉M + β |down〉S |down, down〉M (8.4)
by the linear Schro¨dinger evolution. Now, according to the picture of RDM of par-
ticles, there is a probability of |β|2 that M will end up with a configuration recording
x-spin down for the second result even though he recorded x-spin up for the first
result. Thus it appears that there is a probability of |β|2 that M’s two measurement
results will disagree. However, if M does get x-spin down for her second mea-
surement, her configuration will be the one associated with the second term of the
above state. This means that M’s actual memory configuration will record x-spin
down for her first result, and thus for M the two measurements in fact yield the
same result.
Although the predictions of the above theory are consistent with experience, the
unreliability of an observer’s memories will lead to an empirical incoherence prob-
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lem (Barrett, 1999, p.126). The problem is that although one can test the instanta-
neous empirical predictions of the theory (i.e. the way that measurement records
are correlated at a particular instant), one cannot test its dynamical law that gov-
erns the time evolution of the particle configuration because one’s memories of
measurement records are unreliable. In other words, even if the dynamical law of
the theory were correct, one could not have an empirical justification for accepting
that it is correct.
The more serious problem of the above theory, in my opinion, is that the as-
sumption of the existence of instantaneous mental states is implausible (see also
Butterfield, 1996; Donald, 1996). A large number of neuroscience experiments
show that the appearance and persistence of a conscious experience in our brain
involves a dynamical process of many neuron groups in the brain, which certainly
requires a duration. Note that the limit of our brain is relevant here, because it is we
human beings who do the quantum experiments. If a mental state has a duration,
no matter how short the duation is, then the above theory will be wrong. In this
case, the doctrine of psychophysical supervenience requires that the mental state
of an observer supervenes on her physical state in the duration.
To sum up, it is arguable that the RDM of particles cannot solve the measurement
problem in a satisfactory way. This may be not against expectation, since the RDM
of particles provides only an ontological interpretation of the wave function. As I
will argue below, however, this ontological interpretation of the wave function, if
it is true, may also have implications for solving the measurement problem.
8.3 The origin of the Born probabilities
An important aspect of the measurement problem is to explain the origin of the
Born probabilities or the probabilities of measurement results.12 According to the
suggested interpretation of the wave function in terms of RDM of particles, the
ontological meaning of the modulus squared of the wave function of an electron
in a given position is that it represents the probability density that the electron as
a particle appears in this position, while according to the Born rule, the modulus
squared of the wave function of the electron in the position also gives the probabil-
ity density that the electron is found there. It is hardly conceivable that these two
probabilities, which are both equal to the modulus squared of the wave function,
12 The Born probabilities are usually given the frequency interpretation, which is neutral with respect to the
issue whether the probabilities are fundamental or due to ignorance. Although there have been attempts to
derive the Born rule from more fundamental postulates of quantum mechanics, it is still controversial
whether these arguments really derive the Born rule or they are in fact circular (see Landsman, 2009 and
references therein). In my opinion, only after finding the origin of the Born probabilities, can one find the
correct derivation of the Born rule (see Section 8.4).
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have no connection. On the contrary, it seems natural to assume that the origin of
the Born probabilities is the RDM of particles.
There is a further argument supporting this assumption. According to the pic-
ture of RDM of particles, the wave function of a quantum system represents an
instantaneous property of the particles of the system that determines their motion.
However, the wave function is not a complete description of the instantaneous state
of the particles. The instantaneous state of the particles at a given instant also in-
cludes their random positions, momenta and energies at the instant. Although the
probability of the particles being in each random instantaneous state is completely
determined by the wave function, their stay in the state at each instant is indepen-
dent of the wave function. Therefore, it seems natural to assume that the random
stays of the particles may have certain stochastic influences on the evolution of the
system, which are manifested in the measurement process, e.g. including generat-
ing the random result during a measurement. I will discuss this point in more detail
in Section 8.4.1.
If the assumption that the origin of the Born probabilities is the RDM of particles
turns out to be true, then it will have significant implications for solving the mea-
surement problem, because the existing solutions have not taken this assumption
into account.13 In Bohm’s theory, the dynamics is deterministic and the Born prob-
abilities are epistemic in nature. In the latest formulation of Everett’s theory (Wal-
lace, 2012), the Born probabilities are subjective in the sense that it is defined via
decision theory. In collapse theories, although the Born probabilities are objective,
it is usually assumed that the randomness originates from a classical noise source
independent of the wave function of the studied system. In short, none of these
major solutions to the measurement problem assumes that the Born probabilities
originate from the wave function itself. Therefore, if the Born probabilities origi-
nate from the objective probabilities inherent in the RDM of particles described by
the wave function, then all these realistic alternatives to quantum mechanics need
to be reformulated so that they can be consistent with this result. The reformula-
tion may be easier for some alternatives, but more difficult or even impossible for
others. In the following, I will give an analysis of this issue.
In order that the Born probabilities originate from the RDM of particles, the
instantaneous particle configuration of a measuring device must have efficacy in
determining the generation of the measurement result during the measurement pro-
cess. In other words, besides the deterministic quantum dynamics, there must exist
an additional random dynamics which results from the RDM of particles and which
results in the appearance of a random measurement result. As noted before, a nec-
essary condition for a certain variable to be able to represent a measurement result
13 Note that Bell’s Everett (?) theory or the theory discussed in the last section is an exception, where the Born
probabilities directly come from the objective probabilities inherent in the RDM of particles.
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is that the mental state of an observer supervenes on this variable. This variable may
be the instantaneous particle configuration or the wave function or certain branches
of the wave function or additional variables. Then if the RDM of particles is the
origin of the Born probabilities, then the instantaneous particle configuration must
influence the evolution of this variable by a random dynamics during the measure-
ment process.
There are two possible ways to realize the random dynamics. One way is that
the instantaneous particle configuration of a measuring device or an observer repre-
sents the measurement result, and correspondingly the RDM of particles provides
the random dynamics. This requires that the mental state of an observer is well-
defined at an instant and it also supervenes on the instantaneous particle configura-
tion of the observer. This is the case in Bell’s Everett (?) theory, in which the Born
probabilities directly come from the objective probabilities inherent in the RDM of
particles.
The other way is that the instantaneous particle configuration, which does not
represent the measurement result, influences the variable representing the measure-
ment result by a new random dynamics. The variable representing the measurement
result may be the wave function or certain branches of the wave function or addi-
tional variables, corresponding to collapse theories or Everett’s theory or Bohm’s
theory. In collapse theories, it is required that the instantaneous particle configura-
tion influences the evolution of the wave function by a random dynamics to gen-
erate the right Born probabilities. It has been shown by a concrete collapse model
that this is possible (Gao, 2013a). In Everett’s theory, it is required that the instan-
taneous particle configuration influences the evolution of certain branches of the
wave function by a random dynamics to generate the right Born probabilities. This
seems impossible since the evolution of the wave function is always governed by
the deterministic Schro¨dinger equation according to the theory. In Bohm’s theory,
it is required that the instantaneous particle configuration (which undergoes RDM)
influences the evolution of the positions of Bohmian particles (which undergoes
continuous motion) by a random dynamics to generate the right Born probabili-
ties. This seems possible, but the picture of two kinds of particles can hardly be
satisfactory.
In the following sections, I will analyze these implications for the major solu-
tions to the measurement problem in detail. In addition, I will also present some
other objections to these solutions based on the picture of RDM of particles.
8.3.1 Everett’s theory
I will first analyze Everett’s theory. According to this theory, there is only the wave
function physically, and its evolution is always governed by the Schro¨dinger equa-
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tion. Moreover, the theory claims that after a quantum measurement with many
possible results there will be many observers, and each of them is consciously
aware of one of these definite results. For example, when an observer M measures
the x-spin of a spin one-half system S and the post-measurement state of the com-
posite system is the superposition of M recording x-spin up and S being x-spin up
and M recording x-spin down and S being x-spin down:
α |up〉S |up〉M + β |down〉S |down〉M , (8.5)
where α and β are not zero and satisfy the normalization condition |α|2 + |β|2 = 1,
there will be two observers after the measurement, and each of them is consciously
aware of a definite record, either x-spin up or x-spin down.
As I noted before, there are in general two ways of understanding the notion
of multiplicity in Everett’s theory. One is the strong form which claims that there
are many physical observers (in material content) after a quantum measurement
with many possible results, and the other is the weak form which claims that
there is one physical observer (in material content), but there are many mental
observers or many mental states of the same physical observer after the quan-
tum measurement. It is obvious that the strong form is not consistent with the
picture of RDM of particles, according to which the number of particles is not
changed when the wave function of a quantum system evolves over time, e.g.
from (α |up〉S +β |down〉S ) |ready〉M to α |up〉S |up〉M +β |down〉S |down〉M. In other
words, there is only one physical world according to the picture of RDM of parti-
cles.
However, a more detailed analysis is needed to determine whether the weak form
of Everett’s theory is consistent with the picture of RDM of particles. To begin
with, if assuming that an observer’s mental state is well-defined at an instant, and
it supervenes on the physical state of the observer at the instant, then the resulting
theory will be Bell’s Everett (?) theory. The theory is a one-world and one-mind
theory. In this case, the weak form of Everett’s theory is not consistent with the pic-
ture of RDM of particles. Next, assume an observer’s mental state is well-defined
in a finite (continuous) time interval, and it supervenes on the physical state of the
observer in the time interval. This is a well-accepted assumption. According to the
picture of RDM of particles, when an observer is in a post-measurement superpo-
sition such as (8.5), her physical state during any finite time interval is the whole
superposition, not any of its branches. Each branch of the superposition exists not
in a continuous time interval, but only in a discontinuous, dense instant set, and
the combination of all these instant sets forms a continuous time interval. Then
according to the above assumption, when an observer is in a post-measurement su-
perposition such as (8.5), her mental state supervenes on the whole superposition,
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not on any of its branches, and thus there is still one world and one mind. This
means that the weak form of Everett’s theory is not consistent with the picture of
RDM of particles either in this case.
In order that the weak form of Everett’s theory is consistent with the picture of
RDM of particles, one must assume that when an observer is in a post-measurement
superposition such as (8.5), she has many mental states, each of which supervenes
on one branch of the superposition, which exists in a discontinuous, dense instant
set. This requires that an observer’s mental states are well-defined even in a discon-
tinuous, dense instant set, and each of them supervenes on her partial physical state
in the discontinuous, dense instant set. However, this requirement seems ad hoc,
only for the purpose of being consistent with the predictions of the weak form of
Everett’s theory. Moreover, it will lead to a very strange picture, namely that when
a physical observer has many minds, these minds do not exist at the same time at
any precise instant, but exist at different instants and interlace with each other in
time.
In the following, I will analyze the origin of the Born probabilities in the weak
form of Everett’s theory. I will argue that even if the theory is consistent with the
picture of RDM of particles, it cannot accommodate the assumption that the origin
of the Born probabilities is the RDM of particles. In the weak form of Everett’s
theory, measurement records are represented by certain branches of the wave func-
tion of the observer on which her mental states supervene. In order that the Born
probabilities originate from the RDM of particles, the instantaneous particle con-
figuration of the observer must influence the evolution of these branches of her
wave function. This means that besides the deterministic quantum dynamics, there
must exist an additional random dynamics which results from the RDM of particles
and results in the appearance of random measurement records. However, according
to the weak form of Everett’s theory, there is only the wave function, and its evo-
lution is always governed by the Schro¨dinger equation. Therefore, in the theory,
the instantaneous particle configuration of an observer can have no influence on
the evolution of any branches of her wave function, and as a result, the Born prob-
abilities cannot originate from the objective probability inherent in the RDM of
particles. Note that Everett’s theory cannot be reformulated by adding the required
random dynamics for the wave function either; otherwise it will become a collapse
theory.
There is another possibility which deserves to be considered. If the doctrine of
psychophysical supervenience is violated, then even though the evolution of the
wave function is always governed by the Schro¨dinger equation, the instantaneous
particle configuration of an observer may also influence the evolution of her mental
states (which supervene on certain branches of her wave function), and thus it may
be still possible that the Born probabilities originate from the RDM of particles.
8.3 The origin of the Born probabilities 113
In the single-mind theory, this possibility indeed exists. In the many-minds theory,
however, this possibility does not exist. Since the instantaneous particle configu-
ration is the same for the mental states of all minds, its random influence on the
evolution of the mental state of each mind will be also the same. This means that
the measurement record for every mind will be the same, which is certainly in-
consistent with the predictions of the many-minds theory. Therefore, at least for
some minds the origin of the Born probabilities is not the RDM of particles in the
many-minds theory.
8.3.2 Bohm’s theory
In this section, I will analyze Bohm’s theory. In particular, I will examine whether
it is possible that the Born probabilities originate from the RDM of particles de-
scribed by the wave function in Bohm’s theory.
According to Bohm’s theory, a complete realistic description of a quantum sys-
tem is provided by the configuration defined by the positions of its Bohmian parti-
cles together with its wave function. The wave function follows the linear Schro¨dinger
equation and never collapses. The Bohmian particles are guided by the wave func-
tion via the guiding equation to undergo deterministic continuous motion. As noted
before, in Bohm’s theory, there are two suggested forms of psychophysical super-
venience, and for either form the result of a measurement is determined by the
positions of the Bohmian particles of the measuring device. Thus, in order that the
Born probabilities originate from the RDM of particles, the instantaneous RDM
particle configuration must influence the evolution of the positions of Bohmian
particles by a random dynamics. This means that the guiding equation needs to be
added a stochastic evolution term, which originates from the RDM of particles and
is required to generate the right measurement results in accordance with the Born
rule. In the following, I will show that this is in principle possible. I use Vink’s
(1993) discrete dynamics for a one-body system to illustrate this possibility.14
The continuity equation in the discrete position representation |xn〉 is:
~∂Pn(t)/∂t =
∑
m
Jnm(t), (8.6)
where
Pn(t) = |〈xn |ψ(t)〉 |2, (8.7)
14 Vink’s dynamics is also called the Bohm-Bell-Vink dynamics (Barrett, 1999).
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Jnm(t) = 2Im(〈ψ(t) |xn〉 〈xn|H |xm〉 〈xm |ψ(t)〉), (8.8)
where |ψ(t)〉 is the wave function of the system, and H is the Hamiltonian of the
system.
In Vink’s dynamics, the position jumps of the Bohmian particle of the system are
governed by a transition probability Tmndt which gives the probability to go from
position xn to xm in the time interval dt. The transition matrix T gives rise to a
time-dependent probability distribution xn (for an ensemble of identically prepared
systems), Pn(t), which has to satisfy the master equation:
∂Pn(t)/∂t =
∑
m
(TnmPm − TmnPn). (8.9)
Then when the transition matrix T satisfies the following equation:
Jnm/~ = TnmPm − TmnPn. (8.10)
the above continuity equation can be satisfied.
Vink (1993) showed that when choosing Bell’s simple solution where for n ,
m15
Tnm =
Jnm/~Pm, Jnm ≥ 00, Jnm < 0, (8.11)
the dynamics reduces to the (first-order) guiding equation of Bohm’s theory in the
continuum limit.
Besides the Bohmian particle undergoing Vink’s discrete position jumps, the
system is also composed of a particle which undergoes RDM according to the pic-
ture of RDM of particles. If the RDM of the particle influences the position jumps
of the Bohmian particle, then there must exist a stochastic evolution term in the
solution Tnm, which depends on the instantaneous Bohmian particle configuration
xk and may be denoted by S m(k). It can be seen that one can add to Tnm defined
above any solution T 0 of the homogeneous equation:
T 0nmPm − T 0mnPn = 0. (8.12)
This requires that S m(k) should satisfy the following relation:
S m(k)Pm − S n(k)Pn = 0. (8.13)
15 The probability Tnndt follows from the normalization relation
∑
m Tnmdt = 1 for a time discretization step dt.
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This result shows that when this relation is satisfied the random influences of
the RDM of particles can keep the probability distribution of the positions of the
Bohmian particles of an ensemble of identically prepared systems unchanged. Then
under the quantum equilibrium hypothesis,16 the probabilities of measurement re-
sults predicted by the revised theory are still the same as the Born probabilities.
In this revised theory, however, it can hardly say that the Born probabilities orig-
inate from the RDM of particles. In the theory, the quantum equilibrium hypothesis
still plays a major role, while the random influences of the RDM of particles are
only a side effect. In order that the Born probabilities really originate from the
RDM of particles, the random influences of the RDM of particles on the evolution
of the positions of Bohmian particles are required to generate the right measure-
ment results in accordance with the Born rule no matter what the initial probability
distribution of the positions of these Bohmian particles is (i.e. without resorting
to the quantum equilibrium hypothesis). However, it can be argued by a concrete
example that this is impossible.
Consider an electron in a superposition of two energy eigenstates in two boxes.
Due to the restriction of box walls, the Bohmian particle of the electron cannot
continuously move from one box to another. Then no matter what the random in-
fluence of the RDM of the electron is, the probability distribution of the positions
of the Bohmian particles of an ensemble of identical prepared electrons in the two
boxes keeps unchanged.17 Therefore, if the initial probability distribution of the
positions of these Bohmian particles is different from the Born probabilities, e.g.
the initial positions of these Bohmian particle are all in one box, then the probabil-
ities of position measurement results will be different from the Born probabilities
(cf. Valentini and Westman, 2005)).
One may object that this example is only an unrealistic situation. But even for
such situations the revised theory is also required to be consistent with the Born
rule. It can be imagined that for realistic situations the motion of each Bohmian par-
ticle under the random influences of the RDM of particles may be ergodic, during
which the probability of each Bohmian particle being in any position is in accor-
dance with the Born probabilities. Then the probabilities of position measurement
results will be the same as the Born probabilities. Moreover, these probabilities
also originate from the RDM of particles.
However, there are at least two problems with this picture of ergodic motion of
Bohmian particles. The first problem concerns the time scale of forming the er-
16 The quantum equilibrium hypothesis provides the initial conditions for the guidance equation which make
Bohm’s theory obey Born’s rule in terms of position distributions.
17 Here it is implicitly assumed that the motion of Bohmian particles keeps continuous under the random
influence of the RDM of particles. If the motion of the Bohmian particle of the electron becomes
discontinuous, then it seems that its state of motion will be also described by a wave function, and as a result,
there will be two electrons. This leads to a contradiction.
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godic motion. The random influences of the RDM of particles need a certain time
to make the initial non-ergodic motion of Bohmian particles become ergodic mo-
tion. But when the ergodic motion is formed, the original wave function already
evolves to a new one. If only the time scale of forming the ergodic motion is finite,
then there is always a finite discrepency between the probabilities of measurement
results and the Born probabilities, although it is possible that current experiments
cannot yet detect the difference. The second and more serious problem is that this
picture of ergodic motion is inconsistent with the predictions of quantum mechan-
ics. Since the wave function never collapses in the theory, even though the Bohmian
particles are initially trapped in one branch of the post-measurement state after a
measurement, the random influences of the RDM of particles (which is described
by the post-measurement state) will soon make the motion of the Bohmian particles
ergodic, which means that the Bohmian particles will move throughout the whole
region the post-measurement state spreads. Then a subsequent measurement may
obtain a result different from the result of the initial measurement. This contradicts
the predictions of quantum mechanics.
Finally, I will give a few comments on the reality of the wave function and
Bohmian particles in Bohm’s theory. It is usually thought that in Bohm’s theory the
wave function cannot be directly measured and thus is more hidden than Bohmian
particles. For example, Bell once wrote,
the most hidden of all variables, in the pilot wave picture, is the wavefunction, which
manifests itself to us only by its influence on the complementary variables [i.e. positions
of Bohmian particles]. (Bell, 1987, p.201)
Maudlin made this point more clearly, he said:
no experiment can directly reveal the quantum state of any system: our only clues to the
quantum state are inferences from the behavior of the Primary Ontology [i.e. Bohmian
particles]. (Maudlin, 2013, p.147)
However, this is a misunderstanding. Although an unknown quantum state or wave
function cannot be measured, a known wave function can be directly measured
by a series of protective measurements (Aharonov and Vaidman, 1993; Aharonov,
Anandan and Vaidman, 1993; Gao, 2014a) (see also Section 1.3 for a brief intro-
duction). In contrast, it is the exact positions of Bohmian particles that cannot be
measured even in principle. As Du¨rr, Goldstein and Zanghı` stated explicitly,
in a universe governed by Bohmian mechanics it is in principle impossible to know more
about the configuration of any subsystem than what is expressed by (4.1) [i.e. |ψ|2]. (Du¨rr,
Goldstein and Zanghı`, 1992)
Therefore, Bohmian particles are more hidden than the wave function in Bohm’s
theory.
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This result also raises a doubt on the reality of Bohmian particles.18 It seems not
wholly satisfactory to directly claim reality for certain mathematical objects in a
physical theory, e.g. directly claiming reality for Bohmian particles and their trajec-
tories in Bohm’s theory.19 This point of view is also supported by a recent research
program on the reality of the wave function (Harrigan and Spekkens, 2010; Pusey,
Barrett and Rudolph, 2012; Leifer, 2014a; Gao, 2015b). To determine whether or
not a mathematical object in a physical theory directly describes the physical re-
ality, a more satisfactory strategy is to analyze the connection between them via
experience. A physical theory is a theory connecting with experience after all.
There are in general two ways to realize this strategy. One way is to assume the
existence of the underlying state of reality and its connection with experience or
results of measurements. A typical example is the ontological models framework
(Harrigan and Spekkens, 2010), which assumes that when a measurement is per-
formed, the behaviour of the measuring device is determined by the ontic state of
the measured system, along with the physical properties of the measuring device.
The other way is via a criterion of reality related to experience. A well-known ex-
ample is the EPR criterion of reality (Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, 1935). I have
also suggested an improved criterion of reality before (in Section 4.4).
As I have argued in Chapter 4, with the help of protective measurements one can
prove the reality of the wave function by either realization of the above strategy.
This provides a convincing reason for including the wave function in the ontology
of Bohm’s theory. In contrast, the reality of Bohmian particles cannot be proved by
either realization of the above strategy. The main reason is still that the exact po-
sitions of Bohmian particles cannot be measured in principle,20 or in other words,
there is no connection between Bohmian particles and experience.21 Although the
lack of proof cannot exclude the possibility that Bohmian particles are real, it does
raise a doubt about the reality of Bohmian particles.
In addition, my previous analysis of the meaning of the wave function further
increases the doubt. I have argued that the wave function is neither nomological
18 The reality of the trajectories of the Bohmian particles has been questioned based on analysis of weak
measurement and protective measurement (Englert, Scully, Su¨ssmann and Walther, 1992; Aharonov and
Vaidman, 1996; Aharonov, Englert and Scully, 1999; Aharonov, Erez and Scully, 2004). However, these
objections may be answered by noticing that what the protective measurement measures is the wave
function, not the Bohmian particles (see also Drezet, 2006). For another answer to these objections see Hiley,
Callaghan and Maroney (2000).
19 For example, an opponent of Bohm’s theory would say: “This kind of reality is entirely in a lofty Platonic
world, and we are merely invited to imagine that we live in such a world.” (Werner, 2015)
20 Even the approximate positions of Bohmian particles can only be measured by a strong measurement which
disturbs the measured system greatly. Moreover, the result of a strong position measurement does not reflect
the actual position of the measured Bohmian particle, but only reflect the disturbed position of the Bohmian
particle immediately before the result appears.
21 It seems that the connection between Bohmian particles and experience may be directly established by
assuming that the mental state of an observer supervenes on the relative positions of Bohmian particles. As I
have argued in the first section of this chapter, however, this assumption is problematic.
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nor a physical field in a high-dimensional space; rather, it represents the state of
RDM of particles in our three-dimensional space. If this interpretation of the wave
function turns out to be true, then there are already particles in Bohm’s theory.
These particles are more like real particles than Bohmian particles; they have mass
and charge, and their state of motion, which is described by the wave function, can
also be measured. Morover, there are already additional variables besides the wave
function. They are the definite positions, momenta and energies of these particles at
each instant. Although the evolution of these variables over time is not continuous
and deterministic, their random dynamics might just lead to the stochastic collapse
of the wave function and further account for the appearance of random measure-
ment results. I will analyze this possibility in detail later on. Then the motivation to
introduce additional, unobservable Bohmian particles will be largly reduced. Last
but not least, introducing Bohmian particles will also lead to a very clumsy and un-
natural picture. For example, an electron will contain two particles, one undergoing
RDM, and the other undergoing deterministic continuous motion.
To sum up, I have argued that Bohm’s theory can hardly accommodate the as-
sumption that the Born probabilities originate from the RDM of particles described
by the wave function. Moreover, the existence of the RDM of particles itself also
reduces the necessity of introducing additional Bohmian particles in the first place.
8.3.3 Collapse theories
I have analyzed Everett’s theory and Bohm’s theory, which are two major solutions
to the measurement problem. It is argued that these two theories can hardly be con-
sistent with the suggested interpretation of the wave function in terms of RDM of
particles. Moreover, even if they can be reformulated to be consistent with the new
interpretation, they can hardly accommodate the assumption that the Born prob-
abilities originate from the RDM of particles. If there are no additional variables
(that represent definite measurement results) besides the wave function, then the
state of a quantum system including a measuring device will be represented by
its wave function. If there are no many worlds either, then a definite measurement
result, which is usually denoted by a definite position of the pointer of a measur-
ing device, will be represented by a local wavepacket of the pointer, rather than
by a superposition of many local wavepackets. As a consequence, the generation
of definite measurement results can only be achieved by the collapse of the wave
function. In other words, wavefunction collapse will be a real physical process.
Therefore, the previous analyses strongly suggest that the picture of RDM of parti-
cles favors collapse theories, the other major solution to the measurement problem
besides Everett’s theory and Bohm’s theory.
Admittedly, the existing collapse theories are still phenomenological models,
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and they are also plagued by a few serious problems, such as energy non-conservation
problem (Pearle, 2007, 2009). In particular, the physical origin of wavefunction
collapse, including the origin of the randomness of the collapse process, is still un-
known, although there are already several interesting conjectures (see, e.g. Dio´si,
1989; Penrose, 1996). In the next section, I will try to solve these problems and
propose a new collapse model in terms of RDM of particles. It will be shown that
the picture of RDM of particles can be readily combined with the picture of wave-
function collapse. On the one hand, the dynamical collapse of the wave function
can release the randomness of the RDM of particles, and on the other hand, the
RDM of particles can provide an appropriate noise source that collapses the wave
function. Especially, it will be shown by the new collapse model that the Born
probabilities can indeed originate from the objective probabilities inherent in the
RDM of particles.
8.4 A model of wavefunction collapse in terms of RDM of particles
It is well known that a ‘chooser’ and a ‘choice’ are needed to bring the required
dynamical collapse of the wave function (Pearle 1999). The chooser is the noise
source that collapses the wave function, and the choices are the states toward which
the collapse tends. In this section, I will first analyze these two problems and pro-
pose a new model of energy-conserved wavefunction collapse in terms of RDM
of particle. Then I will investigate the consistency of the model and experiments.
Finally, I will also give a few speculations on the physical origin of wavefunction
collapse.
8.4.1 The chooser in discrete time
To begin with, I will analyze the chooser problem. In the existing collapse models,
the chooser is usually assumed to be an unknown classical noise field independent
of the collapsed wave function (Pearle, 2007, 2009). If what the wave function de-
scribes is the RDM of particles, then it seems natural to assume that the random
motion of particles is the appropriate noise source to collapse the wave function.
This assumption has four merits at least. First, the noise source and its proper-
ties are already known. For example, the probability density that the particles of a
quantum system appear in certain positions at each instant is given by the modulus
squared of the wave function of the system in these positions at the instant. Next,
this noise source is not a classical field, and thus the model can avoid the problems
introduced by the field such as the problem of infinite energy etc (Pearle, 2009).
Thirdly, as I have argued before, the RDM of particles can explain the origin of the
Born probabilities. Last but not least, the RDM of particles can also manifest itself
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in the laws of motion by introducing the collapse evolution of the wave function.
In the following, I will give a more detailed analysis of this assumption.
According to the picture of RDM of particles, the wave function of a quantum
system represents an instantaneous property of the particles of the system that de-
termines their random motion. Besides the wave function, the instantaneous state
of the particles at a given instant also includes their random positions, momenta
and energies at the instant. Although the probability of the particles being in each
random instantaneous state is completely determined by (the modulus squared of)
their wave function, their stay in the state at each instant is independent of the
wave function. Therefore, it seems natural to assume that the random stays of the
particles may have certain physical efficacy that manifests in the evolution of the
system.22 Since the motion of the particles is essentially random, their stay at an
instant does not influence their stays at other instants in any direct way. Then the
random stays of the particles can only influence the evolution of their wave func-
tion.23 Moreover, since the quantity that directly determines the probability of the
random stays is the modulus squared of the wave function, it seems more appro-
priate to assume that it is not the wave function, but its modulus squared, that is
influenced by the random stays of the particles. This forms a feedback; the modulus
squared of the wave function of a quantum system determines the probabilities of
the random stays of its particles in certain positions, momenta and energies, while
these random stays also influence the evolution of the modulus squared of the wave
function in a stochastic way.
However, the existence of the stochastic influences on the evolution of the wave
function seems to rely on an important precondition: the discreteness of time. If
time is continuous and instants are durationless, then the accumulated influences
of the random stays during an arbitrarily short time interval, even if they exist,
will contain no randomness. The reason is that the discontinuity and randomness
of motion exist only at each durationless instant, and they don’t exist during an
arbitrarily short time interval or an infinitesimal time interval.24 Concretely speak-
ing, the integral of the influences of the random stays during an infinitesimal time
interval contains no randomness inherent in the random stays, no matter how the
influence at each instant is. The integral can be formulated as
∫ t+dt
t ρ(X, t)N(X, t)dt,
22 This is distinct from the case of continuous motion. For the latter, the position of a particle at each instant is
completely determined by its intrinisic velocity at the instant (and its initial position), and thus the position of
the particle has no influence on its velocity.
23 In fact, since the random stays of the particles as one part of the instantaneous state of the system are
completely random, the complete equation of motion for the instantaneous state is only about the evolution
of the wave function. Therefore, the random stays of the particles can only manifest themselves in the
complete equation of motion by their stochastic influences on the evolution of the wave function.
24 For example, the state of RDM of particles in real space, which is defined during an infinitesimal time
interval at a given instant, is described by the position density and position flux density, and they are
continuous quantities that contain no discontinuity and randomness.
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where X = X(t) is a random variable that describes the random stays, ρ(X, t) is the
probability density function, and N(X, t) is a general influence function which is es-
sentially discontinuous. Note that this integral is Lebesgue integrable when ρ(X, t)
is integrable and N(X, t) is finite for any X and t. It can be shown by a simple
example that this integral as a function of time contains no randomness. Suppose
the random variable X only assumes two values 0 and 1, and N(X, t) = X(t). Then
we have
∫ t+dt
t ρ(X, t)N(X, t)dt = ρ(1, t)dt. This integral is a continuous function of
time, and its evolution with time contains no randomness. In contrast, if time is
discrete and instants are not zero-sized but finite-sized, the integral during a finite
time interval will be obviously a random function of time.25
There is also another argument for the discrete stochastic evolution of the wave
function. It has been widely argued that the existence of a minimum observable
interval of space and time, the Planck scale, is a model-independent result of the
proper combination of quantum field theory and general relativity (see, e.g. Garay,
1995 for a review).26 The existence of a minimum observable interval of time or the
Planck time means that any physical change during a time interval shorter than the
Planck time is unobservable, or in other words, a physically observable change can
only happen during a time interval not shorter than the Planck time. Since the above
stochastic influences on the evolution of the wave function depend not only on time
duration but also on the wave function itself in general, the influences can always
be observable for some wave functions during an arbitrarily short time interval (at
the ensemble level). However, the existence of a minimum observable Planck time
demands that all observable processes should happen during a time interval not
shorter than the Planck time, and thus each tiny stochastic influence must happen
during one unit of Planck time or more.27 Moreover, if there are many possible
instantaneous states where the stochastic influences can happen at each time (e.g.
for a general wave function), the duration of each tiny stochastic influence will be
exactly one unit of Planck time for most time; when the time interval is longer than
one unit of Planck time the stochastic influence will happen in other instantaneous
states with probability almost equal to one.
To sum up, I have argued that the manifestation of the randomness and disconti-
nuity of RDM of particles in the laws of motion requires that time is discrete. In the
following analysis, I will assume that time is indeed discrete, and the size of each
25 In some sense, the discreteness of time prevents particles from jumping from their present instantaneous state
to another instantaneous state and makes the particles stay in the present instantaneous state all through
during each finite-sized instant.
26 Note that the existing arguments do not imply but only suggest that spacetime is discrete in the ontological
sense. Moreover, the meanings and realization of discrete spacetime are also different in the existing models
of quantum gravity.
27 This means that the minimum duration of the random stay of a particle in a definite position, momentum and
energy is always a discrete instant.
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discrete instant is the Planck time.28 In discrete time, the particles of a quantum
system randomly stay in an instantaneous state with definite positions, momenta
and energies at each discrete instant with probability determined by the modulus
squared of the wave function of the system at the instant. Each random, finite stay
of the particles may have a finite influence on the evolution of the wave function.
As I will demonstrate later, the accumulation of such discrete and random influ-
ences may lead to the right collapse of the wave function, which can then explain
the generation of the definite measurement result. Accordingly, the evolution of the
wave function will be governed by a revised Schro¨dinger equation, which includes
the normal linear terms and a stochastic nonlinear term that describes the discrete
collapse dynamics.29
8.4.2 Energy conservation and the choices
Now I will analyze the choice problem. The random stay of the particles of a quan-
tum system at each discrete instant may have a stochastic influence on the evolution
of the wave function of the system at the instant. If the stochastic influences accu-
mulate and result in the collapse of the wave function, then what are the states
toward which the collapse tends? This is the choice problem or preferred basis
problem. It may be expected that the stochastic influences of the RDM of particles
on the wave function should not be arbitrary but be restricted by certain funda-
mental principles. In particular, it seems reasonable to assume that the resulting
dynamical collapse of the wave function should also satisfy the principle of con-
servation of energy.30 If this assumption is true, then the choices or preferred bases
will be the energy eigenstates of the total Hamiltonian of the studied system.31 In
the following, I will give a detailed analysis of the consequences of this assump-
tion. Its possible physical basis will be investigated in the last subsection.
As is well known, for a deterministic evolution of the wave function such as the
28 It has been conjectured that a fundamental theory of physics may be formulated by three natural constants:
the Planck time (tP), the Planck length (lP), and the Planck constant (~), and all other physical constants are
expressed by the combinations of them (Gao, 2006b). For example, the speed of light is c = lP/tP, and the
Einstein gravitational constant is κ = 8pilPtP/~. In this sense, the RDM of particles in discrete space and
time, represented by the above three constants, is more fundamental than the phenomena described by the
special and general theory of relativity. However, even if this conjecture is true, it is still a big challenge how
to work out the details (see Gao, 2014c for an initial attempt).
29 Note that the wave function (as an instantaneous property of particles) also exists in discrete time, which
means that the evolution of the wave function including the linear Schro¨dinger evolution is also discrete in
nature.
30 It is worth noting that there might also exist a possibility that the principle of conservation of energy is not
universal and indeed violated by wavefunction collapse. A hint is that the usual proof that spacetime
translation invariance leads to the conservation of energy and momentum relies on the linearity of quantum
dynamics, and it does not apply to nonlinear quantum dynamics such as wavefunction collapse. I will not
consider this possibility here.
31 For superpositions of degenerate energy eigenstates of a many-body system, a further collapse rule is needed.
I will discuss this issue later on.
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linear Schro¨dinger evolution, the requirement of conservation of energy may apply
to a single isolated system. However, for a stochastic evolution of the wave func-
tion such as the dynamical collapse process, the requirement of conservation of
energy cannot apply to a single system in general but only apply to an ensemble of
identically prepared systems. It can be proved that only when the preferred bases
are energy eigenstates of the total Hamiltonian for each identical system in an en-
semble, can energy be conserved at the ensemble level for wavefunction collapse
(see Pearle, 2000 for a more detailed analysis). Note that for the linear Schro¨dinger
evolution under a time-independent external potential, energy is conserved but mo-
mentum is not conserved even at the ensemble level, and thus it is not conservation
of momentum but conservation of energy that is a more universal restriction for
wavefunction collapse.
The conservation of energy can not only solve the preferred basis problem, but
also further determine the law of dynamical collapse to a large extent. For each
system in the same quantum state in an ensemble, in order that the probability
distribution of energy eigenvalues keeps constant at all times for the whole en-
semble (i.e. energy is conserved at the ensemble level), the random change of the
energy probability distribution of the system, which results from the random stay
of the system at each discrete instant, must satisfy a certain restriction. Concretely
speaking, the random stay in an energy eigenvalue Ei will increase the probability
of the energy eigenstate |Ei > and decrease the probabilities of all other energy
eigenstates pro rata. Moreover, the increasing amplitude must be proportional to
the total probability of all other energy eigenstates, and the coefficient is related to
the energy uncertainty of the state. I will prove these results in the next subsection.
A more important question is whether this energy-conserved collapse model can
explain definite measurement results. At first sight the answer appears negative.
For example, the energy eigenstates being preferred bases seems apparently in-
consistent with the localization of macroscopic objects including the pointers of
measuring devices. However, a detailed analysis given later will demonstrate that
the model can be consistent with experiments. The key is to realize that the energy
uncertainty driving the collapse of the entangled state of a many-body system is
not the uncertainty of the total energy of all sub-systems, but the sum of the ab-
solute energy uncertainty of every sub-system. As a result, the preferred bases are
the product states of the energy eigenstates of the Hamiltonian of each sub-system
for a non-interacting or weakly-interacting many-body system. This gives a further
collapse rule for superpositions of degenerate energy eigenstates of a many-body
system.
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8.4.3 A discrete model of energy-conserved wavefunction collapse
In this subsection, I will present a concrete model of energy-conserved wavefunc-
tion collapse based on the above analysis (see also Gao, 2013a).
Consider a multi-level system with a constant Hamiltonian. Its initial state is:
|ψ(0)〉 =
m∑
i=1
ci(0) |Ei〉, (8.14)
where |Ei〉 are the energy eigenstates of the Hamiltonian of the system, Ei is the
corresponding energy eigenvalue, and the coefficients ci(0) satisfy the normaliza-
tion relation
∑m
i=1 |ci(0)|2 = 1.
Based on the previous analysis, I assume that this superposition of energy eigen-
states will collapse to one of the eigenstates after a discrete dynamical process, and
the collapse evolution satisfies the conservation of energy at the ensemble level.
The physical picture of the dynamical collapse process is as follows. At the initial
discrete instant t0 = tP (where tP is the Planck time), the system randomly stays
in a branch |Ei〉 with probability Pi(0) ≡ |ci(0)|2. This finite stay slightly changes
the probability of the staying branch, and correspondingly the probabilities of all
other branches are also changed pro rata. Similarly, at any discrete instant t = ntP
the system randomly stays in a branch |Ei〉 with probability Pi(t) ≡ |ci(t)|2, and the
random stay also changes the probabilities of the branches slightly. Then during a
finite time interval much larger than tP, the probability of each branch will undergo
a discrete and stochastic evolution. In the end, the probability of one branch will
be close to one, and the probabilities of other branches will be close to zero. In
other words, the initial superposition will randomly collapse to one of the energy
branches in the superposition effectively.32
Now I will give a concrete analysis of this dynamical collapse process. Since the
linear Schro¨dinger evolution does not change the energy probability distribution,
we may only consider the influence of dynamical collapse on the energy probability
distribution. Suppose the system stays in branch |Ei〉 at instant t = ntP, and the stay
changes the probability of this branch, Pi(t), to
Pii(t + tP) = Pi(t) + ∆Pi, (8.15)
where the superscript i denotes the staying branch, and ∆Pi is a functional of Pi(t).
Due to the conservation of probability, the increase of the probability of one branch
can only come from the scale-down of the probabilities of all other branches. This
means that the probability of another branch P j(t) ( j , i) correspondingly changes
to
32 I have suggested a possible solution to the tails problem in Section 8.1.3.
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Pij(t + tP) = P j(t) −
P j(t)∆Pi
1 − Pi(t) , (8.16)
where the superscript i still denotes the staying branch.33 The probability of this
random stay at the instant is p(Ei, t) = Pi(t). Then we can work out the diagonal
density matrix elements of the evolution: 34
ρii(t + tP) =
m∑
j=1
p(E j, t)P
j
i (t + tP)
= Pi(t)[Pi(t) + ∆Pi] +
∑
j,i
P j(t)[Pi(t) − Pi(t)∆P j(t)1 − P j(t) ]
= ρii(t) + Pi(t)[∆Pi −
∑
j,i
P j(t)
∆P j(t)
1 − P j(t) ]. (8.17)
Here I will introduce the first rule of dynamical collapse, which says that the
probability distribution of energy eigenvalues for an ensemble of identically pre-
pared systems is constant during the dynamical collapse process. As I have argued
in the last subsection, this rule is required by the principle of conservation of en-
ergy at the ensemble level. By this rule, we have ρii(t + tP) = ρii(t) for any i. This
leads to the following set of equations:
∆P1(t) −
∑
j,1
P j(t)∆P j(t)
1 − P j(t) = 0,
∆P2(t) −
∑
j,2
P j(t)∆P j(t)
1 − P j(t) = 0,
...
∆Pm(t) −
∑
j,m
P j(t)∆P j(t)
1 − P j(t) = 0. (8.18)
By solving this equations set (e.g. by subtracting each other), we can find the fol-
lowing relation for any i:
∆Pi
1 − Pi(t) = k, (8.19)
33 This result can also be obtained by first increasing the probability of the staying branch and then normalizing
the probabilities of all branches. This means that Pii(t + tP) =
Pi(t)+∆
1+∆ and P
i
j(t + tP) =
P j(t)
1+∆ for any j , i. In
this way, we have ∆Pi = ∆1+∆ (1 − Pi(t)) and ∆P j = − ∆1+∆ P j(t) for any j , i.
34 The density matrix here describes the ensemble of states which arise from all possible random evolution
(Pearle, 1999).
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where k is an undetermined dimensionless quantity that relates to the state |ψ(t)〉.
By using (8.19), we can further work out the non-diagonal density matrix ele-
ments of the evolution. But it is more convenient to calculate the following variant
of non-diagonal density matrix elements:
ρi j(t + tP) =
m∑
l=1
p(El, t)Pli(t + tP)P
l
j(t + tP)
=
∑
l,i, j
Pl(t)[Pi(t) − kPi(t)][P j(t) − kP j(t)]
+Pi(t)[Pi(t) + k(1 − Pi(t))][P j(t) − kP j(t)]
+P j(t)[P j(t) + k(1 − P j(t))][Pi(t) − kPi(t)]
= (1 − k2)ρi j(t). (8.20)
Since the collapse time, τc, is usually defined by the relation ρi j(τc) = 12ρi j(0),
we may use an appropriate approximation, where k is assumed to be the same as
its initial value during the time interval [0, τc], to simplify the calculation of the
collapse time. Then we have:
ρi j(t) ≈ (1 − k2)nρi j(0). (8.21)
The corresponding collapse time is in the order of:
τc ≈ 1k2 tP, (8.22)
In the following, I will analyze the formula of k defined by (8.19). To begin with,
the probability restricting condition 0 6 Pi(t) 6 1 for any i requires that 0 6 k 6 1.
When k = 0, no collapse happens, and when k = 1, collapse happens instanta-
neously. Note that k cannot be smaller than zero, as this will lead to the negative
value of Pi(t) in some cases. For instance, when k is negative and Pi(t) <
|k|
1+|k| ,
Pii(t + tP) = Pi(t) + k[1 − Pi(t)] will be negative and violate the probability re-
stricting condition. That k is positive indicates that each random stay increases the
probability of the staying branch and decreases the probabilities of other branches.
Next, it can be argued that k is proportional to the energy uncertainty of the state.
When the energy uncertainty is zero, i.e., when the state is an energy eigenstate,
no collapse happens. When the energy uncertainty is not zero, collapse happens.
The energy uncertainty can be defined with the common RMS (mean square root)
uncertainty:
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∆E =
√
m∑
i=1
Pi(Ei − E)2, (8.23)
where E =
∑m
i=1 PiEi is the average energy. For the simplest two-level system, we
have
∆E =
√
P1P2|E1 − E2|. (8.24)
Thirdly, in order to cancel out the dimension of energy, the dimensionless quan-
tity k should also include a constant with the dimension of time. This constant is
arguably the Planck time tP. In continuous time where tP = 0, no stochastic in-
fluence exists and no collapse happens. In discrete time where tP , 0, collapse
happens.
Then after omitting a coefficient in the order of unity, we can get the formula of
k in the first order:
k ≈ ∆EtP/~. (8.25)
This is the second rule of dynamical collapse. By inputting (8.25) into (8.22), we
can further get the collapse time formula:
τc ≈ ~EP(∆E)2 , (8.26)
where EP = h/tP is the Planck energy, and ∆E is the energy uncertainty of the
initial state.
Here it is worth pointing out that k must contain the first order term of ∆E. The
reason is that the only existence of the second order or higher order term of ∆E
will lead to much longer collapse time for some common measurement situations,
which contradicts experiments (Gao, 2006a, 2006b). In addition, a similar analy-
sis of the consistency with experiments may also provide a further support for the
energy-conserved collapse model in which the preferred bases are energy eigen-
states. First of all, if the preferred bases are not energy eigenstates but momentum
eigenstates, then the energy uncertainty will be replaced by momentum uncertainty
in the collapse time formula (8.26), namely τc ≈ ~EP(∆pc)2 . As a result, the collapse
time will be too short to be consistent with experiments for some situations. For
example, for the ground state of hydrogen atom the collapse time will be a few
days. Note that the second order or higher order term of ∆p will also lead to much
longer collapse time for some common measurement situations, which contradicts
experiments.
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Next, if the preferred bases are position eigenstates,35 then the collapse time for-
mula (8.26) will be replaced by something like τc ≈ l2tP(∆x)2 , where l is a certain length
scale which may relate to the studied system, such as the Compton wavelength of
the system. No matter what length scale l is, the collapse time of a momentum
eigenstate will be zero since its position uncertainty is infinite. This means that the
momentum eigenstates of a quantum system will instantaneously collapse to one
of its position eigenstates and thus cannot exist. Moreover, the wave functions with
very small momentum uncertainty will also collapse very quickly even for micro-
scopic particles. These predictions can hardly be consistent with experiments.
The results of the above analysis can be summarized as follows. Suppose the
state of the studied multi-level system at instant t = ntP is:
|ψ(t)〉 =
m∑
i=1
ci(t)e−iEit/~ |Ei〉. (8.27)
The equation of discrete collapse dynamics for Pi(t) ≡ |ci(t)|2 is:
Pi(t + tP) = Pi(t) +
∆E
EP
[δEsEi − Pi(t)], (8.28)
where ∆E is the energy uncertainty of the state at instant t defined by (8.23), Es is
a random variable representing the random stay of the system, and its probability
of assuming Ei at instant t is Pi(t). When Es = Ei, δEsEi = 1, and when Es , Ei,
δEsEi = 0.
This equation of dynamical collapse can be extended to the entangled states of
a many-body system. The difference only lies in the definition of the energy un-
certainty ∆E. For a non-interacting or weakly-interacting many-body system in an
entangled state, for which the energy uncertainty of each sub-system can be prop-
erly defined, ∆E is the sum of the absolute energy uncertainty of all sub-systems,
namely
∆E =
√√ n∑
j=1
m∑
i=1
Pi(E ji − E j)2, (8.29)
where n is the total number of the entangled sub-systems, m is the total number
of energy branches in the entangled state, E ji is the energy of the j-th sub-system
in the i-th energy branch of the state, and E j is the average energy of the j-th sub-
35 In continuous space and time, a position eigenstate has infinite average energy and cannot be physically real.
But in discrete space and time, position eigenstates will be the states whose spatial dimension is about the
Planck length, and they may exist.
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system. Correspondingly, the preferred bases are the product states of the energy
eigenstates of the Hamiltonian of each sub-system.
It is worth pointing out that the above ∆E is not defined as the uncertainty of the
total energy of all sub-systems as in the energy-driven collapse models (see, e.g.
Percival, 1995, 1998a; Hughston, 1996). The reason is that each sub-system has
its own energy uncertainty that drives its collapse, and the total driving “force”
for the whole entangled state should be the sum of the driving “forces” of all
sub-systems, at least in the first order approximation. Although these two kinds
of energy uncertainty are equal in numerical values in some situations (e.g. for a
strongly-interacting many-body system), there are also some situations where they
are not equal. For example, for a superposition of degenerate energy eigenstates
of a non-interacting many-body system, which may arise during a common mea-
surement process, the uncertainty of the total energy of all sub-systems is exactly
zero, but the absolute energy uncertainty of each sub-system and their sum may
be not zero. As a result, the superpositions of degenerate energy eigenstates of a
many-body system may also collapse. As we will see later, it is this distinct feature
of my model that makes it be able to avoid Pearle’s (2004) serious objections to the
energy-driven collapse models.
It can be seen that the equation of dynamical collapse, Eq.(8.28), has an interest-
ing property, scale invariance. After a discrete instant tP, the probability increase
of the staying branch |Ei〉 is ∆Pi = k(1 − Pi), and the probability decrease of the
neighboring branch |Ei+1〉 is ∆Pi+1 = kPi+1. Then the probability increase of these
two branches is
∆(Pi + Pi+1) = k[1 − (Pi + Pi+1)]. (8.30)
Similarly, the equation ∆P = k(1 − P) holds true for the total probability of arbi-
trarily many branches (one of which is the staying branch). This property of scale
invariance may simplify the calculation in many cases. For instance, for a super-
position of two wavepackets with energy difference, ∆E12, much larger than the
energy uncertainty of each wavepacket, ∆E1 = ∆E2 , we can calculate the collapse
dynamics in two steps. First, we use Eq.(8.28) and Eq.(8.24) with |E1−E2| = ∆E12
to calculate the time of the superposition collapsing into one of the two wavepack-
ets. Here we need not to consider the infinitely many energy eigenstates consti-
tuting each wavepacket and their probability distribution. Next, we use Eq.(8.28)
with ∆E = ∆E1 to calculate the time of the wavepacket collapsing into one of its
energy eigenstates. In general, this collapse process is so slow that its effect can be
neglected.
There is another point that needs to be clarified. As I have argued before, the
discontinuity of motion requires that the collapse dynamics should be discrete in
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nature, and moreover, the preferred bases should be energy sssssssseigenstates in
order that the collapse dynamics satisfies the conservation of energy at the ensem-
ble level. As a consequence, the energy eigenvalues must be also discrete for any
quantum system. This result seems to contradict the predictions of quantum me-
chanics. But when considering that our accelerating universe has a finite event hori-
zon, the momentum and energy eigenvalues of any quantum system in the universe
may be indeed discrete.36 The reason is that all quantum systems in our universe
are limited by the finite horizon, and thus no free quantum systems exist in the strict
sense. For example, the energy of a massless particle (e.g. photon) can only assume
discrete values En = n2 hc4RU , and the minimum energy is E1 =
hc
4RU
≈ 10−33eV ,
where RU ≈ 1025m is the radius of the event horizon of our universe.37 In addition,
for a particle with mass m0, its energy also assumes discrete values En = n2 h
2
32m0R2U
.
For instance, the minimum energy is E1 ≈ 10−72eV for electrons, which is much
smaller than the minimum energy of photons.
Finally, it will be interesting to see whether the discreteness of energy still keeps
the collapse dynamics smooth. Suppose the energy uncertainty of a quantum sys-
tem is ∆E ≈ 1eV , and its energy ranges between the minimum energy E1 and 1eV .
Then we can get the maximum energy level lmax ≈
√
1eV
10−33eV ≈ 1016. The probabil-
ity of most energy eigenstates in the superposition will be about P ≈ 10−16. During
each discrete instant tP, the probability increase of the staying energy branch is
∆P ≈ ∆EEP (1 − P) ≈ 10−28. This indicates that the probability change during each
random stay is still very tiny. However, it can be seen that when the energy uncer-
tainty is larger than 108eV , the probability change during each random stay will be
abrupt.
8.4.4 On the consistency of the model and experiments
In this subsection, I will analyze whether the proposed model of energy-conserved
wavefunction collapse is consistent with experiments. Note that Adler (2002) has
already given a detailed consistency analysis in the context of energy-driven col-
lapse models, and as we will see below, some of his analyses also apply to my
model.
36 It has been suggested that certain quantum fluctuations of discrete spacetime within a finite event horizon
may be a possible form of dark energy, and their existence may explain the observed cosmic acceleration
(Gao, 2005, 2013c). In addition, it is worth noting that the existence of discrete energy levels for a quantum
system limited in our universe is also supported by the holographic principle, which implies that the total
information within a universe with a finite event horizon is finite. If the energy of a quantum system is
continuous, then the information contained in the system will be infinite.
37 Note that the current upper bound on the photon mass is about mγ < 10−18eV/c2 (Nakamura et al, 2010).
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Maintenance of coherence
First of all, it can be shown that the model satisfies the constraint of predicting the
maintenance of coherence when this is observed. Since the energy uncertainty of
the state of a microscopic particle is very small in general, its collapse will be too
slow to have any detectable effect in present experiments on these particles. For
example, the energy uncertainty of a photon emitted from an atom is in the order
of 10−6eV , and the corresponding collapse time is 1025s according to Eq. (8.26) of
our collapse model, which is much longer than the age of the universe, 1017s. This
means that the final states of collapse (i.e. energy eigenstates) are never reached
for a quantum system with small energy uncertainty even during a time interval as
long as the age of the universe.
As another example, consider the SQUID experiment of Friedman et al (2000),
where the coherent superpositions of macroscopic states consisting of oppositely
circulating supercurrents are observed.38 In the experiment, each circulating cur-
rent corresponds to the collective motion of about 109 Cooper pairs, and the energy
uncertainty is about 8.6× 10−6eV . Eq. (8.26) predicts a collapse time of 1023s, and
thus maintenance of coherence is expected despite the macroscopic structure of the
state.
A more interesting example is provided by certain long-lived nuclear isomers,
which have large energy gaps from their ground states (see Adler, 2002 and ref-
erences therein). For example, the metastable isomer of 180Ta, the only nuclear
isomer to exist naturally on earth, has a half-life of more than 1015 years and an
energy gap of 75keV from the ground state. According to Eq. (8.26), a coherent su-
perposition of the ground state and metastable isomer of 180Ta will spontaneously
collapse to either the isomeric state or the ground state, with a collapse time of or-
der 20 minutes. It will be a promising way to test my collapse model by examining
the maintenance of coherence of such a superposition.
Rapid localization in measurement situations
In the following, I will show that my model of energy-conserved wavefunction
collapse can explain definite measurement results.
Consider a typical measurement process in quantum mechanics. According to
the standard von Neumann procedure, measuring an observable A in a quantum
state |ψ〉 involves an interaction Hamiltonian
HI = g(t)PA (8.31)
38 Note that the possibility of using the SQUID experiments to test the collapse theories has been discussed in
great detail by Rae (1990) and Buffa, Nicrosini and Rimini (1995). See also Leggett (2002) for a helpful
review of SQUID experiments as tests of the limits of quantum mechanics.
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coupling the measured system to an appropriate measuring device, where P is
the conjugate momentum of the pointer variable. The time-dependent coupling
strength g(t) is a smooth function normalized to
∫
dtg(t) = 1 during the inter-
action interval τ, and g(0) = g(τ) = 0. The initial state of the pointer is supposed
to be a Gaussian wavepacket centered at initial position 0, denoted by |φ(0)〉.
For a conventional projective measurement, the interaction HI is of very short
duration and so strong that it dominates the rest of the Hamiltonian (i.e. the effect
of the free Hamiltonians of the measuring device and the measured system can be
neglected). Then the state of the combined system at the end of the interaction can
be written as
|t = τ〉 = e− i~ PA |ψ〉 |φ(0)〉 . (8.32)
By expanding |ψ〉 in the eigenstates of A, |ai〉, we obtain
|t = τ〉 =
∑
i
e−
i
~ Paici |ai〉 |φ(0)〉 , (8.33)
where ci are the expansion coefficients. The exponential term shifts the center of
the pointer by ai:
|t = τ〉 =
∑
i
ci |ai〉 |φ(ai)〉 . (8.34)
This is an entangled state, where the eigenstates of A with eigenvalues ai get cor-
related to macroscopically distinguishable states of the measuring device in which
the pointer is shifted by these values ai (but the width of the pointer wavepacket
is not changed). According to the collapse postulate, this state will instantaneously
and randomly collapse into one of its branches |ai〉 |φ(ai)〉. Correspondingly, the
measurement will obtain a definite result, ai, which is one of the eigenvalues of the
measured observable.
Let us see whether my energy-conserved collapse model can explain the definite
measurement results. At first sight, the answer seems negative. As emphasized by
Pearle (2004), each device state in the above entangled superposition has precisely
the same energy spectrum for an ideal measurement.39 Then it seems that the su-
perposition will not collapse according to the energy-conserved collapse model.
However, this is not the case. The key is to realize that different eigenstates of the
measured observable are generally measured in different parts of the measuring
device, and they interact with different groups of atoms or molecules in these parts.
39 According to Pearle (2004), when considering environmental influences, each device/environment state in
the superposition also has precisely the same energy spectrum.
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Therefore, we should rewrite the device states explicitly as |φ(0)〉 = ∏ j ∣∣∣ϕ j(0)〉 and
|φ(ai)〉 = |ϕi(1)〉∏ j,i ∣∣∣ϕ j(0)〉, where ∣∣∣ϕ j(0)〉 denotes the initial state of the device in
part j, and |ϕi(1)〉 denotes the result state of the device in part i. Then we have
∑
i
ci |ai〉 |φ(ai)〉 =
∑
i
ci |ai〉 |ϕi(1)〉
∏
j,i
∣∣∣ϕ j(0)〉 . (8.35)
Since there is always some kind of measurement amplification from the micro-
scopic state to the macroscopic post-measurement state in the measurement pro-
cess, there is a large energy difference between the states |ϕi(1)〉 and |ϕi(0)〉 for any
i.40 As a result, the total energy uncertainty, which is approximately equal to the
energy difference according to Eq. (8.29), is also very large, and it will result in a
rapid collapse of the above superposition into one of its branches according to my
energy-conserved collapse model.41
Let me give a more realistic example, a photon being detected via photoelectric
effect. In the beginning of the detection, the spreading spatial wave function of the
photon is entangled with the states of a large number of surface atoms of the de-
tector. In each local branch of the entangled state, the total energy of the photon
is wholly absorbed by the electron in the local atom interacting with the photon.42
This is clearly indicated by the term δ(E f −Ei − ~ω) in the transition rate of photo-
electric effect. The state of the ejecting electron is a (spherical) wavepacket moving
outward from the local atom, whose average direction and momentum distribution
are determined by the momentum and polarization of the photon.
This microscopic effect of ejecting electron is then amplified (e.g. by an avalanche
process of atoms) to form a macroscopic signal such as the shift of the pointer of a
measuring device. During the amplification process, the energy difference is con-
stantly increasing between the branch in which the photon is absorbed and the
branch in which the photon is not absorbed near each atom interacting with the
photon. This large energy difference will soon lead to the collapse of the whole
superposition into one of the local branches, and thus the photon is only detected
40 Since each result state of the measuring device has the same energy spectrum, the energy difference between
the states |ϕi(1)〉 and |ϕi(0)〉 is the same for any i.
41 Since the uncertainty of the total energy of the whole entangled system is still zero, the energy-driven
collapse models (e.g. Percival, 1995; Hughston, 1996) will predict that no wavefunction collapse happens
and no definite measurement result appears for the above measurement process (Pearle, 2004).
42 In more general measurement situations, the measured particle (e.g. an electron) is not annihilated by the
detector. However, in each local branch of the entangled state of the whole system, the particle also interacts
with a single atom of the detector by an ionizing process, and energy is also conserved during the interaction.
Due to this important property, although the measured particle is detected locally in a detector (the size of the
local region is in the order of the size of an atom), its wave function does not necessarily undergo position
collapse as assumed by the GRW and CSL models (Ghirardi, 2016), and especially, energy can still be
conserved (even at the individual level) during the localization process according to my model.
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locally.43 Take the single photon detector - avalanche photodiode as a concrete
example.44 Its energy consumption is sharply peaked in a very short measuring
interval. One type of avalanche photodiode operates at 105 cps and has a mean
power dissipation of 4mW (Gao, 2006b). This corresponds to an energy consump-
tion of about 2.5 × 1011eV per measuring interval 10−5s. By using the collapse
time formula (8.26), where the energy uncertainty is ∆E ≈ 2.5 × 1011eV , we find
the collapse time is τc ≈ 1.25 × 10−10s, which is much shorter than the measuring
interval.
Emergence of the classical world
In this subsection, I will show that my model of energy-conserved wavefunction
collapse can also account for the emergence of the classical world.
At first glance, it seems that there is an apparent inconsistency between the pre-
dictions of my model and our macroscopic experience. According to the model,
when there is a superposition of a macroscopic object in an identical physical state
(an approximate energy eigenstate) at two different, widely separated locations,
the superposition does not collapse, since there is no energy difference between the
two branches of the superposition. But our experience tells us that macroscopic ob-
jects are localized. This inconsistency problem has been basically solved by Adler
(2002). The crux of the matter lies in the influences of environment. The collisions
and especially the accretions of environmental particles will quickly increase the
energy uncertainty of the entangled state of the whole system including the object
and environmental particles, and thus the initial superposition will soon collapse to
one of the localized branches according to my model. Accordingly, macroscopic
objects are always localized due to environmental influences. It is worth emphasiz-
ing again that the energy uncertainty here denotes the sum of the absolute energy
uncertainty of each sub-system in the entangled state as defined by my model.45
43 In a similar way, a spherically symmetric wave function will be detected as a linear track in a cloud chamber
(cf. Mott, 1929).
44 Take the widely-used Geiger counter as another illustration of the amplification process during a
measurement. A Geiger counter is an instrument used to detect particles such as α particles, β particles and γ
rays etc. It consists of a glass envelope containing a low-pressure gas (usually a mixture of methane with
argon and neon) and two electrodes, with a cylindrical mesh being the cathode and a fine-wire anode running
through the centre of the tube. A potential difference of about 103V relative to the tube is maintained between
the electrodes, therefore creating a strong electric field near the wire. The counter works on the mechanism
of gas multiplication. Ionization in the gas is caused by the entry of a particle. The ions are attracted to their
appropriate electrode, and they gain sufficient energy to eject electrons from the gas atoms as they pass
through the gas. This further causes the atoms to ionize. Therefore, electrons are produced continuously by
this process and rapid gas multiplication takes place (especially in the central electrode because of its strong
electric field strength). Its effect is that more than 106 electrons are collected by the central electrode for every
ion produced in the primary absorption process. These “electron avalanches” create electric pulses which
then can be amplified electronically and counted by a meter to calculate the number of initial ionization
events. In this way, a Geiger counter can detect low-energy radiation because even one ionized particle
produces a full pulse on the central wire. It can be estimated that the introduced energy difference during a
detection is ∆E ≈ 109eV , and the corresponding collapse time is τc ≈ 10−5 s according to my collapse model.
45 The uncertainty of the total energy of the whole system is still very small even if the environmental
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As a typical example, consider a dust particle of radius a ≈ 10−5cm and mass
m ≈ 10−7g. It is well known that localized states of macroscopic objects spread
very slowly under the free Schro¨dinger evolution. For instance, for a Gaussian
wavepacket with initial width ∆, the wavepacket will spread so that the width dou-
bles in a time t = 2m∆2/~. This means that the double time is almost infinite for a
macroscopic object. If the dust particle had no interactions with environment and
its initial state is a Gaussian wavepacket with width ∆ ≈ 10−5cm, the doubling
time would be about the age of our universe. However, if the dust particle inter-
acts with environment, the situation turns out to be very different. Although the
different components that couple to the environment will be individually incred-
ibly localised, collectively they can have a spread that is many orders of magni-
tude larger. In other words, the state of the dust particle and the environment will
be a superposition of zillions of very well localised terms, each with slightly dif-
ferent positions, and which are collectively spread over a macroscopic distance
(Bacciagaluppi, 2008). According to Joos and Zeh (1985), the spread in an envir-
onment full of thermal radiation only is proportional to mass times the cube of
time for large times, namely (∆x)2 ≈ Λmτ3, where Λ is the localization rate de-
pending on the environment, defined by the evolution equation of density matrix
ρt(x, x′) = ρ0(x, x′)e−Λt(x−x
′)2 . For example, if the above dust particle interacts with
thermal radiation at T = 300K, the localization rate is Λ = 1012, and the overall
spread of its state is of the order of 10m after a second (Joos and Zeh, 1985). If the
dust particle interacts with air molecules, e.g. floating in the air, the spread of its
state will be much faster.
Let us see whether the energy-conserved wavefunction collapse in my model
can prevent the above spreading. Suppose the dust particle is in a superposition of
two identical localized states that are separated by 10−5cm in space. The particle
floats in the air, and its average velocity is about zero. At standard temperature
and pressure, one nitrogen molecule accretes in the dust particle, whose area is
10−10cm2, during a time interval of 10−14s in average (Adler, 2002). Since the
mass of the dust particle is much larger than the mass of a nitrogen molecule, the
change of the velocity of the particle is negligible when compared with the change
of the velocity of the nitrogen molecules during the process of accretion. Then
the kinetic energy difference between an accreted molecule and a freely moving
molecule is about ∆E = 32 kT ≈ 10−2eV . When one nitrogen molecule accretes
in one localized branch of the dust particle (the molecule is freely moving in the
other localized branch), it will increase the energy uncertainty of the total entangled
state by ∆E ≈ 10−2eV . Then after a time interval of 10−4s, the number of accreted
nitrogen molecules is about 1010, and the total energy uncertainty is about 108eV .
influences are counted. Thus no observable collapse happens for the above situation according to the
energy-driven collapse models (Pearle, 2004).
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According to Eq. (8.26) of my collapse model, the corresponding collapse time is
about 10−4s.
In my energy-conserved collapse model, the final states of collapse are energy
eigenstates, and in particular, they are nonlocal momentum eigenstates for free
quantum systems. Thus it is somewhat counterintuitive that the energy-conserved
wavefunction collapse can make the states of macroscopic objects local. As I have
argued above, this is due to the constant influences of environmental particles.
When the spreading of the state of a macroscopic object becomes larger, its interac-
tion with environmental particles will introduce a larger energy difference between
its different local branches, and this will collapse the spreading state again into
a more localized state. As a result, the states of macroscopic objects in an envir-
onment will not reach the final states of collapse, namely momentum eigenstates,
although they do continuously undergo the energy-conserved dynamical collapse.
In a word, according to my energy-conserved collapse model, there are two op-
posite processes for a macroscopic object constantly interacting with environmen-
tal particles. One is the spreading process due to the linear Schro¨dinger evolution,
and the other is the localization process due to the energy-conserved collapse evo-
lution. The interactions with environmental particles not only make the spreading
more rapidly but also make the localization more frequently. In the end these two
processes will reach an approximate equilibrium. The state of a macroscopic ob-
ject will be a wavepacket narrow in both position and momentum, and this narrow
wavepacket will approximately follow Newtonian trajectories by Ehrenfest’s the-
orem (if the external potential is uniform enough along the width of the packet).
This may explain the emergence of the classical world around us.
Definite conscious experiences of observers
Ultimately, my energy-conserved collapse model should be able to account for the
definite conscious experiences of us as observers. If the observed system is the
pointer of a measuring device or another macroscopic object, which is already in a
definite state, then it will be easy to explain the definite conscious experiences of
observers. But if the observed system is a microscopic system which can trigger
a conscious perception of the observer, then we will need a careful analysis of
the process of observation. For example, a small number of photons entering into
the eyes of an observer from direction A may trigger a visual perception vA of
the observer, and the same photons from direction B may trigger another different
visual perception vB of the observer. Then, what visual perception of the observer
will a superposition of these two input states trigger? It is required that a qualified
observer should be like a measuring device and her visual perception should be
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either vA or vB in this case. In the following, I will show that we are indeed qualified
observers according to my energy-conserved collapse model.46.
According to the neuroscience literature, the generation of a conscious percep-
tion such as a visual perception in human brains involves a large number of neurons
changing their states from a resting state (resting potential) to a firing state (action
potential). In each neuron, the main difference of these two states lies in the motion
of 106 Na+s passing through the neuron membrane. Since the membrane potential
is in the order of 10−2V , the energy difference between the firing state and the
resting state is ∆E ≈ 104eV .47 According to Eq. (8.26) of my energy-conserved
collapse model, the collapse time of a superposition of these two states of a neuron
is τc ≈ 105s. When considering the number of neurons that can form a conscious
perception is usually in the order of 107, the collapse time of the quantum superpo-
sition of two different conscious perceptions is τc ≈ 10−9s. Since the normal con-
scious time of a human being is in the order of several hundred milliseconds, the
collapse time is much shorter than the normal conscious time. This demonstrates
that we human beings are qualified observers and our conscious experiences are
always definite according to my energy-conserved collapse model.
8.4.5 In search of a deeper basis
In this last subsection, I will give a few speculations about the physical basis of my
energy-conserved collapse model.
As I have pointed out before, the requirement of conservation of energy for
wavefunction collapse is for an ensemble of identically prepared systems, not for
a single system. Since each system in an ensemble does not “know” the other sys-
tems and the whole ensemble (see, however, Smolin, 2012), it seems that there must
exist certain underlying mechanism for each system which can ensure the conser-
vation of energy for an ensemble. This means that the conservation of energy for
an ensemble of identically prepared systems can be more appropriately understood
as a result of the laws of motion for individual systems in the ensemble. Here is a
possible underlying mechanism. First of all, energy is conserved for the evolution
of individual energy eigenstates. Next, a superposition of energy eigenstates will
dynamically collapse to one of these energy eigenstates, and the probability of the
collapse result satisfies the Born rule. Then the wavefunction collapse will satisfy
the conservation of energy for an ensemble of identically prepared systems. In the
following, I will give a more detailed analysis of this underlying mechanism.
According to the picture of RDM of particles, for a particle in a superposition
46 Note that a serious analysis of human perceptions such as visual perception in terms of collapse theories such
as the GRW model was first given by Aicardi et al (1991) and Ghirardi (1999).
47 Since there are also other contributions to the energy difference from environmental particles, the energy
difference will be larger and the collapse time will be shorter.
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of energy eigenstates, the particle stays in an instantaneous state with a definite en-
ergy eigenvalue at a discrete instant, and at another instant it may jump to another
instantaneous state with a different energy eigenvalue. It seems to be a reasonable
assumption that the particle has both the tendency to jump among the instanta-
neous states with different energies and the tendency to stay in the instantaneous
states with the same energy, and their relative strength is determined by the energy
uncertainty of the superposition. This assumption seems natural and comprehensi-
ble, since there should exist two opposite tendencies in general, and their relative
strength is determined by a certain condition. In some sense, the two tendencies
of a particle are related to the two parts of its instantaneous state, respectively;
the jumping tendency is related to the wave function, and it is needed to manifest
the superposition of different energy eigenstates, while the staying tendency is re-
lated to the random stays. These two opposite tendencies together constitute the
complete “temperament” of a particle.
It can be argued that the tendency to stay in the same energy for individual parti-
cles may be the physical origin of the energy-conserved wavefunction collapse. For
a particle in a superposition of energy eigenstates, the particle stays in an instanta-
neous state with an energy eigenvalue at a discrete instant, and the staying tendency
of the particle will increase its probability of being in the instantaneous states with
the present energy, so that it can stay in the same energy with higher probability at
the next instant (which manifests its staying tendency). In other words, the random
stay of a particle in an instantaneous state with an energy eigenvalue will increase
the probability of the energy eigenvalue (and correspondingly decrease the proba-
bilities of other energy eigenvalues pro rata). Moreover, the increase of probability
is arguably proportional to the energy uncertainty of the particle; when the energy
uncertainty is zero, the probability does not change, while when the energy uncer-
tainty is not zero, the probability increases.
It can be further argued that the probability distribution of energy eigenvalues
should remain constant during the random evolution of an ensemble of identi-
cally prepared systems, and thus the resulting wavefunction collapse will satisfy
the Born rule. The reason is as follows. At a deeper level, it is very likely that the
laws of nature permit nature to manifest itself, or else we will be unable to find the
laws of nature and verify them by experiments, and our scientific investigations will
be also pointless. This may be regarded as a meta-law. By this meta-law, when an
initial superposition of energy eigenstates undergoes the energy collapse process,
which is essentially random and irreversible, the probability distribution of energy
eigenvalues should manifest itself through the collapse results for an ensemble of
identically prepared systems. This means that the diagonal density matrix elements
for the ensemble should be precisely the same as the initial probability distribution
at every step of the evolution. Otherwise the probability distribution of the collapse
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results in the ensemble cannot reflect the initial probability distribution, or in other
words, the probability information contained in the initial state will be completely
lost due to the random and irreversible wavefunction collapse.48 As a consequence,
the collapse evolution will conserve energy at the ensemble level, and the proba-
bilities of collapse results will also satisfy the Born rule.
Certainly, even if the above argument is valid, there is still a question that needs
to be answered. Why energy? Why not position or momentum? If there is only one
property that undergoes RDM, then the above tendency argument for the unique
property may be satisfying. But if there are many properties that undergoes RDM,
then we need to answer why the tendency argument applies only to energy. A pos-
sible answer is that energy is the property that determines the linear Schro¨dinger
evolution of the state of motion, and thus it seems natural and uniform that energy
also determines the nonlinear collapse evolution. Moreover, energy eigenstates are
the states of motion that no longer evolve (except an absolute phase) for the linear
evolution. Then by analogy, it is likely that energy eigenstates are also the states
that no longer evolve for the nonlinear collapse evolution, i.e., that energy eigen-
states are the preferred bases. I must admit that these arguments are very specula-
tive, and the physical origin of wavefunction collapse is still an unsolved issue.
8.5 An analysis of other collapse models
In this section, I will give a critical analysis of other collapse models. These models
can be sorted into two categories.49 The first category may be called spontaneous
collapse models, in which the dynamical collapse of the wave function is assumed
to happen even for an isolated system. They include the gravity-induced collapse
model (Dio´si, 1989; Penrose, 1996), the GRW model (Ghirardi, Rimini and We-
ber, 1986) etc.50 The second category may be called interaction-induced collapse
models, which assume that the dynamical collapse of the wave function of a given
system results from its particular interaction with a noise field. A typical exam-
ple is the CSL (Continuous Spontaneous Localization) model (Pearle, 1989; Ghi-
48 Note that the reversible Schro¨dinger evolution conserves the information even for individual isolated systems.
49 For a helpful analysis of the properties of collapse models in a more general formalism see Weinberg (2012).
In addition, it is worth noting that the requirement of no-faster-than-light signaling implies that the dynamics
of the density matrix must be linear for collapse models (Gisin, 1989, 1990; Adler and Bassi, 2009; Bassi
and Hejazi, 2015).
50 The GRW model was originally referred to as QMSL (Quantum Mechanics with Spontaneous
Localizations). In this model, it is assumed that each elementary constituent of any physical system is
subjected, at random times, to random and spontaneous localization processes (or hittings) around
appropriate positions. The random hittings happen much less frequently for a microscopic system, e.g. an
electron undergoes a hitting, on average, every hundred million years. If these hittings are assumed to be
brought about by an external system, then the GRW model should be regarded not as a spontaneous collapse
model but as an interaction-induced collapse model.
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rardi, Pearle and Rimini, 1990).51 In the following, I will mainly analyze Penrose’s
gravity-induced collapse model and the CSL model.
8.5.1 Penrose’s gravity-induced collapse model
It seems very natural to guess that the collapse of the wave function is induced by
gravity. The reasons include: (1) gravity is the only universal force being present
in all physical interactions; (2) gravitational effects grow with the size of the ob-
jects concerned, and it is in the context of macroscopic objects that linear super-
positions may be violated. The gravity-induced wavefunction collapse conjecture
can be traced back to Feynman (1995). In his Lectures on Gravitation, Feynman
considered the philosophical problems in quantizing macroscopic objects and con-
templates on a possible breakdown of quantum theory.52 He said, “I would like to
suggest that it is possible that quantum mechanics fails at large distances and for
large objects, it is not inconsistent with what we do know. If this failure of quantum
mechanics is connected with gravity, we might speculatively expect this to happen
for masses such that GM2/~c = 1, of M near 10−5 grams.” (Feynman, 1995)
Feynman’s suggestion was later investigated by several authors (e.g. Ka´ro lyha´zy,
1966; Ka´rolyha´zy, Frenkel and Luka´cs, 1986; Dio´si, 1984, 1987, 1989; Penrose,
1981, 1986, 1989, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004). In particular, Penrose
(1996) proposed a detailed gravity-induced wavefunction collapse argument, and
the proposal is a ‘minimalist’ one in the sense that it does not aspire to a more
complete dynamics. The argument is based on a fundamental conflict between the
superposition principle of quantum mechanics and the principle of general covari-
ance of general relativity. The conflict can be seen by considering the superposition
of a static mass distribution in two different locations, say position A and position
B. On the one hand, according to quantum mechanics, the valid definition of such
a superposed state requires the existence of a definite space-time background, in
which position A and position B can be distinguished. On the other hand, accord-
ing to general relativity, the space-time geometry, including the distinguishability
of position A and position B, cannot be predetermined, and must be dynamically
determined by the superposed state. Since the different position states in the su-
perposition determine different space-time geometries, the space-time geometry
determined by the whole superposition is indefinite, and as a result, the superposed
state and its evolution cannot be consistently defined. In particular, the definition
of the time-translation operator for the superposed space-time geometries involves
an inherent ill-definedness, leading to an essential uncertainty in the energy of the
51 If the involved noise field in the CSL model is not taken as real, then the model should be regarded as a
spontaneous collapse model.
52 It is worth noting that Feynman considered this conjecture even earlier at the 1957 Chapel Hill conference
(see DeWitt and Rickles, 2011, ch.22).
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superposed state. Then by analogy Penrose argued that this superposition, like an
unstable particle in quantum mechanics, is also unstable, and it will decay or col-
lapse into one of the two states in the superposition after a finite lifetime.
Moreover, Penrose (1996) suggested that the essential energy uncertainty in the
Newtonian limit is proportional to the gravitational self-energy E∆ of the difference
between the two mass distributions,53 and the collapse time, analogous to the half-
life of an unstable particle, is
T ≈ ~/E∆. (8.36)
This criterion is very close to that put forward by Dio´si (1989) earlier,54 and it is
usually called the Dio´si-Penrose criterion. Later, Penrose (1998) further suggested
that the preferred bases (i.e. the states toward which the collapse tends) are the sta-
tionary solutions of the so-called Schro¨dinger-Newton equation within Newtonian
approximation.
Now I will examine Penrose’s gravity-induced wavefunction collapse argument
in detail (see also Gao, 2013b). The crux of the argument is whether the conflict
between quantum mechanics and general relativity requires that a quantum super-
position of two space-time geometries must collapse after a finite time. I will argue
in the following that the answer seems negative. First of all, although it is widely
acknowledged that there exists a fundamental conflict between the superposition
principle of quantum mechanics and the principle of general covariance of gen-
eral relativity, it is still a controversial issue what the exact nature of the conflict
is and how to resolve it. The problem is often referred to as the ‘problem of time’
in various approaches to quantum gravity (Kucharˇ, 1992; Isham, 1993; Isham and
Butterfield, 1999; Kiefer, 2007; Anderson, 2012). It seems not impossible that the
conflict may be solved by reformulating quantum mechanics in a way that does not
rely on a definite space-time background (see, e.g. Rovelli, 2004, 2011).
Secondly, Penrose’s argument by analogy seems too weak to establish a neces-
sary connection between wavefunction collapse and the conflict between general
relativity and quantum mechanics. Even though there is an essential uncertainty
in the energy of the superposition of different space-time geometries, this kind of
energy uncertainty is different in nature from the energy uncertainty of unstable
particles or unstable states in quantum mechanics (Gao, 2010). The former results
from the ill-definedness of the time-translation operator for the superposed space-
time geometries, while the latter exists in a definite space-time background, and
53 Penrose’s Newtonian expression for the energy uncertainty has been generalized to an arbitrary quantum
superposition of relativistic, but weak, gravitational fields (Anandan, 1998).
54 In Dio´si’s (1989) collapse model, the increase of energy induced by wavefunction collapse is too large to be
consistent with experiments. This problem was pointed out and solved by Ghirardi, Grassi and Rimini
(1990).
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there is a well-defined time-translation operator for the unstable states. Moreover,
the decay of an unstable state (e.g. an excited state of an atom) is a natural result
of the linear quantum dynamics, and the process is not random but deterministic.
In particular, the decay process is not spontaneous but caused by the background
field constantly interacting with the unstable state, e.g. the state may not decay
at all when being in a very special background field with bandgap (Yablonovitch,
1987). In contrast, the hypothetical decay or collapse of the superposed space-time
geometries is spontaneous, nonlinear and random. In short, there exists no con-
vincing analogy between a superposition of different space-time geometries and an
unstable state in quantum mechanics. Accordingly, one cannot argue for the col-
lapse of the superposition of different space-time geometries by this analogy. Al-
though an unstable state in quantum mechanics may decay after a very short time,
this does not imply that a superposition of different space-time geometries should
also decay - and, again, sometimes an unstable state does not decay at all under
special circumstances. To sum up, Penrose’s argument by analogy has a very lim-
ited force, and it is not strong enough to establish a necessary connection between
wavefunction collapse and the conflict between quantum mechanics and general
relativity.55
Thirdly, it can be further argued that the conflict between quantum mechanics
and general relativity does not necessarily lead to wavefunction collapse. The key
is to realize that the conflict also needs to be resolved before the wavefunction col-
lapse finishes, and when the conflict has been resolved, the wavefunction collapse
will lose its physical basis relating to the conflict. As argued by Penrose (1996), a
quantum superposition of different space-time geometries and its evolution are both
ill-defined due to the fundamental conflict between the principle of general covari-
ance of general relativity and the superposition principle of quantum mechanics,
and the ill-definedness requires that the superposition must collapse into one of the
definite space-time geometries, which has no problem of ill-definedness. However,
the wavefunction collapse seems too late to save the superposition from the “suf-
fering” of the ill-definedness during the collapse. In the final analysis, the conflict
or the problem of ill-definedness needs to be solved before defining a quantum
superposition of different space-time geometries and its evolution. In particular,
the hypothetical collapse evolution of the superposition also needs to be consis-
tently defined, which again indicates that wavefunction collapse does not solve the
problem of ill-definedness. On the other hand, once the problem of ill-definedness
is solved and a consistent description obtained, wavefunction collapse will lose
its connection with the problem. Therefore, contrary to Penrose’s expectation, it
55 In my opinion, Penrose also realized the limitation of the analogy and only considered it as a plausibility
argument.
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seems that the conflict between quantum mechanics and general relativity does not
entail the existence of wavefunction collapse.
Even though Penrose’s gravity-induced wavefunction collapse argument may be
problematic, it is still possible that wavefunction collapse is a real physical process
as I have argued in previous sections. Moreover, Penrose’s collapse time formula
can also be assumed as it is, and numerical estimates based on the formula for
life-times of superpositions indeed turn out to be realistic (Penrose, 1994, 1996).
Therefore, Penrose’s suggestions for the collapse time formula and the preferred
basis also deserve to be examined as some aspects of a phenomenological model.
To begin with, I will analyze Penrose’s collapse time formula, Eq. (8.36), ac-
cording to which the collapse time of a superposition of two mass distributions
is inversely proportional to the gravitational self-energy of the difference between
the two mass distributions. As I have argued above, there does not exist a precise
analogy between such a superposition and an unstable state in quantum mechan-
ics, and gravity does not necessarily induce wavefunction collapse either. Thus
this collapse time formula, which is originally based on a similar application of
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle to unstable states, will lose its original physi-
cal basis. In particular, the appearance of the gravitational self-energy term in the
formula is in want of a reasonable explanation (see below). In fact, it has been
shown that this gravitational self-energy term does not represent the ill-definedness
of time-translation operator in the strictly Newtonian regime (Christian, 2001). In
this regime, the time-translation operator can be well defined, but the gravitational
self-energy term is obviously not zero. Moreover, as Dio´si (2007) pointed out, the
microscopic formulation of Penrose’s collapse time formula also meets the cut-off
difficulty.
Next, I will analyze Penrose’s choice of the preferred basis. According to Pen-
rose (1998), the preferred bases are the stationary solutions of the Schro¨dinger-
Newton equation:
i~
∂ψ(x, t)
∂t
= − ~
2
2m
∇2ψ(x, t) −Gm2
∫ |ψ(x′, t)|2
|x − x′| d
3x′ψ(x, t) + Vψ(x, t), (8.37)
where m is the mass of a quantum system, V is an external potential, G is Newton’s
gravitational constant. This equation describes the gravitational self-interaction of
a single quantum system, in which the mass density m|ψ(x, t)|2 is the source of
the classical gravitational potential. However, there is an obvious objection to the
Schro¨dinger-Newton equation (see also Giulini and Groβardt, 2012). Since charge
accompanies mass for a charged particle such as an electron, the existence of the
gravitational self-interaction, although which is too weak to be excluded by present
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experiments (Salzman and Carlip, 2006; Giulini and Groβardt, 2011),56 entails
the existence of a remarkable electrostatic self-interaction of the charged particle,
which, as I have argued before, is incompatible with experimental observations.57
For example, for the electron in the hydrogen atom, the potential of the electrostatic
self-interaction is of the same order as the Coulomb potential produced by the nu-
cleus, and thus it is impossible that the revised Schro¨dinger equation with such an
electrostatic self-interaction term, like the Schro¨dinger equation, gives predictions
of the hydrogen spectra that agree with experiment.
On the other hand, it is worth noting that protective measurements show that a
charged quantum system such as an electron does have mass and charge distribu-
tions in space, and the mass and charge density in each position is also propor-
tional to the modulus squared of the wave function of the system there (Aharonov
and Vaidman, 1993; Aharonov, Anandan and Vaidman, 1993). However, as I have
argued in Chapter 6, the distributions do not exist throughout space at the same
time, for which there are gravitational and electrostatic self-interactions of the dis-
tributions. Rather, they are effective, formed by the ergodic motion of a point-like
particle with the total mass and charge of the system. In this case, there will exist
no gravitational and electrostatic self-interactions of the distributions. This is con-
sistent with the predictions of quantum mechanics and experimental observations.
Finally, I will briefly discuss another two potential problems of Penrose’s col-
lapse model. The first problem is the origin of the randomness of collapse results.
Since wavefunction collapse is spontaneous in Penrose’s collapse model, the ran-
domness of collapse results can only come from the studied quantum system itself.
Yet the gravitational field of the studied quantum system, even if it does induce
wavefunction collapse, seems to fail to account for the origin of the randomness.
The second problem is energy non-conservation. Although Penrose did not give a
concrete model of wavefunction collapse, he thought that the energy uncertainty
E∆ may cover such a potential non-conservation, leading to no actual violation of
energy conservation (Penrose, 2004). However, this is still a controversial issue.
For instance, Dio´si (2007) pointed out that the von Neumann-Newton equation,
which may be regarded as a realization of Penrose’s scheme, does not conserve
energy.
In conclusion, Penrose’s proposal that gravity induces wavefunction collapse
seems debatable. However, as I have argued in previous sections, it is very likely
56 Note that Salzman and Carlip (2006) overestimated the influence of gravitational self-interaction on the
dispersion of wavepackets by about 6 orders of magnitude. This was pointed out and corrected by Giulini
and Groβardt (2011).
57 Since the Schro¨dinger-Newton equation is the nonrelativistic realization of the typical model of semiclassical
gravity, in which the source term in the classical Einstein equation is taken as the expectation of the energy
momentum operator in the quantum state (Rosenfeld, 1963), the above analysis also presents a serious
objection to the approach of semiclassical gravity. Note that although the existing arguments against the
semiclassical gravity models seem very strong, they are not conclusive (Carlip, 2008; Boughn, 2009).
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that wavefunction collapse is a real physical process as Penrose thinks, although its
origin remains a deep mystery. Moreover, relating the process with gravity is still
an extremely crucial problem which deserves a lot of attention, and approaches
that are not fully satisfactory may also give hints concerning where to go or how to
proceed.
8.5.2 The CSL model
Different from Penrose’s gravity-induced collapse model, the CSL model is a typi-
cal interaction-induced collapse model. In the model, it is assumed that the collapse
of the wave function of a quantum system is caused by its interaction with a clas-
sical scalar field, w(x, t). Moreover, the preferred bases are the eigenstates of the
smeared mass density operator, and the mechanism leading to the suppression of
the superpositions of macroscopically different states is fundamentally governed
by the integral of the squared differences of the mass densities associated to the su-
perposed states. It may be expected that the introduction of the noise field can help
solve the problems plagued by the spontaneous collapse models, e.g. the problems
of energy non-conservation and the origin of randomness. However, one must first
answer what field the noise field is and especially why it can collapse the wave
functions of all quantum systems. The validity of the CSL model strongly depends
on the existence of this hypothetical noise field. In the following, I will mainly
analyze this important legitimization problem of the CSL model.58
Whatever the nature of the noise field w(x, t) is, it cannot be quantum in the usual
sense since its coupling to a quantum system is not a standard coupling between
two quantum systems. The coupling is anti-Hermitian, and the equation of the re-
sulting dynamical collapse is not the standard Schro¨dinger equation with a stochas-
tic potential either. According to our current understandings, the gravitational field
is the only universal field that might be not quantized, although this possibility
seems extremely small in the view of most researchers. Therefore, it seems natu-
ral to assume that this noise field is the gravitational field, and the randomness of
collapse results originates from the fluctuations of the gravitational field (see, e.g.
Ka´rolyha´zy, Frenkel and Luka´cs, 1986; Dio´si, 1989, 2007; Adler, 2016). In fact, it
58 As admitted by Pearle (2009), “When, over 35 years ago, ... I had the idea of introducing a randomly
fluctuating quantity to cause wave function collapse, I thought, because there are so many things in nature
which fluctuate randomly, that when the theory is better developed, it would become clear what thing in
nature to identify with that randomly fluctuating quantity. Perhaps ironically, this problem of legitimizing the
phenomenological CSL collapse description by tying it in a natural way to established physics remains
almost untouched.” Related to this legitimization problem is that the two parameters which specify the model
are ad hoc (Pearle, 2007). These two parameters, which were originally introduced by Ghirardi, Rimini and
Weber (1986), are a distance scale, a ≈ 10−5cm, characterising the distance beyond which the collapse
becomes effective, and a time scale, λ−1 ≈ 1016sec, giving the rate of collapse for a microscopic system. If
wavefunction collapse is a fundamental physical process related to other fundamental processes, the
parameters should be able to be written in terms of other physical constants.
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has been argued that in the CSL model the w-field energy density must have a grav-
itational interaction with ordinary matter (Pearle and Squires, 1996; Pearle, 2009).
The argument of Pearle and Squires (1996) can be summarized as follows.59
There are two equations which characterize the CSL model. The first equation is
a modified Schro¨dinger equation, which expresses the influence of an arbitrary field
w(x, t) on the studied quantum system. The second equation is a probability rule
whichs gives the probability that nature actually chooses a particular w(x, t). This
probability rule can also be interpreted as expressing the influence of the quantum
system on the field. As a result, w(x, t) can be written as follows:
w(x, t) = w0(x, t) + 〈A(x, t)〉, (8.38)
where A(x, t) is the mass density operator smeared over the GRW scale a, 〈A(x, t)〉
is its expectation value, and w0(x, t) is a Gaussian randomly fluctuating field with
zero drift, temporally white noise in character and with a particular spatial correla-
tion function. Then the scalar field w(x, t) that causes wavefunction collapse can be
interpreted as the gravitational curvature scalar with two sources, the expectation
value of the smeared mass density operator and an independent white noise fluc-
tuating source.60 This indicates that the CSL model is based on the semiclassical
gravity, and the smeared mass density is the source of the gravitational potential.61
According to my previous analysis in Chapter 6, however,assuming the exis-
tence of smeared mass density is arguably debatable. First, protective measure-
ments show that the mass density of a quantum system is proportional to the mod-
ulus squared of its wave function and thus it is not smeared. In other words, the
assumed existence of the smeared mass density in the CSL model contradicts the
results of protective measurements. Note that it is crucial that the mass density of a
quantum system should be smeared over the GRW scale a in the CSL model; with-
out such a smearing the energy excitation of particles undergoing collapse would
be beyond experimental constraints (Pearle and Squires, 1996). Next, my previous
analysis of Schro¨dinger’s charge density hypothesis also applies to the mass den-
sity ontology. According to the analysis, the mass density of a quantum system,
59 Pearle (2009) further argued that compatibility with general relativity requires a gravitational force exerted
upon matter by the w-field. However, as Pearle (2009) also admitted, no convincing connection (for example,
identification of metric fluctuations, dark matter or dark energy with w(x, t)) has yet emerged, and the
legitimization problem (i.e. the problem of endowing physical reality to the noise field) is still in its infancy.
60 Recently Adler (2016) gave a new conjecture on the physical origin of the noise field, according to which the
noise field comes from a rapidly fluctuating complex part of the classical gravitational metric.
61 Note that Ghirardi, Grassi and Benatti (1995) and Ghirardi (1997) explicitly introduced the mass density
ontology in the context of collapse theories (see also Allori et al, 2008; Bedingham et al, 2014). According to
Ghirardi (2016), “what the theory is about, what is real ‘out there’ at a given space point x, is just a field, i.e.
a variable m(x, t) given by the expectation value of the mass density operator M(x) at x obtained by
multiplying the mass of any kind of particle times the number density operator for the considered type of
particle and summing over all possible types of particles.”
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even if it is smeared, is not real but effective; it is formed by the ergodic motion of
point-like particles with masses. Therefore, it is arguable that the quantum ontol-
ogy of the CSL model is not fields, but particles. Finally, although the approach of
semiclassical gravity may be consistent in the context of collapse models (Pearle
and Squires, 1996; Ghirardi, 2016), it may have been excluded as I have argued
in the last subsection. In conclusion, it seems that the noise field introduced in the
CSL model cannot have a gravitational origin, and this may raise a strong doubt
about the reality of the field.
On the other hand, even though the approach of semiclassical gravity is viable
and the noise field in the CSL model can be the gravitational field, one still needs
to answer why the gravitational field has the very ability to collapse the wave func-
tions of all quantum systems as required by the model. It is worth noting that the
randomly fluctuating field in the model, w0(x, t), is not the gravitational field of the
studied quantum system but the background gravitational field. Therefore, Pen-
rose’s gravity-induced wavefunction collapse argument, even if it is valid, does not
apply to the CSL model. The fluctuations of the background gravitational field can
readily lead to the decoherence of the wave function of a quantum system, but it
seems that they have no magical ability to cause the collapse of the wave function.
Moreover, since the Schro¨dinger equation is purely deterministic, it seems that the
random quantum fluctuations must also result from the collapse of the wave func-
tion in such collapse models. If this is true, then these models will be based on
circular reasonings.
Finally, I will briefly discuss another two problems of the CSL model.62 The first
problem is energy non-conservation. The collapse in the model narrows the wave
function in position space, thereby producing an increase of energy.63 A possible
solution to this problem is that the conservation laws may be satisfied when the
contributions of the noise field w(x, t) to the conserved quantities are taken into
account. It has been shown that the total mean energy can be conserved (Pearle,
2004), and the energy increase can also be made finite when revising the coupling
between the noise field and the studied quantum system (Bassi, Ippoliti and Vac-
chini, 2005). But a complete solution has not been found yet, and it is still unknown
whether such a solution indeed exists.
The second problem is to make a relativistic quantum field theory which de-
scribes wavefunction collapse (Pearle, 2009; Ghirardi, 2016). Notwithstanding a
good deal of effort, a satisfactory theory has not been obtained.64 The main diffi-
62 Pearle (2007, 2009), Bassi (2007) and Ghirardi (2016) gave a very detailed analysis of the problems of the
CSL model and the present status of the investigations of them.
63 Note that with appropriate choice for the parameters in the CSL model, such a violation of energy
conservation is very tiny and hardly detectable by present day technology. For a recent proposal of
experimental test see Dio´si (2015).
64 For example, Tumulka (2006, 2009) proposed a relativistic version of the GRW flash theory. But it is still
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culty is that the hypothetical interaction responsible for collapse will produce too
many particles out of the vacuum, amounting to infinite energy per second per vol-
ume, in the relativistic extension of these interaction-induced collapse models. It
has been suggested that the problem of infinities may be solved by smearing out
the point interactions. For example, Nicrosini and Rimini (2003) showed that this
is possible when including a locally preferred frame. More recently, Bedingham
(2011) introduced a new relativistic field responsible for mediating the collapse
process, and showed that his model can fulfill the aim of smearing the interac-
tions whilst preserving Lorentz covariance and frame independence. Whether this
promising model is wholly satisfactory needs to be further studied. Note that spon-
taneous collapse models without collapse interaction (e.g. my energy-conserved
collapse model) do not have the problem of infinities. I will analyze the problem of
compatibility between wavefunction collapse and the principle of relativity in the
next chapter.
debatable whether the ontology of the theory, which is known as the GRW flash ontology, is satisfactory
(Esfeld and Gisin, 2014).
9
Quantum ontology and relativity
In this chapter, I will give a primary analysis of how special relativity influences
the suggested ontology of quantum mechanics, namely the RDM of particles, as
well as how the quantum ontology influences special relativity reciprocally.
It is well known that there are two important conceptual issues concerning the
unification of quantum mechanics and special relativity. First, the apparent incom-
patibility between wavefunction collapse (and the resulting quantum nonlocality)
and the principle of relativity has been an unsolved problem since the founding of
quantum mechanics (see, e.g. Bell and Gao, 2016 and references therein). For ex-
ample, it is still debatable whether a preferred Lorentz frame is needed to solve the
incompatibility problem. Second, although the combination of the linear quantum
dynamics and special relativity has been obtained in quantum field theory, it is still
a controversial issue what the ontology of the theory really is (see, e.g. Cao, 1999;
Kuhlmann, 2015, section 5). Is it fields or particles? Or it is other physical entities?
In the following sections, I will analyze how to solve these problems in terms of
RDM of particles. The analysis may not only give the picture of quantum ontology
in the relativistic domain, but also suggest how special relativity should be revised
to accommodate the quantum ontology.
9.1 The picture of motion distorted by the Lorentz transformation
Let us first see how the picture of RDM of particles is changed by the Lorentz
transformation.
9.1.1 Picture of motion of a single particle
For the RDM of a particle, the particle has a tendency to be in any possible posi-
tion at a given instant, and the probability density that the particle appears in each
position x at a given instant t is given by the modulus squared of its wave function,
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namely ρ(x, t) = |ψ(x, t)|2. The physical picture of the motion of the particle is as
follows. At a discrete instant the particle randomly stays in a position, and at the
next instant it will still stay there or randomly appear in another position, which
is probably not in the neighborhood of the previous position. In this way, during
a time interval much longer than the duration of a discrete instant, the particle
will move discontinuously and randomly throughout the whole space with position
probability density ρ(x, t). Since the distance between the locations occupied by
the particle at two neighboring instants may be very large, this jumping process is
obviously nonlocal. In the nonrelativistic domain where time is absolute, the non-
local jumping process is the same in every inertial frame. But in the relativistic
domain, the jumping process will look different in different inertial frames due to
the Lorentz transformation.
Suppose a particle is in position x1 at instant t1 and in position x2 at instant t2 in
an inertial frame S . In another inertial frame S ′ with velocity v relative to S , the
Lorentz transformation leads to:
t
′
1 =
t1 − x1v/c2√
1 − v2/c2
, (9.1)
t
′
2 =
t2 − x2v/c2√
1 − v2/c2
, (9.2)
x
′
1 =
x1 − vt1√
1 − v2/c2
, (9.3)
x
′
2 =
x2 − vt2√
1 − v2/c2
. (9.4)
Since the jumping process of the particle is nonlocal, the two events (t1, x1) and
(t2, x2) may readily satisfy the spacelike separation condition |x2 − x1| > c|t2 − t1|.
Then we can always select a possible velocity v < c that leads to t
′
1 = t
′
2:
v =
t2 − t1
x2 − x1 c
2. (9.5)
But obviously the two positions of the particle in frame S ′, namely x′1 and x
′
2, are
not equal. This means that in frame S ′ the particle will be in two different positions
x
′
1 and x
′
2 at the same time at instant t
′
1. In other words, it seems that there are two
identical particles at instant t
′
1 in frame S
′. Note that the velocity of S ′ relative to S
may be much smaller than the speed of light, and thus the appearance of the two-
particle picture is irrelevant to the high-energy processes described by relativistic
quantum field theory, e.g. the creation and annihilation of particles.
9.1 The picture of motion distorted by the Lorentz transformation 151
The above result shows that for any pair of events in frame S that satisfies the
spacelike separation condition, there always exists an inertial frame in which the
two-particle picture will appear. Since the jumping process of the particle in frame
S is essentially random, it can be expected that the two-particle picture will appear
in infinitely many inertial frames with the same probability. Then during an arbi-
trary finite time interval, in each inertial frame the measure of the set of the instants
at which there are two particles in appearance, which is equal to the length of the
time interval divided by the total number of the frames that is infinite, will be zero.
Moreover, there may also exist situations where the particle is at arbitrarily many
positions at the same time at an instant in an inertial frame, although the appearing
probability of these situations is also zero. Certainly, at nearly all instants in a time
interval, whose measure is equal to the length of the time interval, the particle is
still in one position at an instant in all inertial frames. Therefore, the many-particle
appearance of the RDM of a particle cannot be measured in principle.
However, for the RDM of a particle, in any inertial frame different from S , the
Lorentz transformation will generally make the time order of the random stays of
the particle in S reversal, since the discontinuous motion of the particle is nonlocal
and most neighboring random stays are spacelike separated events. In other words,
the time order is not Lorentz invariant. Moreover, the set of the instantsin a time
interval at which the time order of the random stays of the particle is reversed has
non-zero measure, which may be close to the length of the time interval. As we
will see below, this reversal of time order will lead to more distorted pictures for
quantum entanglement and wavefunction collapse.
9.1.2 Picture of quantum entanglement
Now I will analyze the motion of two particles in an entangled state. For the RDM
of two particles in an entangled state, the two particles have a joint tendency to be in
any two possible positions, and the probability density that the two particles appear
in each position pair x1 and x2 at a given instant t is determined by the modulus
squared of their wave function at the instant, namely ρ(x1, x2, t) = |ψ(x1, x2, t)|2.
Suppose two particles are in an entangled state 1√
2
(ψuϕu + ψdϕd), where ψu and
ψd are two spatially separated states of particle 1, ϕu and ϕd are two spatially sepa-
rated states of particle 2. The physical picture of this entangled state is as follows.
At an instant, particles 1 and 2 randomly stay in two positions in the region where
the state ψuϕu or ψdϕd spreads. At the next instant, they will still stay there or jump
to another two positions in the region where the state ψuϕu or ψdϕd spreads. Dur-
ing a very short time interval, the two particles will discontinuously and randomly
move throughout the two regions where the states ψuϕu and ψdϕd spread with the
same probability 12 . In this way, the two particles jump in a precisely simultaneous
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way. At an arbitrary instant, if particle 1 is in the region of ψu or ψd, then particle 2
must be in the region of ϕu or ϕd, and vice versa. Moreover, when particle 1 jumps
from the region of ψu to the region of ψd or from the region of ψd to the region of
ψu, particle 2 must simultaneously jump from the region of ϕu to the region of ϕd
or from the region of ϕd to the region of ϕu, and vice versa. Note that this kind of
random synchronicity between the motion of particle 1 and the motion of particle
2 is irrelevant to the distance between them, and it can only be accounted for by
the existence of joint tendency of the two particles as a whole.
The above picture of quantum entanglement is supposed to exist in one inertial
frame. It can be expected that when observed in another inertial frame, this perfect
picture will be distorted in a similar way as the single particle picture. Let me give
a concrete analysis. Suppose in an inertial frame S , at instant ta particle 1 is in
position x1a in the region of ψu and particle 2 is in position x2a in the region of ϕu,
and at instant tb particle 1 is in position x1b in the region of ψd and particle 2 is in
position x2b in the region of ϕd. Then according to the Lorentz transformation, in
another inertial frame S ′ with velocity v′ relative to S , where v′ satisfies:
v′ =
ta − tb
x1a − x2b c
2, (9.6)
the instant at which particle 1 is in position x′1a in the region of ψ
′
u is the same as
the instant at which particle 2 is in position x′2b in the region of ϕ
′
d, namely
t′1a = t
′
2b =
1√
1 − v′2/c2
x1atb − x2bta
x1a − x2b . (9.7)
This means that in S ′ there exists an instant at which particle 1 is in the region
of ψ′u but particle 2 is in the region of ϕ′d. Similarly, in another inertial frame S
′′
with velocity v′′ relative to S , there also exists an instant t′′ at which particle 1 is
in the region of ψ′′d but particle 2 is in the region of ϕ
′′
u , where v
′′ and t′′ satisfy the
following relations:
v′′ =
ta − tb
x2a − x1b c
2, (9.8)
t′′ =
1√
1 − v′′2/c2
x2atb − x1bta
x2a − x1b . (9.9)
Note that since the two particles are well separated in space, the above two veloc-
ities can readily satisfy the restricting conditions v′ < c and v′′ < c when the time
interval |ta − tb| is very short.
Since the motion of particles is essentially random, in any inertial frame S ′
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which is different from S , the original correlation between the motion of the two
particles in S can only keep half the time for the above entangled state, and the
correlation will be reversed for the other half of time, during which the two par-
ticles will be in state ψ′uϕ′d or ψ
′
dϕ
′
u at each instant. For a general entangled state
aψuϕu+bψdϕd, where |a|2+|b|2 = 1, the proportion of correlation-reversed time will
be 2|ab|2, and the proportion of correlation-kept time will be |a|4 + |b|4. Moreover,
the instants at which the original correlation is kept or reversed are discontinu-
ous and random. This means that the synchronicity between the jumps of the two
particles is destroyed too.
To sum up, the above analysis indicates that the instantaneous correlation and
synchronicity between the motion of two entangled particles in one inertial frame is
destroyed in other frames due to the Lorentz transformation.1 As we will see below,
however, this distorted picture of quantum entanglement cannot be measured either.
9.1.3 Picture of wavefunction collapse
I have shown that the picture of the instantaneous motion of particles is distorted
by the Lorentz transformation due to the nonlocality and randomness of motion. In
the following, I will further show that the nonlocal and random collapse evolution
of the state of motion (defined during an infinitesimal time interval around a given
instant) will be influenced more seriously by the Lorentz transformation.
Consider a particle being in a superposition of two Gaussian wavepackets 1√
2
(ψ1+
ψ2) in an inertial frame S . The centers of the two wavepackets are located in x1 and
x2 (x1 < x2), respectively, and the width of each wavepacket is much smaller than
the distance between them. Suppose after an appropriate measurement, this super-
posed state randomly collapses to ψ1 or ψ2 with the same probability 12 , and the
collapse happens in different positions at the same time in S . This means that when
the superposition collapses to the branch ψ1 near position x1, the other branch
ψ2 near position x2 will disappear simultaneously. The simultaneity of wavefunc-
tion collapse ensures that the sum of the probabilities of the particle being in all
branches is 1 at every instant.
According to the picture of RDM of particles, the above collapse process can
be described as follows. Before the collapse of the superposition 1√
2
(ψ1 + ψ2), the
particle jumps between the two branches ψ1 and ψ2 or the two regions near x1 and
x2 in a discontinuous and random way. At each instant, the particle is either in a
position near x1 or in a position near x2, and its probability of being in each region
is the same 12 . This means that at every instant there is always one particle, which
1 Certainly, in these frames there are still correlations and synchronicity between the jumps of the two particles
at different instants. As noted above, however, since these instants are discontinuous and random, such
correlations and synchronicity can hardly be identified.
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spends half the time near x1 and half the time near x2. After the superposition
collapses to one of its branches, e.g. ψ1, the particle only jumps in the region near
x1 in a discontinuous and random way, and its probability of being in this region is
1. This means that at every instant there is always one particle being in a position
inside the region.
Now let us see the picture of the above collapse process in another inertial frame
S ′ with velocity v relative to S . Suppose the superposition 1√
2
(ψ1 + ψ2) collapses
to the branch ψ1 near position x1 at instant t in S . This process contains two events
happening simultaneously in two spatially separated regions. One event is the dis-
appearance of the branch 1√
2
ψ2 near position x2 at instant t, and the other event is
the change of the branch 1√
2
ψ1 to ψ1 happening near position x1 at instant t.2 Ac-
cording to the Lorentz transformation, the times of occurrence of these two events
in S ′ are
t′1 =
t − x1v/c2√
1 − v2/c2
, (9.10)
t′2 =
t − x2v/c2√
1 − v2/c2
. (9.11)
It can be seen that x1 < x2 leads to t′1 > t
′
2. Then during the period between t
′
1 and
t′2, the branch
1√
2
ψ′2 near position x
′
2 has already disappeared, but the branch
1√
2
ψ′1
near position x′1 has not changed to ψ
′
1. This means that at any instant between
t′1 and t
′
2, there is only a non-normalized state
1√
2
ψ′1. According to the picture of
RDM of particles, for a particle being in the state 1√
2
ψ′1, the probability of the
particle being in the branch ψ′1 or in the region near x1 is
1
2 . In other words, at each
instant the particle either exists in a position near x1 or disappears in the whole
space with the same probability 12 . This result indicates that in S
′ the particle only
exists half the time during the period between t′1 and t
′
2. In contrast, the particle
always exists in a certain position in space at any time in S .
Similarly, if the superposition 1√
2
(ψ1 + ψ2) collapses to the branch ψ2 near po-
sition x2 at instant t in S , then in S ′, during the period between t′1 and t
′
2, the
branch 1√
2
ψ′2 near position x
′
2 has already changed to ψ
′
2, while the branch
1√
2
ψ′1
near position x′1 has not disappeared and is still there. Therefore, there is only a
non-normalized state 1√
2
ψ′1 + ψ
′
2 at any instant between t
′
1 and t
′
2. According to the
picture of RDM of particles, this means that during the period between t′1 and t
′
2,
there is more than one particle in S ′: the first particle is in the branch ψ′2 all the
2 Strictly speaking, since the collapse time is finite, these events happen not at a precise instant but during a
very short time, which may be much shorter than the time of light propagating between x1 and x2.
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time, and the second identical particle exists half the time in the branch ψ′1 (and it
exists nowhere in space half the time).
However, although the state of the particle in S ′ is not normalized, the total prob-
ability of finding the particle in the whole space is still 1, not 12 or
3
2 , in the frame.
In other words, although the collapse process is seriously distorted in S ′, the dis-
tortion cannot be measured. The reason is that in S ′ the collapse resulting from
measurement happens at different instants in different positions,3 and the superpo-
sition of the branches in these positions and at these instants is always normalized.
In the following, I will give a more detailed explanation.
As noted above, in S ′ the collapse first happens at t′2 for the branch
1√
2
ψ′2 near
position x′2, and then happens at t
′
1 for the branch
1√
2
ψ′1 near position x
′
1 after a
delay. If we measure the branch 1√
2
ψ′2, then the resulting collapse will influence
the other branch 1√
2
ψ′1 only after a delay of ∆t
′ = |x1−x2 |v/c
2√
1−v2/c2
, while if we measure
the branch 1√
2
ψ′1, then the resulting collapse will influence the other branch
1√
2
ψ′2
in advance by the same time interval ∆t′, and the influence is backward in time.
Now suppose we make a measurement on the branch 1√
2
ψ′2 near position x
′
2 and
detect the particle there (i.e., the state after collapse is ψ′2). Then before the other
branch 1√
2
ψ′1 disappears, which happens after a delay of ∆t
′, we can make a second
measurement on the branch 1√
2
ψ′1 near position x
′
1. It seems that the probability of
finding the particle there is not 0 but 12 , and thus the total probability of finding the
particle in the whole space is great than one and it is possible that we can detect
two particles. However, this is not the case. Although the second measurement
on the branch 1√
2
ψ′1 near position x
′
1 is made later than the first measurement,
it is the second measurement that collapses the superposition 1√
2
(ψ′1 + ψ
′
2) to ψ
′
2
near position x′2; the local branch
1√
2
ψ′1 near position x
′
1 disappears immediately
after the measurement, while the influence of the resulting collapse on the other
branch 1√
2
ψ′2 near position x
′
2 is backward in time and happens before the first
measurement on this branch. Therefore, the second measurement near position x′1
must obtain a null result, and the reason the first measurement detects the particle
near position x′2 is that the superposition already collapses to ψ
′
2 near position x
′
2
before the measurement due to the second measurement.
By a similar analysis, it can also be shown that the measurements on an entan-
gled state of two particles, e.g. ψuϕu + ψdϕd, can only obtain correlated results
in every inertial frame. If a measurement on particle 1 obtains the result u or d,
indicating the state of the particle collapses to the state ψu or ψd after the mea-
3 Concretely speaking, the time order of the collapses happening in different positions in S ′ is connected with
the time order of the corresponding collapses in S by the Lorentz transformation.
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surement, then a second measurement on particle 2 can only obtain the result u or
d, indicating the state of particle 2 collapses to the state ϕu or ϕd after the mea-
surement. Accordingly, although the instantaneous correlation and synchronicity
between the motion of two entangled particles is destroyed in all but one inertial
frame, the distorted picture of quantum entanglement cannot be measured.
9.2 Simultaneity: relative or absolute?
The above analysis clearly demonstrates the apparent conflict between the RDM of
particles and the Lorentz transformation in special relativity. The crux of the matter
lies in the relativity of simultaneity. If simultaneity is relative as manifested by
the Lorentz transformation, then the picture of RDM of particles will be seriously
distorted except in a preferred frame, although the distortion is unobservable in
principle. Only when simultaneity is absolute, can the picture of RDM of particles
be kept perfect in every inertial frame.
Although the relativity of simultaneity has been often regarded as one of the es-
sential concepts of special relativity, it is not necessitated by experimental facts
but a result of the choice of standard synchrony (see, e.g. Reichenbach, 1958;
Gru¨nbaum, 1973).4 As Einstein (1905) already pointed out in his first paper on
special relativity, whether or not two spatially separated events are simultaneous
depends on the adoption of a convention in the framework of special relativity. In
particular, the choice of standard synchrony, which is based on the constancy of
the one-way speed of light and results in the relativity of simultaneity, is only a
convenient convention.5 Strictly speaking, the speed constant c in special relativ-
ity is two-way speed, not one-way speed, and as a result, the general space-time
transformation required by the constancy of the two-way speed of light is not the
Lorentz transformation but the Edwards-Winnie transformation (Edwards, 1963;
Winnie, 1970):
4 For a comprehensive discussion of this issue see Janis (2014) and references therein.
5 The standard synchrony can be described in terms of the following thought experiment. There are two spatial
locations A and B in an inertial frame. Let a light ray, traveling in vacuum, leave A at time t1 (as measured by
a clock at rest there), and arrive at B coincident with the event E at B. Let the ray be instantaneously reflected
back to A, arriving at time t2 (as measured by the same clock at rest there). Then the standard synchrony is
defined by saying that E is simultaneous with the event at A that occurred at time (t1 + t2)/2. This definition
is equivalent to the requirement that the one-way speeds of light are the same on the two segments of its
round-trip journey between A and B. Here one may argue that the definition of standard synchrony makes use
only of the relation of equality (of the one-way speeds of light in different directions), so that simplicity
dictates its choice. However, even in the framework of special relativity, since the equality of the one-way
speeds of light is a convention this choice does not simplify the postulational basis of the theory but only
gives a symbolically simpler representation (Gru¨nbaum, 1973). On the other hand, as I have demonstrated in
the last section, when going beyond the framework of special relativity and considering the RDM of particles
and its collapse evolution, standard synchrony is not simple but complex and it will lead to serious distortions
in describing the dynamical collapse of the wave function.
9.2 Simultaneity: relative or absolute? 157
x′ = η(x − vt), (9.12)
t′ = η[1 + β(k + k′)]t + η[β(k2 − 1) + k − k′]x/c, (9.13)
where x, t and x′, t′ are the coordinates of inertial frames S and S ′, respectively, v
is the velocity of S ′ relative to S , c is the invariant two-way speed of light, β = v/c,
and η = 1/
√
(1 + βk)2 − β2. k and k′ represent the directionality of the one-way
speed of light in S and S ′, respectively, and they satisfy −1 6 k, k′ 6 1. Concretely
speaking, the one-way speeds of light along x and −x directions in S are cx = c1−k
and c−x = c1+k , respectively, and the one-way speeds of light along x
′ and −x′
directions in S ′ are cx′ = c1−k′ and c−x′ =
c
1+k′ , respectively.
If we adopt the convention of standard synchrony, namely assuming that the one-
way speed of light is isotropic and constant in every inertial frame, then k, k′ = 0
and the Edwards-Winnie transformation reduces to the Lorentz transformation,
which leads to the relativity of simultaneity. Alternatively, one can adopt the con-
vention of nonstandard synchrony that makes simultaneity absolute. In order to do
this, one may first synchronize the clocks at different locations in an arbitrary iner-
tial frame by Einstein’s standard synchrony, that is, one may assume the one-way
speed of light is isotropic in this frame, and then let the clocks in other frames be
directly regulated by the clocks in this frame when they coincide in space. The
corresponding space-time transformation can be derived as follows. Let S be the
preferred Lorentz frame in which the one-way speed of light is isotropic, namely,
let k = 0. Then we get
k′ = β(k2 − 1) + k = −β. (9.14)
Since the synchrony convention leads to the absoluteness of simultaneity, we also
have in the Edwards-Winnie transformation:
β(k2 − 1) + k − k′ = 0. (9.15)
Thus the space-time transformation that restores absolute simultaneity is:
x′ =
1√
1 − v2/c2
(x − vt), (9.16)
t′ =
√
1 − v2/c2t, (9.17)
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where x, t are the coordinates of the preferred Lorentz frame S , x′, t′ are the coordi-
nates of another inertial frame S ′, and v is the velocity of this frame relative to the
preferred frame. In S ′, the one-way speed of light along the x′ and −x′ direction is
cx′ = c
2
c−v and c−x′ =
c2
c+v , respectively.
The above analysis demonstrates the possibility of keeping simultaneity absolute
within the framework of special relativity. One can adopt the convention of stan-
dard synchrony that leads to the relativity of simultaneity, and one can also adopt
the convention of nonstandard synchrony that restores the absoluteness of simul-
taneity. It is often thought that if there is a causal influence connecting two distinct
events, then the claim that they are not simultaneous will have a nonconventional
basis (Reichenbach, 1958; Gru¨nbaum, 1973; Janis, 2014). In particular, if there is
an arbitrarily fast causal influence connecting two spacelike separated events, then
these two events will be simultaneous and simultaneity will be nonconventional.
In my opinion, this view is problematic, since it depends on a debatable concept
of causality. It can be argued that a causal influence may be instantaneous and its
transmission requires no time, and moreover, a cause may not precede its effect
either, namely there may exist retrocausality (Price, 2008; Faye, 2015; Price and
Wharton, 2016).6 Then even if there is a causal influence connecting two distinct
events, one cannot make sure that these two events are not simultaneous, and one
event must precede the other event. In the final analysis, it seems that one still needs
a certain way of synchrony to determine the transmission speed and direction of a
causal influence.
Although the concept of causality may not provide a nonconventional basis of si-
multaneity, some other requirements may do. For example, if it is required that the
number of particles is constant in every inertial frame, then the RDM of particles
and its collapse evolution will provide a nonconventional basis for the absoluteness
of simultaneity. As I have shown in the last section, for the RDM of particles, if
adopting standard synchrony that leads to the relativity of simultaneity, then even
if there is always one particle in a preferred frame, there may exist two particles at
some instants in other inertial frames. Similarly, during the collapse evolution of
the RDM of particles, if adopting standard synchrony that leads to the relativity of
simultaneity, then even if there is always one particle in the preferred frame, there
may exist two particles or no particles at some instants in other inertial frames.
Therefore, if the number of particles is required to be constant in every inertial
frame, then the existence of RDM of particles and its collapse evolution will re-
quire that simultaneity is absolute, thus providing a nonconventional basis for the
absoluteness of simultaneity. However, one may still object that this requirement
is not necessary. For instance, one may think the picture of RDM of particles is
6 In my view, the time order of two events, causally related or otherwise, is not necessarily invariant, and it
may be physically meaningless.
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only real in the preferred frame, and the appearance of the two-particle picture
etc in other inertial frames is a mere illusion. Then the nonconventional basis of
simultaneity provided by the requirement is also debatable.
In any case, whether simultaneity is relative or absolute, there is always a pre-
ferred Lorentz frame for the RDM of particles and its collapse evolution in the
relativistic domain. If the invariance of the one-way speed of light or standard syn-
chrony is assumed, then the collapse evolution of the RDM of particles will not
happen simultaneously at different locations in space in all but one Lorentz frame,
and thus it will single out a preferred Lorentz frame, in which the collapse of the
wave function happens simultaneously at different locations in space. Alternatively,
if restoring absolute simultaneity and assuming the collapse of the wave function
happens simultaneously at different locations in space in every inertial frame, then
the one-way speed of light will be not isotropic in all but one Lorentz frame, and
thus the non-invariance of the one-way speed of light will also single out a pre-
ferred Lorentz frame, in which the one-way speed of light is isotropic. In the final
analysis, the existence of a preferred Lorentz frame is an inevitable result of the
combination of the constancy of the two-way speed of light and the existence of
RDM of particles and its collapse evolution. Therefore, no matter which assump-
tion is adopted, the preferred Lorentz frame can always be defined as the Lorentz
frame in which the one-way speed of light is isotropic and the collapse of the wave
function happens simultaneously in the whole space.
9.3 Collapse dynamics and preferred Lorentz frame
If a preferred Lorentz frame as defined above indeed exists, then it will be natural
to ask whether the frame can be detected. It is usually thought that the answer to
this question is negative (see, e.g. Maudlin, 2002). For example, although Bohm’s
theory and certain collapse theories assume the existence of a preferred Lorentz
frame, the frame is undetectable in these theories. In this section, I will first give
a few arguments supporting the detectability of the preferred Lorentz frame, and
then show that the frame can be detected in my model of energy-conserved wave-
function collapse.
First of all, it is worth noting that the detectability of the preferred Lorentz frame
is not prohibited. It is usually thought that in order to detect the preferred Lorentz
frame one must be able to measure the collapse of an individual wave function.
If the collapse of an individual wave function can be measured, then when adopt-
ing standard synchrony one will be able to detect the preferred Lorentz frame by
measuring the time order of the collapses of the wave function happening at dif-
ferent locations in space. Only in the preferred Lorentz frame, the collapse of the
wave function happens simultaneously at different locations in space. But the mea-
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surability of the collapse of an individual wave function will lead to superluminal
signaling and thus is prohibited by the no-signaling theorem of quantum mechan-
ics. As a result, the preferred Lorentz frame cannot be detected.
There are two loopholes in this argument. One loophole is that the no-signaling
theorem may be not universally true. It has been argued that when the measur-
ing device is replaced with a conscious observer superluminal signaling may be
achieved in principle in collapse theories (Squires, 1992; Gao, 2004, 2014d). The
other loophole is that there are other possible methods of detecting the preferred
Lorentz frame, which do not depend on the measurability of individual wavefunc-
tion collapse and the existence of superluminal signaling (see below). Therefore,
even if the no-signaling theorem is universally true, it does not prohibit the de-
tectability of the preferred Lorentz frame.
Next, the detectability of the preferred Lorentz frame is also supported by one
of our basic scientific beliefs, the so-called minimum ontology. It says that if a cer-
tain thing cannot be detected in principle, then it does not exist, whereas if a cer-
tain thing does exist, then it can be detected. According to this view, the preferred
Lorentz frame should be detectable in principle if it exists. Imagine that there ex-
ists some kind of fundamental particles around us, but they cannot be detected in
principle. How unbelievable this is!
However, it seems that there are two common objections to this view. First, one
might refute this view by resorting to the fact that the objects beyond the event hori-
zon of an observer cannot be detected by the observer. My answer is that although
these objects cannot be detected by the observer, they can be detected locally by
other observers. Second, one may refute this view based on the fact that an un-
known quantum state cannot be measured. This objection seems to have a certain
force, and presumably it makes some people believe in the undetectability of the
preferred Lorentz frame. But this objection is arguably invalid too. To begin with, a
preferred Lorentz frame is a classical system, not a quantum system, and its state of
motion is described by a definite velocity, not by a superposed quantum state, while
the unknown velocity of a classical system can be measured. Next, although the un-
known state of a quantum system cannot be measured, the other definite properties
of the system, such as its mass and charge, can still be detected by gravitational
and electromagnetic interactions. Moreover, an unknown quantum state being not
measurable does not mean that a known quantum state is not measurable either. A
known quantum state of a single system can be measured by a series of protective
measurements, and even an unknown nondegenerate energy eigenstate can also be
measured by protective measurements (Aharonov and Vaidman, 1993; Aharonov,
Anandan and Vaidman, 1993; Gao, 2014a). Thus the fact that an unknown quantum
cannot be measured does not refute the the minimum ontology.
In the following, I will demonstrate that the preferred Lorentz frame can be de-
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tected by measuring the (average) collapse time of the wave function in my model
of energy-conserved wavefunction collapse. According to the model, the collapse
time formula for a superposition of energy eigenstates is
τc ≈ ~
2
tP(∆E)2
, (9.18)
where tP is the Planck time, ∆E is the energy uncertainty of the state. It is assumed
here that this collapse time formula is still valid in a Lorentz frame in the rela-
tivistic domain. This assumption seems reasonable, as the collapse time formula
already contains the speed of light c via the Planck time tP.7 Since the formula is
not relativistically invariant, its relativistically invariant form must contain a term
relating to the velocity of the experimental frame relative to a preferred Lorentz
frame. In other words, there must exist a preferred Lorentz frame according to the
collapse model.
The preferred Lorentz frame, denoted by S 0, can be defined as the Lorentz frame
in which the above formula is valid. Then in another Lorentz frame the collapse
time will depend on the velocity of the frame relative to S 0. According to the
Lorentz transformation, in a Lorentz frame S ′ with velocity v relative to the frame
S 0 we have
τ′c =
1√
1 − v2/c2
τc, (9.19)
t′P =
1√
1 − v2/c2
tP, (9.20)
∆E′ ≈ 1 − v/c√
1 − v2/c2
∆E. (9.21)
Here I only consider the situation where the particle has very high energy, namely
E ≈ pc, and thus Eq. (9.21) holds. Further, I assume that the Planck time tP is the
minimum time (i.e., the duration of a discrete instant) in the preferred Lorentz
frame, and in another Lorentz frame the minimum time is connected with the
Planck time tP by the time dilation formula required by special relativity. Then
by inputting these equations into Eq. (9.18), we can obtain the relativistic collapse
time formula for an arbitrary experimental frame with velocity v relative to the
frame S 0:
7 In contrast, the collapse theories in which the collapse time formula does not contain c are not directly
applicable in the relativistic domain.
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τc ≈ (1 + v/c)−2 ~
2
tP(∆E)2
. (9.22)
This formula contains a factor relating to the velocity of the experimental frame
relative to the preferred Lorentz frame.8
Therefore, according to my energy-conserved collapse model, the collapse time
of a given wave function will differ in different Lorentz frames. For example, con-
sidering the maximum difference of the speed of revolution of the Earth with re-
spect to the Sun is ∆v ≈ 60km/s, the maximum difference of the collapse times
measured at different times (e.g., spring and fall) on the Earth will be ∆τc ≈
4 × 10−4τc. As a result, the collapse dynamics will single out a preferred Lorentz
frame in which the collapse time of a given wave function is longest, and the frame
can also be determined by comparing the collapse times of a given wave function
in different Lorentz frames.9 It may be expected that this preferred Lorentz frame
is the CMB-frame in which the cosmic background radiation is isotropic, and the
one-way speed of light is also isotropic.
9.4 Particle ontology for quantum field theory
It is well known that although the combination of linear quantum dynamics and
special relativity has been obtained in quantum field theory, it is still a controver-
sial issue how to understand the ontology of the theory. Does quantum field theory
really describe a world composed of physical fields? Or it describes a world com-
posed of particles or other new entities? I have argued in the previous chapters
that the onology of (nonrelativistic) quantum mechanics is particles which undergo
random discontinuous motion in our three-dimensional space. If this is true, then
it seems that the ontology of (relativistic) quantum field theory will be still these
particles, since the Lorentz transformation in special relativity does not change the
existent form of particles as shown in the previous sections. In the following, I will
give a more detailed argument supporting this answer.
The picture of particles appears from my analysis of the charge density of a
quantum system such as an electron, which is given in Chapter 6. First, I argue
with the help of protective measurements that a quantum system has a well-defined
8 Note that in order to be relativistic invariant the nonrelativistic equation of collapse dynamics, Eq. (8.28),
must contain a velocity term as follows: Pi(t + tP) = Pi(t) + f (v) ∆EEP [δEsEi − Pi(t)], where f (v) ≈ 1 + v/c
when E ≈ pc, and v is the velocity of the experimental frame relative to the preferred Lorentz frame. The
above relativistic collapse time formula can be derived from this relativistic equation of collapse dynamics.
9 In general, we can measure the collapse time of a wave function by measuring the change of the interference
between the corresponding collapse branches for an ensemble of identically prepared systems. The main
technical difficulty of realizing such a measurement is to exclude the influence of environmental decoherence
(cf. Marshall et al, 2003).
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charge distribution in space, in exactly the same sense that a classical system has
a well-defined charge distribution in space. Moreover, protective measurements
also show that the charge of a quantum system such as an electron is distributed
throughout space, and the charge density in each position is equal to the modulus
squared of the wave function of the system there multiplied by the charge of the
system. Second, I argue that the charge distribution of an electron is effective, that
is, it is formed by the ergodic motion of a localized particle with the total charge
of the electron. If the charge distribution of an electron is continuous and exists
throughout space at the same time, then any two parts of the distribution, like two
electrons, will arguably have electrostatic interaction too. The existence of such
electrostatic self-interaction for an electron not only contradicts the superposition
principle of quantum mechanics but also is incompatible with experimental obser-
vations. In contrast, if the charge distribution of an electron is effective, namely
if there is only a localized particle at every instant, then it is understandable that
there exists no such electrostatic self-interaction for the effective charge distribu-
tion formed by the motion of the particle. This is consistent with the superposition
principle of quantum mechanics and experimental observations.
Now I will argue that the above analysis in quantum mechanics also holds true
in quantum field theory. Consider a quantum system in the low-energy regime such
as the electron being in the ground state in a Hydrogen atom which is at rest in a
Lorentz frame. First, it can be argued that the electron still has a charge distribution
throughout the whole space according to quantum field theory.10 The reason is
that the principle of protective measurements is still valid in quantum field theory;
when the electron is measured by a protective measurement during which its state
is not changed, the measurement result is still the expectation value of the measured
observable in the measured state. Then quantum field theory also predicts that the
charge of the electron is distributed throughout space, although the charge density
in each position is somewhat different from that predicted by quantum mechanics
due to the correction from quantum field theory. This result is also guaranteed by an
analysis of experimental observations. Since the predictions of quantum mechanics
are consistent with experimental observations to a very high precision in the low-
energy regime, a series of actual protective measurements will also confirm that
the charge of the electron is distributed throughout space.
Next, it can be argued that the above analysis of the physical origin of the charge
distribution of an electron is still valid in quantum field theory. The reason is that
the superposition principle also holds true in quantum field theory. Then if the
charge distribution of an electron is continuous and exists throughout space at the
10 It is interesting to note that in relativistic quantum mechanics and quantum field theory there is already the
charge density interpretation for charged particles such as electrons, although it is not clear whether it means
what it should mean.
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same time, the resulting electrostatic self-interaction of the distribution will con-
tradict the superposition principle of quantum field theory. Moreover, the resulting
electrostatic self-interaction of the distribution will be incompatible with experi-
mental observations too. Therefore, the charge distribution of an electron is still
formed by the ergodic motion of a localized particle with the total charge of the
electron. This means that an electron is still a particle in the low-energy regime in
the relativistic domain.
Now consider a quantum system in the high-energy regime such as an electron
moving close to the speed of light in a Lorentz frame. This electron can be gen-
erated by a Lorentz boost from an electron being at rest in another Lorentz frame
in the low-energy regime. As I have shown in the previous sections, the Lorentz
transformation does not change the existent form of particles, although it distorts
the picture of motion when assuming the relativity of simultaneity. Thus an elec-
tron is still a particle in the high-energy regime in the relativistic domain.
Although the ontology of (relativistic) quantum field theory is still particles, the
theory does introduce a pair of new processes for the motion of particles, which
are the creation and annihilation of particles. In quantum mechanics, the number
of particles is conserved and the existence of a particle is eternal. In quantum field
theory, however, a particle can be created and annihilated. This will lead to a new
form of RDM of particles. For example, there will be superpositions of states with
different particle numbers, such as α |0〉+β |1〉. In this superposition, a particle only
exists in the branch |1〉, which, according to the picture of RDM of particles, means
that the particle does not exist in the whole continuous time flow, but only exists
part the time at certain discontinuous and random instants.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the above picture of particles is independent
of whether the state of motion of particles can be localized or not. For example,
the fact that there are no Lorentz invariant localized states poses no threat to the
existence of such particles. According to the picture of RDM of particles, the nature
of a particle lies in that it exists only in one position at an instant, and the existence
of such a particle at an instant is at a deeper level than its state of motion which is
defined during an infinitesimal time interval around the instant. Moreover, whether
the state of motion of a particle can be localized or not is determined by the laws of
motion, and it does not depend on the existence of the particles defined in the above
picture. Similarly, it seems that whether there exist local and total number operators
in quantum field theory does not poses a threat to the picture of RDM of particles
either. In my view, the current particle versus field debate in the philosophy of
quantum field theory (see, e.g. Fraser, 2008; Baker, 2009; Bain, 2011) may be
mostly irrelevant, as the definition of particle there is essentially different from the
definition of particle given here. But a more careful analysis is still needed and will
be given in future work.
Epilogue
In this book, I have argued that the wave function in quantum mechanics is real,
and it represents the state of random discontinuous motion (RDM) of particles in
three-dimensional space. Moreover, this picture of quantum ontology is complete
in accounting for our definite experience, but it requires that the quantum dynamics
be revised to include a stochastic, nonlinear evolution term resulting from the RDM
of particles. Obviously I took a road less traveled by researchers in the foundations
of quantum mechanics. In order to convince more readers that this road is deserved
to be taken, I will review the main results of this book and think about them in a
broader context in the epilogue.
The starting point of my road is protective measurements (Chapter 1). In 1993,
this new method of measurement in quantum mechanics was discovered (Aharonov
and Vaidman, 1993; Aharonov, Anandan and Vaidman, 1993). Distinct from con-
ventional projective measurements, protective measurement is a method for mea-
suring the expectation value of an observable on a single quantum system. By a
series of protective measurements, one can even measure the wave function of
a single quantum system. As thus, besides the Born rule for projective measure-
ments, protective measurements provide another more direct connection between
the wave function and results of measurements, which is not probabilistic but def-
inite. It can be expected that a definite connection between the wave function and
results of measurements is more important for understanding the meaning of the
wave function and searching for the ontology of quantum mechanics. However, it
seems that this connection provided by protective measurements is still less well-
known today, and its significance has not been fully realized by most researchers
either.
The first stop on my road is the reality of the wave function (Chapter 4). It is
correct to say that protective measurements alone do not imply the reality of the
wave function. An additional connection between the state of reality and results
of measurements is needed. This connection is provided by the second assumption
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of the ontological models framework (Spekkens, 2005; Harrigan and Spekkens,
2010; Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph, 2012), which says that when a measurement is
performed, the behaviour of the measuring device is only determined by the ontic
state of the system, along with the physical properties of the measuring device.
For protective measurements, this means that the ontic state of a physical system
determines the definite result of a protective measurement on the system. When
combined with this connection between the state of reality and results of mea-
surements, protective measurements will imply the reality of the wave function.
Protective measurements can measure the wave function of a single quantum sys-
tem, while the measurement results, which are represented by the wave function,
are determined by the ontic state of the system. Therefore, the wave function is
also real, representing a physical property of a single quantum system.
In fact, protective measurements can provide a stronger argument for the reality
of the wave function, which may even persuade people who assume an anti-realist
view of quantum mechanics. Quantum mechanics, like classical mechanics, is also
composed of a mathematical formalism and a rule of connection between the for-
malism and our experience at its core. Then why assume a realist view of classical
mechanics but assume an anti-realist view of quantum mechanics? Presumaly the
main reason is that the connection between quantum mechanics and experience by
the Born rule is probabilistic, while the connection between classical mechanics
and experience is definite. But the existence of protective measurements in quan-
tum mechanics makes this reason invalid; it also provides a definite connection
between quantum mechanics and experience.
On the other hand, it is arguable that a universal approach is needed to investi-
gate the ontological content of all physical theories. The familiar ontology of clas-
sical mechanics should not be given a priori either, but be derived, like any other
physical theories, through the universal approach. Since a physical theory already
specifies a connection between its mathematical formalism and our experience,
we only need another connection between the state of reality and our experience
to derive its ontological content.11 As noted above, the second assumption of the
ontological models framework just provides such a connection. Alternatively, the
ontological content of a physical theory may also be directly derived from a rea-
sonable criterion of reality. The essential point here is not that these approaches
must be valid and the ontological content thus derived must be true and complete,
but that if they can be applied to classical mechanics and macroscopic objects to
derive the anticipant classical ontology, then they should also be applied to quan-
11 This approach provides a strong support for the realist conception of scientific progress, which asserts that
later science improves on earlier science by approaching closer to the truth. By this approach, if a physical
theory is more successful in its empirical predictions, then it is also more accurate in depicting reality, and
thus it is closer to truth. I will analyze the implications of this approach for the philosophy of science in
detail in future work.
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tum mechanics and microscopic objects to derive the quantum ontology, no matter
how unexpected and strange it is.
In a word, due to the existence of protective measurements, quantum mechanics
is not different from classical mechanics when considering its reality. If we as-
sume a realist view of classical mechanics, we should also assume a realist view
of quantum mechanics for consistency. In particular, the wave function in quantum
mechanics, like the trajectory function in classical mechanics, is also real, repre-
senting the physical state of a single quantum system (although the representation
may be incomplete).
The second stop on my road is a new ontological interpretation of the wave func-
tion in terms of RDM of particles (Chapters 6,7). If the wave function in quantum
mechanics represents the physical state of a single system, then what physical state
does the wave function represent? The answer to this question will lead us to the
ontology of quantum mechanics. The most popular position among philosophers of
physics and metaphysicians seems to be wave function realism, according to which
the wave function represents a real, physical field on configuration space (Albert,
1996, 2013). This is the simplest and most straightforward way of thinking about
the wave function realistically. However, it is well known that this interpretation
is plagued by the problem of how to explain our three-dimensional impressions,
while a satisfying solution to this problem seems still missing (see Albert, 2015 for
a recent attempt). This motivates a few authors to suggest that the wave function
represents a property of particles in three-dimensional space (e.g. Monton, 2013;
Lewis, 2013, 2016), although they do not give a concrete ontological picture of
these particles in space and time and specify what property the property is.
In some sense, my idea of RDM of particles can be regarded as a further devel-
opment of this suggestion, although it already came to my mind more than 20 years
ago (Gao, 1993). The picture of RDM of particles clearly shows that interpreting
the multi-dimensional wave function as representing the state of motion of parti-
cles in three-dimensional space is possible. In particular, the RDM of particles can
explain quantum entanglement in a more vivid way, which thus reduces the force
of the main motivation to adopt wave function realism. In any case, this new inter-
pretion of the wave function in terms of RDM of particles provides an alternative
to wave function realism.
Furthermore, the picture of RDM of particles has more explanatory power than
wave function realism. It can readily explain our three-dimensional impressions,
which is still a difficult task for wave function realism. Moreover, it can also explain
many fundamental features of the Schro¨dinger equation that governs the evolution
of the wave function, which seem puzzling for wave function realism. For example,
the existence of N particles in three-dimensional space for an N-body quantum
system can readily explain why there are N mass parameters that are needed to
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describe the system, and why each mass parameter is only correlated with each
group of three coordinates of the 3N coordinates on the configuration space of the
system, and why each group of three coordinates of the 3N coordinates transforms
under the Galilean transformation between two inertial coordinate systems in our
three-dimensional space, etc.
Finally, it can be expected that the difference between particle ontology and field
ontology may also result in different predictions that may be tested with experi-
ments, and thus the two interpretations of the wave function can be distinguished
in physics. The main difference between a particle and a field is that a particle ex-
ists only in one position in space at each instant, while a field exists throughout the
whole space at each instant. It is a fundamental assumption in physics that a physi-
cal entity being at an instant has no interactions with itself being at another instant,
while two physical entities may have interactions with each other. Therefore, a par-
ticle at an instant has no interactions with the particle at another instant, while any
two parts of a field in space (as two local physical entities) may have interactions
with each other. In particular, if a field is massive and charged, then any two parts
of the field in space will have gravitational and electromagnetic interactions with
each other.
Now consider a charged one-body quantum system such as an electron being
in a superposition of two separated wavepackets. Since each wavepacket of the
electron has gravitational and electromagnetic interactions with another electron,
it is arguable that it is also massive and charged. But some people may be not con-
vinced by this heuristic argument. Why? A common reason, I guess, may be that if
each wavepacket of the electron is massive and charged, then the two wavepackets
will have gravitational and electromagnetic interactions with each other, but this
is inconsistent with the superposition principle of quantum mechanics and exper-
imental observations. But this reason is not valid. For if each wavepacket of the
electron is not massive and charged, then how can it have gravitational and elec-
tromagnetic interactions with another electron? Rather, there should be a deeper
reason why there are no interactions between the two wavepackets of the electron.
Besides the above heuristic argument, protective measurements provide a more
convincing argument for the existence of the mass and charge distributions of an
electron in space. This can be considered as a further implication of protective
measurements for the ontological meaning of the wave function. As I have argued
above, when combined with a reasonable connection between the state of real-
ity and results of measurements, protective measurements imply the reality of the
wave function. For example, for an electron whose wave function is ψ(x) at a given
instant, we can measure the density |ψ(x)|2 in each position x in space by a protec-
tive measurement, and by the connection the density |ψ(x)|2 is a physical property
of the electron. Then, what density is the density |ψ(x)|2? Since a measurement
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must always be realized by a certain physical interaction between the measured
system and the measuring device, the density must be, in the first place, the den-
sity of a certain interacting charge. For instance, if the measurement is realized
by an electrostatic interaction between the electron and the measuring device, then
the density multiplied by the charge of the electron, namely −|ψ(x)|2e, will be the
charge density of the electron in position x. This means that an electron has mass
and charge distributions throughout space, and two separated wavepackets of an
electron are both massive and charged.
Let us now see how the difference between particle ontology and field ontology
may result in different empirical predictions. According to the above analysis, if
the wave function of an electron represents the state of RDM of a particle, then
although two separated wavepackets of an electron are massive and charged, they
will have no interactions with each other. This is consistent with the superposi-
tion principle of quantum mechanics and experimental observations. On the other
hand, if the wave function of an electron represents a physical field, then since
this field is massive and charged, any two parts of the field will have gravitational
and electromagnetic interactions with each other, which means that two separated
wavepackets of an electron will have gravitational and electromagnetic interactions
with each other. This is inconsistent with the superposition principle of quantum
mechanics and experimental observations. Therefore, it is arguable that the inter-
pretation of the wave function in terms of motion of particles, rather than wave
function realism, is supported by quantum mechanics and experience.
The third stop on my road is the reality of wavefunction collapse (Chapter 8).
Admitting the validity of the above interpretation of the wave function in terms of
RDM of particles, the next question is whether this picture of quantum ontology is
complete in accounting for our definite conscious experiences. This requires us to
further analyze the measurement problem. The conventional research program is to
first find a solution to the measurement problem, such as Bohm’s theory or Everett’s
theory or collapse theories, and then try to make sense of the wave function in
the solution. By such an approach, the meaning of the wave function will have
no implications for solving the measurement problem. However, this approach is
arguably problematic. The reason is that the meaning of the wave function (in the
Schro¨dinger equation) is independent of how to solve the measurement problem,
while the solution to the measurement problem relies on the meaning of the wave
function. For example, if assuming the operationalist ψ-epistemic view, then the
measurement problem will be dissolved.
My point is that even when assuming the ψ-ontic view, the ontological meaning
of the wave function also has implications for solving the measurement problem.
In particular, it can be argued that the RDM of particles not only provides an on-
tological interpretation of the wave function, but also provides more resources for
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solving the measurement problem. The key is to notice that the modulus squared
of the wave function of an electron not only gives the probability density that the
electron is found in a certain position (according to the Born rule), but also gives
the probability density that the electron as a particle is in the position according to
the picture of RDM of particles. This should not be simply regarded as a coinci-
dence, but be considered as a strong evidence for the existence of a deep connec-
tion. In other words, it is natural to assume that the origin of the Born probabilities
is the RDM of particles. If this assumption turns out to be true, then it will have
significant implications for solving the measurement problem. Since the existing
solutions to the measurement problem, including Bohm’s theory, Everett’s theory
and collapse theories, have not taken this assumption into account, they need to be
reformulated in order to be consistent with the assumption. The reformulation may
be easier for some, but more difficult or even impossible for others.
In order that the Born probabilities originate from the RDM of particles, there
must exist an additional random dynamics besides the linear, deterministic dynam-
ics, which results from the RDM of particles and results in the appearance of a
random measurement result. Since Everett’s theory only admits the linear, deter-
ministic dynamics, it cannot accommodate the above assumption. In other words,
the Born probabilities cannot originate from the RDM of particles in Everett’s the-
ory. In Bohm’s theory, since the motion of the Bohmian particles is not ergodic,
the Born probabilities cannot wholly originate from the RDM of particles either,
and they must also depend on the the initial probability distribution of the posi-
tions of the Bohmian particles. Moreover, if there is an additional random dynam-
ics responsible for generating the measurement result, then the guiding equation,
which is added for the same purpose, will be redundant. Last but not least, the
existence of RDM of particles itself already reduces the necessity of introducing
additional Bohmian particles in the first place; otherwise the theory will be clumsy
and unnatural, since an electron will contain two particles, one undergoing random
discontinuous motion, and the other undergoing deterministic continuous motion.
Compared with Bohm’s theory and Everett’s theory, collapse theories seem to be
the most appropriate framework to accommodate the above assumption about the
origin of the Born probabilities, since a random dynamics responsible for generat-
ing the measurement result is just what these theories need. Moreover, the RDM
of particles may also provide more resources for formulating a dynamical collapse
theory, e.g. it already provides an appropriate noise source to collapse the wave
function. Certainly, the resulting theory will be different from the existing collapse
theories, in which the Born probabilities do not originate from the RDM of parti-
cles. A concrete model of wavefunction collapse in terms of RDM of particles has
been given in Section 8.4.
Besides this analysis of the measurement problem in terms of RDM of parti-
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cles, I have also given a new formulation of the measurement problem which lays
more stress on psychophysical connection, and analyzed whether the major solu-
tions to the problem can satisfy the restriction of psychophysical supervenience
and thus can indeed solve the measurement problem. The analysis also favors col-
lapse theories and disfavors Bohm’s theory and Everett’s theory. In my view, the
measurement problem is essentially the determinate-experience problem (Barrett,
1999), and the underlying ontology (e.g. RDM of particles) and the psychophysical
connection are the two extremes that should be understood fully in the first place
when trying to solve the problem; the underlying ontology is at the lowest level,
and the psychophysical connection is at the highest level.
These are the three main results obtained in this book. In addition to them, I
have also shown that the free Schro¨dinger equation can be derived in a rigorous way
based on spacetime translation invariance and relativistic invariance. This may help
explain the origin of the wave function in quantum mechanics. Moreover, I have
also given a primary analysis of how special relativity may influence the suggested
ontology of quantum mechanics, as well as how the quantum ontology may influ-
ence special relativity reciprocally. Although these analyses are more speculative,
they may inspire other researchers to find the right road.
Ninety years ago, Schro¨dinger wrote in his second paper on wave mechanics:
... it has even been doubted whether what goes on in an atom can be described within a
scheme of space and time. From a philosophical standpoint, I should consider a conclusive
decision in this sense as equivalent to a complete surrender. For we cannot really avoid our
thinking in terms of space and time, and what we cannot comprehend within it, we cannot
comprehend at all. (Moore, 1989, p.208)
However, the meaning of the wave function has not been fully understood until
today, and we are still searching for the ontology of quantum mechanics. Hopefully
the suggested picture of quantum ontology, namely the RDM of particles in space
and time, may provide a satisfying description of what goes on in an atom and
further help us understand the mysterious quantum world.
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